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This thesis is only a fragment of the project which I 
originally planned. I had thought to write a history of the 
several jurisdictions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
excepting, because of its magnitude, that at Common Law. After 
acquainting myself more closely with the source material it be­
came obvious that I could not, even over the course of many 
years, hope to write a serious history of so many jurisdictions 
in a compendious way. It also became apparent that no investi­
gation had previously been made of the separation from the Sup­
reme Court of its various jurisdictions and departments. With 
a sense of compromise I have restricted my study to this, seek­
ing to explain how the specialist units of the Court came to 
take their place and at the same time to sketch what their 
utility and functions were. I have further limited the history 
to what I have loosely described as the "colonial” period by 
which, for the purpose of the thesis, I contemplate the period 
from 1788 to Federation not, as is more strictly correct in 
nomenclature, the period prior to responsible government.
Any student of Australian legal history cannot commence to 
consider the subject without incurring a considerable indebted­
ness to the basic research of Dr. C. H. Currey in his "Chapters 
on the Legal History of NSW". This regrettably unpublished work 
is like a lodestar in a sky of utter darkness. All other infor­
mation must be wrested from a formidable array of primary docu­
ments which, for the greater part, afford no catalogue assistance. 
I mention this, not to luxuriate in the difficulties which have 
confronted me, but to emphasize that the likelihood of error is 
unavoidably increased. While I have endeavoured to verify the 
whole of my writing, it is inevitable that some factual defi­
ciencies must occur. It is only by taking courage to venture 
the project with its mistakes that I can attempt to make some­
what easier the path to further research in this much neglected
field.
I have received most generous assistance from the Librarians 
of the Mitchell, Parliamentary and Law School Libraries, which I 
wish thus inadequately to acknowledge.
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rTHE JURISDICTIONS OF THE COLONIAL SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court of New South Wales when established in
\1824 was not the Colony’s first Court, nor yet its first Sup­
reme Court. It was, however, the first really comprehensive 
judicial tribunal applying British justice rather than the law 
of expediency.
On the foundation of the Colony in 1788, a Criminal Court
z,was constituted under the authority of 27 Geo. Ill c. 2. This 
Court was composed of a military officer, styled Deputy Judge-
3Advocate, presiding over six military or naval officers selec­
ted by roster and summoned by precept from the Governor. The 
practice of the Court was summary in the extreme and its integ­
rity was of the weakest order, many of the officers showing 
patent bias or intolerance at being called upon to join the
5tribunal. This virtual 'Judge and Jury' continued a notor­
iously inefficient existence until replaced by the Supreme 
Court in 1824. There also was provision made by the Letters 
Patent of 2nd. April, 1787, (the "First Charter of Justice")6
7for a Civil Court to be established, but no enabling statute
had ever been passed. The constitutionality of the Civil Court
which was erected in the Colony on the authority of the Charter
8has consequently been doubted. This Court was also for many 
years presided over by the Judge-Advocate and consisted of two 
"fit and proper persons" selected from the fairly limited free 
population. From this Court an appeal lay to the Governor in 
person.
9Ellis Bent, who came to Sydney as Judge-Advocate in 1810, 
was a trained lawyer of remarkable aptitude for his office.
He it was who particularly proposed the establishment of a 
Supreme Court and the separation of law from military influence. 
Speaking of the inadequacy of-the Civil Court to deal with the
needs of the Colony in its advancement beyond a penal settle­
ment, he said: "the civil functions ... have become extremely
burdensome, important, and of great responsibility, embracing 
even more than the usual duties of a Judge, and requiring a 
greater knowledge both of the theory and practice of the law 
than it would become me even to think that I possess"1.0 Of the 
Criminal Court he protested more strongly: "It seems that the
Governor considers me merely as a Subaltern Officer, a mere 
cypher, a person sent out simply to execute his commands as 
one of his staff13... I never did or could consider my appoint­
ment a military one ... such a supposition is incompatible
\zwith the due performance of its functions".
In England it was decided by 1814 to remodel the civil 
jurisprudence of New South Wales and Letters Patent of the 4th. 
February (the "Second Charter of Justice") made provision for 
a new hierarchy of Courts? The old Civil Court remained in 
essence but was called the Governor's Court. It was empowered 
to deal with actions involving less than £50. Of higher order 
was an entirely new civil Court called the Supreme Court and 
having jurisdiction in matters where more than £50 was in issue. 
The Governor, "assisted" by the Judge-Advocate, acted as a High 
Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court was the first in the 
Colony's history to be under the superintendence of a Judge - 
an extraordinary anomaly, as the Judge's precedence and status
t ifwere subordinate to that of the Judge-Advocate.
The whole system was still obviously unsatisfactory and 
the impression made upon Commissioner J. T. Bigge, coupled 
with recommendations by Judge-Advocate Wylde and Mr. Justice 
Field, led to the Commissioner's lending support enough to 
persuade the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the need 
for wider reform. This found its result in the enactment of 
4 Geo. IV c. 96l5which, inter alia, authorized the King to 
issue Letters Patent for the constitution of new Courts of 
Judicature. The letters were issued on 13th. October, 1823 
(the Third Charter of Justice) and set up a Supreme Court in 
these terms: "Now know ye that we upon full consideration of
the premises and of our especial Grace certain knowledge and 
mere motion have in pursuance of the said Act of Parliament 
thought fit to grant direct ordain and appoint that there 
shall be within that part of our Colony of New South Wales 
situate in the Island of New Holland a Court which shall be 
called the Supreme Court of New South Wales and we do hereby 
create direct and constitute the said Supreme Court of New S.
Wales to be a Court of Record”1.6
The Supreme Court was a single Court. When the need for 
a further Judge to assist Chief Justice Forbes was under con­
sideration it was expressly stated that, as the Act contem­
plated "only one Court ... they (the Judges) would not so 
divide themselves, as to hold two Courts concurrently at the 
same time”1.7 On this single Court a wide jurisdiction was con­
ferred. The Act gave it cognizance of "all Pleas Civil Cri­
minal or Mixed in all Cases whatsoever, as fully and amply ...
as His Majesty's Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and
18Exchequer at Westminster" . It was also contemplated by the
Act that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to hear and
determine offences committed at sea including treason, piracy,
19felony, robbery, murder and conspiracy, and to adjudicate at 
the trial of crimes and misdemeanours^0 The Court was to have 
an Equitable jurisdiction and an Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 
the latter being much amplified by the Letters Patent. A pro­
vision giving a limited jurisdiction in Insolvency was in- 
¿2. -eluded. The Letters Patent further gave authority to appoint 
"Guardians and Keepers" of Infants and of "Natural Fools".
Only in Matrimonial Causes was jurisdiction deliberately with­
held from the Colonial Court.
The early Judges of the Court knew of no Equity Court, 
Insolvency, Probate or other jurisdictional Courts there was 
a single tribunal in which all branches of law were entertained. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court 
might at first sight appear to have been dismembered; this 
being emphasized even more strongly in recent times by the 
practice of having the Courts constituting separate jurisdictions
3
i
in widely scattered places. It is the aim of this thesis to 
trace the steps by which the various departments of the Sup­
reme Court were established and to venture the conclusion that 
these were administrative extensions of one and the same Court 
and that there is no historical justification for regarding 
the Supreme Court as at any time losing its unity.
Suggestions of dissecting the Court do not seem to have 
been made before the arrival of Mr. Justice John Walpole Willis, 
a self-opinionated chancery practitioner who saw the opportunity 
of founding a local Equity Court as one for personal benefit.
He recommended in 1838 that a new judicial department in equity 
be set up and that he be given the presidency of it with the
¿H,
grandiose title of Chief Baron. He further suggested that the 
Insolvency and Ecclesiastical business should be transferred 
to himself, leaving the other two Judges to concentrate on the 
Common Law list. The Chief Justice may well have been disposed 
to acquiesce in all of these proposals had Willis not involved
¿(a
himself in an acrimonious quarrel with his brother Judges. In 
the result, the Chief Justice decided that there was not suffi­
cient Equity business to occupy the exclusive attention of one 
Judge and that in any event the need was for a further puisne 
on the judicial strength, not for another Courtt7 A few years 
later Dr. Kinchela sought the appointment of an Equity Judge 
so that he might receive the office, but the idea was rejected 
on substantially similar grounds.
The first step in extending the Court’s power by subdi­
viding its functions was taken in the passing of 4 Vic. No. 22 - 
an Act for the more effectual administration of justice in New 
South Wales. This very belatedly acknowledged the increase in 
Equity litigation and proceeded to confer power on the Governor 
to appoint the Chief Justice or one of the Puisne Judges to sit 
separately to determine chancery matters^3 It marked the commen­
cement of the title of Primary Judge in Equity - later styled 
Chief Judge in Equity.
Nowhere is the confusion between the relationship of the 
Supreme Court and its departments more apparent than in the
Equity Jurisdiction. Indeed it was perfectly clear before the 
end of the colonial era that the Equity Court had come to be 
regarded as an entity so severed from the Common Law Court 
that a suitor in the one Court might be unable to secure re­
lief, on the ground that his redress lay in the other Court. 
Nothing could be more repugnant to the concept of a single 
Court of judicature in New South Wales.
The confusion evidently arose from a fylse analogy between 
the strict separation of the English Courts before the Judi­
cature Acts and what seemed (but was not) a separation in New
South Wales. Hence, as early as 1850, the Pull Court in Bank
30of Australasia v. Murray declined to grant any relief to a 
plaintiff who had proceeded in Equity instead of at Common 
Law. There, despite some strongly dissenting judgements in
31 3Goodlet v. Fowler and Underwood v. Underwood, the matter seemed 
to rest. It was carried on as a vehicle of practical conven­
ience, as appears from the following examination of Sir Alfred 
Stephen before a Select Committee of the Legislative Council: 
”As you admit that there must be an appeal to the Common Law 
Judges, does not that admission imply that there is no neces­
sity for dividing Equity from Common Law? I think that prac­
tically, it is much the same now. The larger portion of the 
Equity business is discharged by Mr. Justice Therry. Never­
theless, appeals from his decisions lie to the three Judges; 
or, when Mr. Justice Milford was fourth Judge, they lay to the 
four:- and these appeals have been more than once heard, in 
Mr. Justice Therry’s absence. I think it desirable, however, 
that the Equity Judge should himself be a member of the Ap­
pellate Tribunal. (Q) Would not such an arrangement form an 
additional difficulty in the way of a future amalgamation of 
the two branches, and of the constitution of one Court? If 
there is to be an amalgamation of the Common Law and Equity, 
an additional difficulty would no doubt be introduced by this 
distinct previous separation:- but the admixture is not in my 
opinion practicable”.
The view that Common Law and Equity were distinct matters
for distinct Courts was reiterated in 0’Rourke v. The Com-
3k 35missioner for Railways and 01 Connor v. North. The introduc­
tion to the Colony of Cairns* and Holt’s Acts by the Equity 
Act 1880 accepted the separation of Law and Equity as axio­
matic and then proceeded to afford some remedy by sections 4 
and 32 for the litigant who would otherwise be obliged to 
seek relief in two Courts. The long series of cases which 
followed were, it is submitted, historically unnecessary as, 
before the Equ:i ty Act 1880 the Equity Court remained part of 
the Supreme Court and was invested with all its powers. The
3bdictum in Weily v. Williams that "in this colony there is 
not the same amalgamation of jurisdictions" as in England 
under the Judicature Acts was quite the opposite of the truth. 
In fact the colonial jurisdictions were, and have remained, 
amalgamated within one Court. As Sir James Martin, C.J., 
succinctly stated - "the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in 
criminal, common law, equity and ecclesiastical matters.
These are not all separate Courts presided over by separate 
Judges, but one and the same Court sitting in its several 
jurisdictions".
The subdivision of Equity, once achieved, the Court re­
tained its sense of unity for a number of years, though many 
suggestions were made for a reallocation of duties. At about 
1850 when the appointment of a fourth Judge was actively can­
vassed, Alfred Stephen considered it desirable that one of the 
bench of four should be appointed Equity Judge with the Insol- 
vency and Ecclesiastical Jurisdictions added to his duties. 
Dickinson, J., made a similar suggestion with the novel ad­
dition that the Courts sit in different buildings "so that there 
might be a distinct Bar to each". He voiced strong disapproval 
of the calls made upon the Judges over the whole field of law 
and felt that specialization was necessary - "The necessity of 
having to consider one day a point of Common Law, another day 
a point of Insolvency, and another day an Equity suit, has been 
to me, personally, a source of the utmost distraction. Shortly 
after I came here I endeavoured to get up Equity. Having never
7
read any Equity before, I found myself dreadfully at fault 
whenever any Equity cases came before the Court ... Although 
I got up each point as it arose, I do not know that the same 
point has ever occurred a second time; and, therefore, when­
ever a new case comes before the Court I have had to go through 
the same course again".
In 1857 the question of the Court's business was referred 
to a Select Committee of the Legislative Council which was di­
rected to report on the expediency of establishing "a separate 
Court of Equity and Insolvency" and to indicate what part of 
the existing Ecclesiastical, Intestate and Lunacy branches
tvtmight be transferred to its Judge. The Committee considered 
that the Equity branch should be reformed by itself and left 
clear of other departments, particularly Insolvency, "because 
your Committee apprehend that the removal of those cases in 
appeal from the three Judges to the decision of one Judge 
would not be satisfactory". By 1858 Stephen again pressed 
for the permanent appointment of a fourth Judge to take Equity, 
Insolvency, Ecclesiastical and Vice-Admiralty matters.
Mr. Justice Burton in 1857 and 1858 was responsible for 
introducing Bills in the Legislative Council on the business 
of the Supreme Court. The first, which was passed by the Coun­
cil, but not the Assembly, sought the establishment of a Court 
"of Equitable Jurisdiction ... in and for the Colony" the Judge 
of which should have "a sole and independent jurisdiction, ex-
U,l+elusive of the Supreme Court in the first instance". The Court 
was envisaged to have jurisdiction in Ecclesiastical matters 
and the supervision of intestate estates and, following Dickin­
son's earlier proposal, was to be "distinct and separate from 
the Supreme Court, not only in jurisdiction, but also as to
i^ sTthe Court in which its sittings shall be held". The second 
was called "A Bill to make further provision for the Adminis­
tration of Justice and to establish a Court of Equity" which 
proposed the erection of a Court detached completely from the 
Supreme Court and known as "the Court of Equity of New South 
Wales". This Court was to have an equitable and ecclesiastical
jurisdiction and was to take over the corresponding work of 
the Supreme Court even to the extent of having pending suits 
transferred to it. The Bill did not become law.
In 1864, a year before a fourth Judge was appointed to 
the Bench, the very large and important jurisdiction in Insol­
vency was recognized as the next subdivision of the Court.
Exactly ten years later the first mention was made in the Law 
Almanac of the newly created Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 
Court and its Judge- constituting yet another department of 
the Supreme Court. The Lunacy Jurisdiction, which had pre­
viously, for practical purposes, been part of the Equity Court, 
was set up in 1880 and a new Court Office opened for the Master 
in Lunacy. The department of the Curator of Intestate Estates 
was established by 1887 in addition to a previously existing 
Office in the Supreme Court Department of the Custodian of 
Wills. These offices did not merge in a consolidated Probate 
Department until 1897 - the Probate Jurisdiction being given 
very little alteration by rule or statute during the colonial 
period. The severance of the departments was completed in 1889 
with the establishment of a Bankruptcy Department in place of 
the old Insolvency Jurisdiction.
As against this pattern of division of functions, there 
is one exception in the Admiralty Jurisdiction which, in con­
sequence, will be considered here only briefly. By Letters 
Patent of 5th. May 1787 authority was given for the creation 
of an independent Court in Vice-Admiralty pursuant to 11 & 12 
Wil. Ill c. 7 and extending statutes. Governor Phillip to­
gether with Ross, Miller, Alt, Hunter, Bradley, King, Maxwell,
Ball and other naval officers were appointed Commissioners in 
the Colony ’’for the examining, enquiring of, trying, hearing 
and determining and adjudging according to the directions of 
the same Acts in any place at sea or upon the land at the said 
territory called Hew South Wales all piracies, felonies, and 
robberies and all assessories thereunto committed or which 
shall be committed in or upon any sea or within any haven, 
river, creek or place where the Admiral or Admirals have
8
The Court was to consist of seven persons at least three 
of whom were to be Commissioners. Practice and procedure in 
the Court were patterned on the English High Court of Admiralty. 
Ross, the Lieutenant Governor, was Judge of the Court but, as 
he was more often away from Sydney than in that town, the con­
vening of the Court occasioned great difficulty in the early 
years. The Court's jurisdiction was restricted to matters of 
a criminal kind but no prize jurisdiction was conferred; an 
anomaly made more emphatic by an order of the Admiralty Com­
missioners in 1813 purporting to revoke the Court's authority 
in prize cases!!7
Up to the time of the founding of the Supreme Court in 
1824 the successive Governors continued to act as Vice-Admirals 
of the separate marine Court, the Judge-Advocates being appoin­
ted as Judges by commission from the High Court of Admiralty.
"This Court", said Judge-Advocate Wylde, in 1821, "has never 
attempted ... to act as an Instance Court (and) it may be wor­
thy of consideration, whether it would not be expedient and of 
great public advantage, from the increasing property of the 
Colonial Interests, that Admiralty Jurisdiction should be given 
to the Supreme Court at this place, as to the Courts in India".
There was little change in the structure of the Vice- 
Admiralty Court after the other jurisprudential changes of 
1824. Over many years the Governor for the time being remained 
as Vice-Admiral and, as a matter of routine, the Chief Justice 
was commissioned as Judge of the Court. The business of the 
Court was of little substance. Therry, J., in 1857 described 
it as amounting to "nothing, or next to nothing. I have not 
for a long time heard of a single Admiralty suit"f°
In 1859 it was proposed by the Executive Council that the 
Vice-Admiralty Court’s jurisdiction should be merged in that 
of the Supreme Court and be invested with cognizance of civil 
as well as criminal matters. This was not in fact achieved 
until the twentieth century, the independence of the Court 
meanwhile being consolidated by the passing of the Inperial Acts 
26 & 27 Vic. c. 24 and 31 Vic. c. 45.
i)
10
Apart, then, from this exception, it is proposed now to 
consider in turn the processes by which the various branches of 
the Supreme Court in New South Wales evolved.
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EQUITY JURISDICTION1
The Supreme Court of 1824 was constituted as a single 
Court with a number of jurisdictions of which the Equity Juris­
diction was one. There was no suggestion at the outset that a 
separate Equity Court should be established. Section IX of 
the Administration of Justice in New South Wales Act 1823 
(4 Geo. IV c. 96) made this provisions
"That the said Supreme Courts respectively shall be Courts 
of Equity in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, and the 
Dependencies thereof respectively, and shall have power and 
authority to administer Justice, and to do, exercise, and per­
form all such Acts, Matters, and Things, necessary for the due 
Execution of such Equitable Jurisdiction, as the Lord High 
Chancellor of Great Britain can or lawfully may within England"*'
Chief Justice Forbes felt that the Court should give all 
of its attention to criminal proceedings and matters at Common 
Law and he did not disguise his own belief that an Equity Juris­
diction was unnecessary: He disposed of it by saying "in an
early stage of society there is comparatively but little oc- 
casion for resorting to a court of Equity" and he complained 
that he could not find sufficient employment for the Master 
of the Court, whom he regarded as a Master in Chancery. Only 
eight simple cases were referred to the Master within the first 
three years of the Court's existence* and very few more up to 
1832 when Master Carter, the first appointee became insolvent 
and was dismissed. The office was allowed to stand vacant and 
the Equity Jurisdiction was resorted to only rarely. Therry,
J., recalled that when he arrived in the Colony "there might 
be two or three bills in the course of a year - half a dozen 
days in the course of a year would dispose of all the Equity
5business". Only two statutory provisions affecting Equity in 
the Colony were passed between 1823 and 1840. The first, 9 Geo. 
IV c. 83, re-enacted the terms of 4 Geo. IV c. 96 so far as the 
Court's jurisdiction was concerned. The second was a statute
11
of the local legislature, 5 Wm. IV No. 8t passed in 1834 
to allow of the adoption in the Colony of some English pro­
cedural enactments relating inter alia to Equity.
Equity business did not commence to revive until Mr.
Justice John Walpole Willis came to take his seat on the col­
onial bench. The Judge had practised extensively in chancery 
and entertained a high regard for his own abilities as an 
equity lawyer. He openly protested that his talents were 
wasted on common law matters and he suggested a reorganization 
of the Court so that a new office of Chief Baron might be crea­
ted and occupied by himself? These recommendations which were 
made in 1838 visualized the entire separation of the Equity and 
Common Law branches of the Court. To Willis’ intense annoy­
ance, the other members of the bench did not regard his proposal 
as practical. However, his idea that he should concentrate on 
Equity hearings and the bulk of the Insolvency, and Ecclesias­
tical work, thus leaving the other two Judges time to make 
sufficient circuits, was accepted to some extent for a few 
years?
Willis did make a substantial contribution to the Equity 
Court because he drew such attention to it. Unfortunately he 
was so devoid of tact or concern for interests other than his 
own that he attracted considerable odium. At the same time 
he was not a fool and his ability was witnessed in his com­
pilation in 1838 of the first Equity Rules (known as the Stan­
ding Rules) which served the Court very satisfactorily for 
over twenty years? He can also be pardoned for his indig­
nation at the policy fostered by Forbes of allowing equity 
matters to look after themselves. ”1 found the practical 
proceedings”, he said to the Governor, ”a perfect chaos of 
irregularity; of the orders and cfecrees which had been made 
I shall say nothing more. ... Was it to be wondered then that 
being brought up and practising for the most part of a long 
professional life, in Courts of Equity and Civil Law, I should 
have discovered flagrant errors in the proceedings of those 
who had never been previously accustomed to this Branch of
Judicature and therefore could not be expected to know the
t °principles and practice of this science ... by Inspiration? 
Unpardonable, however, were his public attacks on the system 
and on his brother Judges, exemplified in his judgements in 
Neale v. Solomon1 and Ex parte Roxburgh1.2* Equally wanting in 
balance were his personal attacks conveyed by letter to his 
opponents as in the following extract from a note which he 
wrote to Chief Justice Dowling: "I believed also from the
state in which I found the Proceedings, and still believe, 
that my Brethren (neither of whom had ever practised in a 
Court of Equity) were incompetent to perform the duty with 
credit to themselves and benefit to the Public. I confess 
that I am of opinion that a Chief Justice duly qualified by 
previous study and experience, should exercise the Jurisdic­
tion, but I did not imagine that one, who never I believe 
(save since his arrival in this Colony) was engaged in any
Equity Proceedings, would have accepted an office so vitally
uessential in its due performance to the public welfare”. 
Dowling for some time persisted in his view that the then 
existing state of the Colony did not warrant the institution 
of a separate Court of Equity!1"
Meanwhile, equity business was progressively increasing 
and by 1836 there were signs of popular dissatisfaction with 
the existing machinery of the Court. The Sydney Gazette in 
May, 1836^ described equity proceedings as adverse to all 
ordinary notions of reason, justice or expediency and it 
asserted that ”in 'equity* - all is uncertainty, delay, and 
too often chicanery - chicanery encouraged indeed from a 
multiplicity of forms, and of endless technicalities - the 
successive innovations of cozening lawyers and the concessions 
of too pliant Judges". There is reliable evidence, particul­
arly that of Therry, J.16, supporting the essential truth of 
these apparently over-coloured assertions. Dr. Kinchela, who 
was a candidate for a seat on the bench, pressed for the 
appointment of a fourth Judge to deal with Equity business.
In support of his claim he pointed out that in 1836 there were
157 pending equity suits of which only twenty had been finally 
determined. In his view Mas the equity business of the Supreme 
Court has already increased very much, and is likely further to 
increase from the nature of the conveyances, and settlements, 
which were heretofore made by parties in this Colony before they 
had obtained legal titles to their property, it may be deemed 
expedient to His Majesty’s Government to appoint an assistant 
Judge for this Colony, whose duty it would be to attend to the 
Equity and Chamber business of the Court, particularly when the 
Circuit Courts shall be established ... The equity and chamber
business of the Court would, even now, occupy tne entire time
xiof a Judge”.
Kinchela did not secure the position which he sought, but 
his representations remain to demonstrate the alteration in 
circumstances which compelled Howling to change his own mind.
The need for an Equity Court was at last being so much felt 
that some action had to be taken and it was taken in 1840 by 
the Act for the more effectual administration of Justice in 
New South Wales, 4 Vic. No. 221.8 The efficacy of the statute, 
so far as the Equity Court was concerned, was another question. 
The Act merely declared by a masterpiece of understatement that 
”the Equity Branch of the Supreme Court hath lately increased”, 
enabled one Judge to exercise the jurisdiction and revived the
19office of Master in Equity. The last was most significant as 
the Master’s office typified the essential slowness of the old 
style of chancery procedure. In this office for instance 
accounts were to be taken, references made and evidence heard - 
all tedious and wasteful inheritances from England.
The provisions of section 20 of 4 Vic. No. 22 were of 
greater face value than actual worth. They enabled the Governor 
to appoint the Chief Justice, or if he declined, one of the 
Puisne Judges to ”sit and hear and determine without the 
assistance of the other Judges or either of them all causes 
and matters at any time depending in the ... Court of Equity”t° 
The decrees and orders of such Judge were then to have the 
same validity as if pronounced by the Pull Court, but an appeal
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to the other Judges of the Court could he made within fourteen 
days?1 This did not achieve what Willis and Kinchela had hoped - 
the appointment of a separate Judge to concentrate on Equity 
business. It merely modified the original basis of the Court’s 
jurisdiction whereby the Pull Court was the proper body to 
entertain all Equity matters. It was not effectively applied 
in the time of Dowling, CJ., and the importance of the statute 
rather was that it marked the first division of the Court into 
its component jurisdictions - as jurisdictions of one and the 
same Supreme Court, not as new Courts independently established. 
The division was therefore in no sense a separation of Equity 
from Common Law so that two Courts existed where only one had 
been before. Indeed, the idea of separate Courts for separate 
subject matter still had very influential opponents: Alfred
Stephen, for instance, wrote to the Governor in 1840 saying - 
"as to each of these proposed separate Jurisdictions, it is to 
be observed, that the necessary additional expence (sic). will 
be out of all proportion to the expected advantage. There 
must be separate Officers, with separate Offices and Salaries. 
Again, there will be produced by such a system, a clashing of
¿ 6  fitinterests, and of decisions, every way undesirable".
The 1840 division was simply intended, though it did not 
so work out in practice, to leave two Judges to concentrate 
on criminal and civil matters while the third Judge should 
give his whole attention to equity, insolvency and ecclesias­
tical work. The change was not a success because the Equity 
Judge was obliged to give priority to any other Court business 
which his brethren could not deal with in their lists. Accor­
ding to Therry, J., in 1857 "Equitus seauitur legem was facet­
iously enough translated not very long since, "Equity always 
comes after common law"; for no matter if it were a case of 
assault involving damages to the extent of £10; or a case of 
pocket-picking to be tried at Darlinghurst, either must have 
precedence of the case of Jobbin’s will, which involved some 
£80,000"
It was in pursuance of 4 Vic. No. 22 that Dowling, CJ.,
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took the title of Primary Judge in Equity towards the close of
Z ip1840. This marked the climax in Willis' bitterness, the de­
tails of which cast some light on the emergence of the juris­
diction. Governor Gipps had observed the "natural sort of 
arrangement" between the Judges by which Willis had, almost 
exclusively, confined himself to the equity hearing!5 and the 
Chief Justice had acknowledged the "very large and meritorious 
share" taken by Willis in the Equity Court? However, the mem­
bers of the Supreme Court became so weary of Willis' provocations 
that they resolved in 1840 to take all litigation in rotation; 
a proposal which infuriated Willis and tricked him into a fool­
ish mistake which caused his downfall. The mistake was that 
Willis wrote to the Governor formally withdrawing from exclusive 
authority in equity on the grounds that he would not permit his 
greater knowledge and experience to attract additional respon­
sibilities to himself "merely in ease of others, who claim an 
equal share in this Equitable Jurisdiction"27 He also wrote to 
Dowling asserting that he had never been anxious for the office 
of Equity Judge and that he did not propose to hold it as a 
locum tenens for others? Willis expected, no doubt, that the 
other Judges would hastily appeal for his reconsideration, and 
they might well have done so, had he not abandoned diplomacy 
completely. In June, Stephen, J., sent a private letter to the 
Chief Justice which somehow fell into the hands of Willis who 
promptly published the following passage: "This is my week,
and there is one Equity Case, if not more, for Friday. I am 
willing, of course to take it alone, but I should feel much re­
lieved if you would sit with me. In return, if it can be of 
any assistance, I shall be most glad to sit with you during 
your week. The fact is, that, although I studied Equity under 
James Stephen, and for a short time under Mr. Garratt and drew 
a goodly number of Bills and Answers with them, and even com­
menced my career as an "Equity Draftsman" yet I have for many 
years had little practice except at Law and I do not therefore 
feel any confidence in my first renewals, in a Court of Equity 
here". To the universal surprise of the legal profession and 
of the Governor, Dowling took the opportunity himself to accept
1 !)
the office of Primary Judge. He told Willis that he did not 
"distinctly recollect how it happened that this duty, which 
you appeared to have undertaken, devolved upon yourself, but 
so it did - certainly not from any disinclination on the part 
of Mr. Justice Burton, Mr. Justice Stephen, or of myself to 
take a full share of Equity Business, although the amount of 
it pending was very small compared with other branches of Juris­
diction". The Chief Justice also seized on Willis* voluntary 
resignation as the rationalization of his action, explaining 
that "your assurance ... determined me then to apprize the 
Governor ... that, although the duties of the office might pos­
sibly interfere with those of a Legislative Councillor, yet I 
could not then shrink from the position in which I was placed, 
and (if it was his pleasure) I should have the honour of accep­
ting the appointment"? Willis was beside himself with animosity: 
"I did suppose", he said, "that the business having been for 
the last three years chiefly in the hands of a Judge who is 
vain enough to think he discharged it satisfactorily, would have 
been a sufficient apology even for the Chief Justice declining 
to accept it"? The incident was the breaking point of the feud. 
In 1841 the Governor resolved the matter in what seemed the only 
way by removing Willis under the guise of appointing him resi­
dent Judge at Port Phillip l2*
The so-called revival of the office of Master effected in 
4 Vic. No. 22 was ouite misleading. The old office of Master 
was not really revived at all, for it was not confined to the 
chancery side but took in all jurisdictions under the style of 
Master of the Court. The office created in 1840 was limited to 
the Equity Jurisdiction alone. It is convenient at this stage 
to review the early basis of the title so that the distinction 
may be understood.
In November 1815» Mr. Justice J. H. Bent wrote to Lord 
Bathurst "another indispensible officer is a Master in Equity, 
and, for want of such officer, I shall be obliged in the Sup­
reme Court to make all references to myself and to take all 
accounts'’^3 Barron Field, J., felt the same difficulty when he
assumed office. He stated that the duties of Master both in 
Law and in Equity naturally fell to him and that no one had 
questioned his performance of the dual functions until 1820; 
he thereupon recommended that he be formally appointed "Master 
and Examiner" of the Court. "They said they cd. find no Pre­
cedent for it as upon looking in the Red book they found that 
a Barrister acted as Master in all the other Colonies. I told 
them ... that here in consequence of the necessity of the case 
we must make a Precedent "3if However, the members of the Court 
declined to appoint the Judge or the other nominees (Mr. Wylde, 
senior, and the Judge-Advocate) and drew up a rule ordering 
that the Pull Court should act as Master and Examiner. Field 
strongly protested (the fees being a source of revenue to him) 
with the result that the Court agreed to rescind its rule and 
in 1820 Field, by letter to the Governor, announced that he had 
appointed himself Master and Examiner^ Commissioner Bigge con­
sidered this action to be "certainly justified by the refusal 
of all the practising solicitors, with the exception of Mr.
Wylde, to give up their practice for the purpose of undertaking 
an office that promised so little emolument as that of master 
and examiner in equity"
By 4 Geo. IV c. 96 the sovereign was empowered to issue 
Letters Patent for the definition of the "Proceedings of the
3TSheriff, Provost Marshal, and other ministerial Officers" in 
the Supreme Court constituted by the Act. The Letters Patent 
accordingly issued on 13th. October, 1823, (the ’Third Charter 
of Justice' f* made provision that "there shall be and belong to 
the said Court the following Officers that is to say a Regis- 
trar a Prothonotary a Master and a Keeper of Records". The 
Master so appointed was not only Master in Equity, but Master 
of the Court, as may be easily verified by reference to the 
terms on which Stephen proposed the Office. "It will further 
be essential to appoint a Master, who will be charged with the 
taxation of Costs, the investigation of complicated accounts, 
and generally with the same occupations as those which are per­
formed by the Masters in Chancery, and the Masters of the Court
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of King * s Bench in England"? Further evidence is afforded by 
the entire omission from the Letters Patent of any reference 
to the Court’s jurisdiction in Equity, The Master was, how­
ever, to confine himself to the civil side of the Court, with 
the extraordinary consequence that he was eligible to practise 
privately in criminal matters,1 In pursuance of the Patent,
William Carter was by Warrant appointed "Master of the Supreme 
Court" in December, 182J>ti2j
A very clear statement of the dual functions of the Master 
as a ministerial officer of all departments of the Court was 
made by the Attorney-General of Van Diemen’s Landt5 He was 
speaking of the operation of the office in that territory, but 
there was no appreciable variance from its operation in New 
South Wales, At Law the Master had to tax bills of costs, 
settle points of practice and receive references from the Judge, 
determine matters of account, hear some prosecutions for assaults, 
libels and similar charges and to act as arbiter in suits where 
settlement or compromise seemed feasible. In equity his duties 
were substantially larger and more important, as he served as 
the Judge’s assistant to determine in Chambers the detail of 
matters which would be prolix for the Court. Gellibrand sum­
marized these duties as follows: "as a Master in Chancery,
The Bill may be referred to him upon a demurrer, or the answer 
may be referred to him upon exceptions, as to its sufficiency; 
in either of which cases he may be compelled to report to the 
Court upon Papers drawn and settled by himself. AIL witnesses 
must be examined by him, upon interrogatories, no person being 
present upon such examinations but the Master, by whom the an­
swers are taken down, and the Witness, which must take place 
in every case, because no parol evidence is allowed in a Suit 
in Equity. Upon all questions of Title, partnership and execu­
torship accounts, and in fact every transaction where it may 
become necessary to go into the detail they must all be re­
ferred to the Master, who is to decide upon the legal effect 
of the several cases referred to him, and report to the Court 
the result of such references. If either party is dissatisfied
with the Master’s report, an application is made to the Court 
for the Master to review the same, and, if the report does not 
appear satisfactory, it is sent back for reconsideration, other­
wise (which is generally the case) it is confirmed”t 1*
This differentiation of functions is more enlightening 
than the official statement of the Master’s duties in New South 
Wales. These were set out by Stephen under six divisions:
1. To tax costs at Law, in Equity, in the Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction and in criminal matters.
2. To investigate all accounts and, in Equity, to investigate 
all disputed questions of fact (save those considered proved
by depositions, or referred for decision to a jury).
3. To prepare all ’conveyances leases and other instruments 
of a legal nature” which the Court might require any litigating 
parties to execute.
4. To attend to the management of estates of minors, lunatics 
and other incapable persons.
5. To take depositions of witnesses required to be examined 
on written interrogatories.
6. To attend in Court ”to assist the Judge with information 
as to the practice and proceedings of the Department of the 
Court over which he is to preside” T
Chief Justice Forbes certainly did not show that he fully 
appreciated the scope of the Master’s intended duties. He 
seems to have regarded the officer as attached to the chancery 
side of the Court only and, as he did not see any need for an 
Equity Court, he was unable to discern what use the Master could 
beib Forbes accordingly recommended that the office be abolished 
and Governor Darling agreed that this should be done*7 Neither 
had foreseen the consequences of removing Master Carter on the 
pretext of appointing him to the office of Sheriff which had 
recently fallen vacant. In England powerful patrons were con­
tending to have the Shrievalty occupied by their nominees and 
Thomas Macquoid was in due course appointed at the instance of 
Sir George Murray. When Macquoid arrived in Sydney, Carter was 
left without employment and demanded and obtained his old office
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as Ma.sfert* Having then to do what he could with the existing 
machinery, Francis Forbes caused a rule of Court to be made in 
Septe)miDer, 1829, for the establishment of three separate Court 
administrative offices - those of the Registrar, Master and 
Chief' Clerk respectively. The rule made it absolutely clear 
that thenceforth the Master was to be primarily an equity officer. 
In his department "all proceedings on the Equity side of the 
Court;, or which belong to the Jurisdiction of the Chancellor 
by thie Common Law shall be commenced and conducted and to the 
said officer shall be referred all Bills of Costs, Bills of Ex­
change, Promissory Notes, and all other matters and things which 
by thie course and practice of the said Court, shall from time to 
time be referred". Even on this footing, the Master’s office 
virtually remained in abeyance as Master Carter became insol­
vent in 1832 and was forthwith dismissed. The Mastership was 
thereupon abolished entirely.
The revival of equity business which, as has been observed, 
led to the enactment of 4 Vic. No. 22, was preceded by some 
close thought as to the ministerial officers on the equity side 
of tbie Court. By 1839 Governor Gipps was convinced that a Mas­
ter would be again required and he made a recommendation accor­
dingly to Lord Glenelg - "it should be left to the Local Legis­
lature to establish ... one or more Masters in Chancery"?0 This 
was approved in England where Lord Stanley expressed the wish 
that the office be assimilated as closely as possible to the 
English office of Master in Chancery. The old colonial office 
of Master on the Common Law side of the Court was never re­
established. The first Master in Equity was Dr. Kinchela who 
was obliged to relinquish the post after only a few months be­
cause of illness. Lord Stanley directed that the vacancy be 
filled by Samuel Frederick Milford with a salary of £1000 per 
yearf1
To return to the general position of the Court and the 
Equify Jurisdiction after the passing of 4 Vic. No. 22 is to 
return to a system which was doomed to failure. Equity liti­
gation was constantly increasing but, unless the Primary Judge 
were able to attend to it personally, no hearing was possible.
As the Chief Justice was Primary Judge this was often a source 
of great embarrassment for he was constantly required in the 
Banco sittings and could not delegate his equity jurisdiction 
even were he on circuit or ill. By September 1841 an amending 
Act had become necessary and was passed in the 5 Vic. No. 9, 
an Act for the Better Advancement of Justice. This enabled 
any of the Judges to exercise the Primary Judge's powers in the 
event of his absence or illness. The unsatisfactory provision 
for appeals to the remaining two Judges was also replaced by 
allowing an appeal to the Pull Court. The combined effect of 
section 21 of 4 Vic. No. 22 and of section 13 of 5 Vic. No. 9 
was thus to give an appeal to the Pull Court from the decisions 
of the Primary Judge, but, in the absence of an appeal in the 
manner prescribed, the decrees and orders of the Primary Judge 
took effect as if made by the Pull Court itself.
The result of the legislation was not to vest the entire 
jurisdiction in one Judge, but only to delegate the jurisdiction 
to him (assuming that there was no subsequent appeal). The
52*Court considered as obiter dicta in M fLaughlin v. Little that 
appeals to the Pull Court were not so much appeals in the strict 
sense as rehearings. Stephen later pointed out that, in any 
case, only a limited part of the jurisdiction was delegated - 
"the powers incident to the office of Lord Chancellor, ... such 
as the issuing of Commissions in Lunacy, and the administration 
of Idiots' and Lunatics' estates, are left where the Act of 
Parliament, and ... the Charter, placed them; with the Court"f3 
Care and guardianship of infants and general rule making power 
also remained with the Court.
Por about fifteen years after 1842 equity business went 
ahead by leaps and bounds. By 1844-46 there were 147 equity 
suits and in 1853 there were 97 cases by bill, rule nisi, claim 
or petition in the single year. In 1854 the number was 114*
By 1856 it had risen to 346. The Master in Equity was con­
stantly employed; matters before him on hearing being quite 
appreciable. In 1843 there were 63 such matters, in 1844 there 
were 34 and thereafter 1845 - 49, 1846 - 23, 1847 - 21, 1848 - 22,
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1849 - 28 and 1850 - 31^ By 1842 it was considered that the 
4 Vic. No. 22 should be further amended to allow of more ex­
peditious procedure in the Equity Court. The Legislative 
Council referred a Bill to this end to a Select Committee 
under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice. The Committee 
decided that Dowling’s dual rule as Chief Justice and as Pri­
mary Judge was not objectionable, and deferred the question 
of procedural reform?5
Ample verification of the increase in equity business was 
provided by the consistent rise in expenses of equity procee­
dings. Master Milford observed of this: ”1 think it is ex­
pensive, but it is difficult to say where the expense lies;
I do not think it is altogether with the fees of Court. I 
have analysed three bills of costs, and I find that in one, 
where the entire costs were ninety-nine pounds two shillings 
and ten pence, the Attorney's fees were seventy-two pounds ten 
shillings, Court fees fifteen pounds thirteen shillings and 
four pence, and Counsel's fees ten pounds nineteen shillings 
and six pence; these are the taxed costs. In another case, 
where the costs were also taxed, the total amount was one 
hundred and fifty-eight pounds - the fees of Court were very 
high, why I cannot tell - twenty-eight pounds six shillings 
fees to counsel twenty-one pounds one shilling and eight pence, 
and the remainder, one hundred and nine pounds, including pay­
ments to witnesses, went to the Solicitor. In another case, 
where the bill was not taxed, the total amount was three hun­
dred and thirty three pounds thirteen shillings and four pence, 
the Counsel's fees eighty six pounds fourteen shillings, Court 
fees twenty seven pounds sixteen shillings and the Solicitor's 
charges, without deducting the witnesses expenses, which were 
very high, two hundred and nineteen pounds three shillings and 
four pence"*?’
It is noteworthy that some of the delay and expense in 
equity was attributed to the want of "an Equity Judge, that is, 
an Equity Judge properly so called, a man brought up to that 
branch of the profession"5,7 and to the further circumstance that
decisions of the Primary Judge were not final. In the 1840's 
it was quite common for speculative re-hearings to be brought 
before the Pull Court and an opinion was expressed that the 
public were not generally satisfied by the decisions given by 
the Primary Judge, "even in the times of Sir James Dowling and 
Mr. a'Beckett it was the same; whether they are dissatisfied 
or not it is difficult to say but they abide the chance of 
having the decision altered by going to the three Judges"?a
So far as the jurisdiction's inherent delays were concer­
ned, the cumbersome nature of pleading and procedure and the 
infrequent sittings of the Court in the Equity jurisdiction 
came under regular attack. The inadequacies of the contemporary 
law and practice were trenchantly summarized by the Select Com­
mittee on the Division of the Legal Profession Abolition Bill 
when, in 1847, they urged the Legislature "to cut down the op­
pressive fees which are exacted by the Government from suitors; - 
to get rid of the senseless jargon and prolixity of some of the 
forms of law; ... to abolish all useless forms; - to cut off 
all sources of delay; ... and above all, to thoroughly cleanse 
out that Augean sty - the Court of Equity, and, instead of the 
prolix, dilatory, and expensive system which prevails there at 
present, to introduce a concise, simple, and expeditious mode 
of proceeding suited to the wants and means of the community 
at large"?
Local lawyers, while they differed on the merits of the 
then existing equity procedure, were united in the view that 
many of the unsatisfactory features of the Equity Court could 
be overcome by giving the Equity Judge a reasonable chance to 
concentrate on equity business. Sir Alfred Stephen considered 
that "if any Equity Judge were appointed, (especially one from 
the Equity Bar) who would also take the Insolvency and Eccles­
iastical Jurisdictions, exclusively of the other Judges, it 
would in my opinion be an advantage, to give the remaining 
three Judges the Common Law duties only"^ Robert Johnson, a 
Solicitor, recommended that the Equity Court should sit more 
frequently and regularly and that "the Judge who sits in Equity
should not have so many other duties to perform, as in conse­
quence of his not having time to prepare his judgments they 
are much delayed, and the Equity business is very much retar- 
ded'*. This could, in his opinion, be achieved best by having 
a Judge exclusively confined to Equity suits. A few years 
later, Dickinson, J., echoed these sentiments by suggesting 
that there be a fourth Judge added to the Court strength, who 
should confine his attention to Equity, Insolvency and Eccles­
iastical business, subject to an appeal to a Bench comprising 
the Chief Justice, the Primary Judge and one of the Puisne 
Judges?2, The Primary Judge, would, however, take precedence 
only with the Puisne Judges according to date of appointment 
and he would receive the same salary as they did. He felt that 
this would be a solution as **an Equity judge will never be ex­
empt from liability to be called on to sit at Nisi Prius, if 
he should also be a judge of the Supreme Court. The power to
¿ . acall him in will soon evoke a supposed necessity to do so".
The Master*s office, unworkable enough with the burdens 
of equity proceedings, had been brought to a standstill with 
the addition of insolvency matters. The Master was obliged 
to enlist the aid of the Chief Justice in an attempt to con­
fine his labours within reasonable bounds. Stephen observed 
that **the very able and learned** Master Milford, although per­
forming his duties with great efficiency, had ”a task imposed 
upon him which is, beyond all reason, laborious; and I venture 
to say, that no man but himself could so long have performed 
them so well. I believe that, for months past, he has never 
had one unoccupied hour; altho* we have been compelled to dis­
pense with his attendance, where his assistance to ourselves 
is most valuable, in the Banco Equity Sittings*’^  In 1858 one 
of the commissioners enquiring into the proposal for the appoint­
ment of a fourth Judge asked a witness whether the duties of the 
Master could not conveniently be vested in such Judge, were he 
appointed. The answer was that the formal matters before the 
Court were ample to occupy the Master and a further Judge as 
well; in other words that the Judge was required in addition
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to and not in substitution for the Master?5 This was the more 
so, as most references on particulars of account and investig­
ations of title did not lend themselves to performance by a 
Judge where a ministerial officer was available.
In 1857 the initiative passed to Therry, J., who made a 
strong appeal for reform of the jurisdiction as well as of 
the Supreme Court at large. He expressed astonishment that in 
1857, with a population of over 500,000, the Colony had only 
three Judges - no more than there had been on his arrival, some 
ten years previously, when the population was only 50,000 (in­
cluding convicts). At a time when "questions constantly arose 
of a most momentous character - whether as regarded the value 
of property involved, the magnitude of the interests at stake, 
or the intricacy of the questions to be decided" he felt that 
"justice was delayed; that parties were put to expense - to 
vexatious expenses - and he could not perform the duties de­
volving upon him in a manner satisfactory to himself or which 
could be satisfactory to the country. The delays were constant; 
counsel were prepared, but they were not heard; appointments 
were made, but they were frustrated. Circuits, or terms, or 
criminal courts intervened; and he, as Primary Judge, perhaps 
concluded in May the hearing of an argument which had been com­
menced in January; and before it was finished probably much 
that was urged at its commencement had passed from his mind". 
Therry did not think that the neglect of the Equity Court was 
a matter of chance, but rather that it was deliberate and cal­
culated. In his view; "This was a commercial country, and 
the commercial interests of the country were fostered and its 
prosperity promoted. But Equity dealt not with active-minded 
men, attentive to their own interests, clamorous for their 
rights. The Equity Court had to protect infants, women, luna­
tics, parties who were not heard, and whose interests consequently 
were postponed to those whose interests were more active, - more 
able to make themselves heard"?7" He considered that the Court 
had too long made its facilities available exclusively to suit­
ors at law and he contended that equitable relief should be given
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a degree of attention at least equivalent to that at Common 
Law. He pressed for a separate Equity Court, whether it was 
to be equal with the other Courts, "or, perhaps, as in England 
taken to the other extreme and raised above them”.
Alfred Stephen disposed of the Equity Jurisdiction by 
saying "Equity was like an unfavoured child - kicked, it might 
be said, from one room to another until it ran the risk of be­
ing utterly neglected'1?* To remedy this neglect he stimulated 
the appointment of a Select Committee of the Legislative Council 
to enquire into the state of business in the Supreme Court. The 
Committee reported what seemed obvious enough - that an increase 
in the number of Judges could not be delayed and that equity re­
form was long overdue. At the initiative of Sir ?/illiam Burton, 
the Chairman of the Committee, a draft Bill to make further pro­
vision for the administration of justice and to establish a 
Court of Equity was submitted in 1858. The proposal was warmly 
approved by the Committee and notice was taken of it in the 
Governor's address at the opening of Parliament when he referred 
to "the great injury daily felt by suitors in the Supreme Court, 
especially in the Equity branch"!0 Yet, when it came to a vote 
in the Legislative Assembly, the Bill was decisively defeated.
In 1858 Stephen wrote to the Attorney General seeking the 
permanent appointment of a fourth Judge to preside solely in 
Equity, Ecclesiastical, Insolvency and Vice-Admiralty matters.71 
If this were not done, he considered that "the suitors of the 
Court (would) practically be denied the means of attaining jus­
tice"!2' He pointed out that double sittings of the Court to 
hear causes were frequent throughout the course of a year, 
though they had been quite rare only a few years before; that 
Circuits had been extended from about six to about twelve or 
fifteen days; and that "notwithstanding these prolonged sit­
tings, and repeated instances of a third Judge being contem­
poraneously engaged in hearing Equity Cases or in Chamber busi­
ness, there is a serious arrear in almost every branch of the 
jurisdiction of the Court"!3 He considered that such arrears 
could not help but increase - that the three existing Judges 
were taxed with duties to their full capacity and had no more
time (even private time was drawn against) to devote to the 
public.
In evidence to the Select Committee on the Moreton Bay 
Judge's Appointment Bill, Stephen again affirmed his belief 
that the appointment of a fourth Judge in Sydney would assist 
the Court in a more ready disposal of business?* In response 
to a question whether there would be sufficient Equity bus­
iness to occupy the attention of one Judge throughout the 
year he said; "I think that the Equity Judge should take all 
ordinary and pressing Chamber business in Term, and while the 
other Judges are on circuit. Including that business, and 
the matters more allied to the Equity business than to Common 
Law, I think that his time will be fully occupied" He also 
observed that there would be a further advantage in that a 
single Equity Judge would ensure greater consistency and avoid 
the inconvenience arising from the hearing of part of a suit 
by one Judge and part by another.
Despite these recommendations, the appointment of an ad­
ditional Judge was not achieved until 1865 when an enabling 
Statute, 28 Vic. No. 7, was passed with the somewhat delayed 
recital that "the business of the Supreme Court ... has of late 
years so largely increased that the present number of Judges 
is insufficient for its disposal".
It was about the same time that the position of the Master 
was once more brought to prominence in the despatch of a letter 
of resignation on the ground of overwork by Master Deffell in 
December 1865. As the government ignored his approach, he wrote 
again in the following year stating that he could no longer 
satisfy his oaths of office because the quantity of time which 
he was obliged to devote to the office of Chief Commissioner 
of Insolvent Estates left him no opportunity to attent to mat­
ters in Equity!* He accordingly asked to be relieved of the 
office of Master, quoting the approval of the Judges, who ex­
pressed their satisfaction of the "impossibility of a contin­
uance, as at present, without a denial of justice pro tanto to 
suitors and to creditors and insolvents, through (the Master's)
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being unable simultaneously to discharge the heavy and daily 
duties of the two departments”• At the same time the Legis­
lative Council passed a Bill "to abolish the Office of Master 
in Equity and to provide for the more speedy and efficient dis­
posal of business in the Equitable Jurisdiction", however the 
Bill was not ratified by the Assembly and went no further.79
The government was left little alternative but to accept 
Deffell’s resignation and it thereupon commenced an investi­
gation of the functions of the office of Master in Equity and 
of the question whether that office might advantageously be 
abolished. A Select Committee was appointed by Parliament 
which, in 1868, published a progress report of evidence. Judge 
Macfarland, who was one of the witnesses, strongly criticized 
the office and advocated its abolition because of its associa­
tion with slow methods8.0 Some Solicitors giving evidence were 
also in favour of abolition. Mr. W. G. A. Pitzhardinge, com- 
plaining of the "enormous and useless expense", asserted that 
from one half to two thirds of the costs in Equity proceedings 
were incurred in unnecessary enquiries in the Master’s office. 
This arose, in his opinion, from the Master’s having to take 
all the evidence in writing, which would not be necessary were 
a Judge to attend to the matter. James Norton in reply to the 
question "would proceedings in Equity be less expensive and 
more expeditious, if there was no necessity for going through 
the Master’s office?" said, "certainly; there would be less 
delay and less expense, that is, independently of the ques­
tion whether it is necessary to go to the Master’s office at 
all"8.2*
Mr. Justice Hargrave, on the other hand, felt that although 
there was need for improvement, the abolition of the office 
could not be entertained for the very practical reason that 
the Judges could not possibly accept any additional adminis­
trative work. In support of this, he reviewed the duties which 
the local Master discharged, but which were within the province 
of quite separate officers in the English Courts. In the first 
place, the Master acted as "Examiner" to take evidence before a
decree, secondly, he settled the text of decrees (which in 
England was the preserve of the Registrars and Clerks of 
Records) and, thirdly, he fulfilled the duties of Master and 
Commissioner in Lunacy, Apart from these, the larger tasks 
of the Master’s department included "all accounts and adminis­
tration of estates, all questions involving disputes between 
executors or trustees and legatees, mortgagors and mortgagees, 
all questions with regard to contracts in which damages will 
not be sufficient compensation to persons thinking themselves 
aggrieved. ... The working out of all the decrees made by the 
Primary Judge, under ... statutes, or under the regular Equity 
jurisdiction, is carried out by the Master in Equity”. Harg­
rave, J., considered that the accounting work, all of which 
was executed by the Master, constituted half of the business 
in Equity. Mr. Holroyd, the then Master, was equally persua­
sive that his office should be retained. He pointed out that, 
although the taking of evidence might be better left to the 
Judge, this only accounted for a relatively small proportion 
of the Master’s duties which could not be passed on conveniently 
to the Judge. There was really no alternative, while the course 
of practice remained as it was, to the retention of the Master 
and his office accordingly survived the second attempt within 
forty years on its life.
To revert to the position of the Equity Court itself during 
the period from approximately 1860 to 1880 is to observe in 
miniature the same terrible delays with which the chancery 
Courts in England were oppressed during the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries. The reason clearly lay in the inadequacy of 
the local practice, founded as it was on the old procedure, to 
cope with the volume of litigation. Until a fresh start was 
made in the Colony by the Equity Act of 1880, equity law re­
mained in the doldrums. The impossibility of securing trial 
by jury with viva voce evidence, the inability to obtain dam­
ages in a suit seeking equitable relief, the lack of an adeq­
uate remedy by counter claim, the tedious and futile device 
of Interrogatories and the waste of time and expense involved
in Exceptions, were but samples of the defects which the 1880 
statute overcame. Reference to the law reports is sufficient 
to demonstrate the calls made upon the Equity Court by liti­
gants at about this period. Year by year the pages allotted 
to the Equity decisions increased and, after 1880, not infre­
quently rivalled in volume the judgements delivered in all 
other jurisdictions combined. Considering the prolixity of 
proceeding, the number of matters disposed of between 1860 and 
1880 was a testimonial to the energies of the Judges in stri­
ving to clear their lists.
It is on record that the then Master in Equity stated in 
1868 that equity suits quite commonly lasted for four or five 
years and he had known several cases which had lasted for as 
many as eight yearsV* Henry Cary, a Sydney Barrister, had ear­
lier drawn attention to the "great denial of justice" caused
by the Equity Court’s inability to sit and by the ruin which
t sconsequently befell a large number of suitors. The Judges 
were not permitted to give sufficient time to their responsi­
bilities in Equity and were still expected to give priority to 
matters at Common Law. Equity sittings were in fact reduced 
to about a fortnight in every six months at a time when more 
hearings were required. The confusion which this caused need 
not be described. Solicitors no longer pressed equity cases 
because the chances of their being heard were almost hopeless. 
The legal profession generally advised clients to settle rather
87than be parties to contested equity claims in which they might, 
as Dickens put it, expect a judgement on the Day of Judgement. 
As early as 1858 a Barrister had asserted that there was no 
prospect of the cases then set down in Equity being heard with-
ggout some addition being made to the bench. The decline which 
thus occurred did not in any way signify that litigants had no 
need for a chancery Court. The position rather was that "a 
vast deal of Equity business (was) not attempted at all from
£9the known impossibility of proceeding”.
Only occasionally did the Judges publicly pronounce the 
difficulties under which they laboured. Appropriately, one
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such exclamation is preserved from the lips of Hargrave, J., 
who, in Richardson v. Alien?0 said: "It is by the abuses of
the equity jurisdiction, rather than by the proper exercise 
of its rightful power, that this Court must become most opp­
ressive and injurious to the community. I am satisfied that 
if I had been enabled, as in England, to take oral evidence 
in this case, up to the present hearing, and were empowered 
now to carry out my own decree for account in Chambers, with 
the aid of a "chief clerk" and mercantile accountants, all 
real matters of difference between the plaintiff and the de­
fendants as to these trust accounts might have been settled a 
year ago, instead of my now being reluctantly compelled to 
send them to the interminable inquiries and delay of the Mas­
ter's office"?1 At about the same time the association of 
Solicitors known as the Law Institute were compaigning for 
similar ideals. They rejected a proposal for a general over­
haul of the law, expressing the view that most departments, 
other than Equity, were operating quite smoothly and that a 
general reform would take years to be perfected. They accor­
dingly sought "speedy action" to reorganize the Equity juris­
diction on a basis which would be comprehensive and without 
"patchwork"
A notable frequency of speculative appeals was particularly 
troublesome in the 1870's and the whole appellate structure of 
the Court was unsatisfactory. It regularly occurred that the 
Equity Judge sat in Banco to hear appeals from his own decisions. 
As result, appeals when allowed, were nearly always by majority; 
though in Carnell v. McLennan the extraordinary conclusion was 
achieved of the Primary Judge's reversing his first instance 
judgement. This was a decision of Hargrave, J., who said on 
the appeal "I am extremely glad that this case has been re­
argued. This is a case of a colonial settlement, and is in 
fact no settlement at all, inasmuch as by it a power is given 
to get rid of the whole settlement. I am inclined to think I 
have gDne too far, and I am inclined to support the contention 
that a married woman could not bind her estate by such a contract
as this. At any rate I do not wish to open the door to allow­
ing a married woman to be deprived of her property by a few 
strokes of the pen”?** It is necessary to record, however, that 
this situation was singular and Hargrave, J., when in the mi­
nority, customarily delivered judgements of great force and 
learning, often pointing to basic rules of Equity which his 
brethren in the majority, having relatively little experience 
as Equity Judges, failed to appreciate. The huge number of 
appeals brought on questions of fact and on awards of costs 
were also embarrassing to the Court. Hargrave, J., commented 
on these in cases which came before him. Of the former he ob-
95*served in Hellyer v. Pruitt "It is to be hoped that as Primary 
Judge I may soon have the assistance of a jury to protect par­
ties against appeals such as this upon mere questions of fact;
- for, as to the law in such cases, there cannot be any diffe-
Q Z .rence of opinion among any Equity Judges". Touching upon 
appeals as to costs he said in Pixon v. Williams "I need scar­
cely state that I have not the least desire to throw any im­
pediment in the way of appellate jurisdiction over the Primary 
Judge; but I only suggest that if this jurisdiction is to ex­
tend to every question of costs in Equity, the decisions of the 
inferior tribunal should not be reversed, except clearly wrong 
in principle, and after full inquiry into all the minute de­
tails of each Equity suit"?7
Legislation during the colonial period was but little con­
cerned with the jurisdictional basis of the Equity Court and, 
so far as statutes did apply to Equity, the majority of them 
were procedural. For present purposes it is indeed necessary 
to refer only to two Acts - 11 Vic. No. 27 of 1847 and the 
Equity Act of 1880. The former, known as "An Act to render 
valid the acts and appointments of parties as Guardians of the 
persons and estates of Infants and as Committees of the persons 
and estates of Lunatics under orders made by the Primary Judge 
in Equity and to authorize the making of orders in cases of 
Infancy by the said Primary Judge in future", recited that the 
Primary Judge's jurisdiction in matters of infancy was very
doubtful and proceeded to confer a certain jurisdiction upon 
him. The latter was substantially a procedural enactment by 
which the old practice was replaced by a system designed to 
minimize delay and expense. The introductory sections are 
relevant here. The Governor in Council was empowered to 
appoint one of the Supreme Court Judges as "Primary Judge in 
Equity" to exercise the jurisdiction of the Equity Court for 
the purpose of disposing of motions and "matters in relation 
thereto". All decrees or orders of that Judge were as valid
and binding as if made by the Pull Court. Any other Supreme
Court Judge could exercise the jurisdiction in the absence or 
illness of the Primary Judge and, by extension under 50 Vic.
No. 36, at the request of the Primary Judge (subject to appeal
to the Pull Court). By section 5 the Primary Judge could sit 
with the assistance of two other Judges and the section was 
apparently intended to provide that he could call for the 
assistance of one other Judge to deal jointly with him in de­
termining matters of technicality or special difficulty.
Independent though the Equity Court had thus become, it 
could not properly be regarded as in any way severed from the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales. It was only, as it were, a 
functional limb of a developed and vital body.
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INSOLVENCY JURISDICTION
One of the most unsettled jurisdictions of the Supreme 
Court was that in Insolvency. Constant statutory variation 
throughout the colonial period demonstrated the public impor­
tance of this form of relief, later witnessed by the assump­
tion to the Commonwealth of legislative powers in the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act of 1924. Insolvency was used in early New 
South Wales as descriptive of a class of persons of whom 
bankrupts were but a species: this in turn stemmed from the 
restriction of the first English Bankruptcy Act (34 & 35 Hen. 
VIII c.4) to traders by the 13 Eliz. I c.7. Colonial insol­
vency legislation attempted to embrace in one jurisdiction 
what had in the course of time become virtually two jurisdic­
tions in England. The English law accordingly was never adop­
ted in the Colony because of the practical impossibility of 
putting its provisions into execution^
As with most other legal remedies of a civil kind, the 
earliest colonial insolvency provisions were quite cryptic.
The Letters Patent of 2nd. April, 1787, for establishing 
Courts of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction on the Eastern 
Coast of New South Wales gave the Civil Court power to im­
prison a defendant whose estate "for want of sufficient dis-
3tress" could not realize funds enough to satisfy the claim 
of a successful plaintiff. This was not a very effective 
remedy and, by 1811, Judge-Advocate Bent complained in general 
terms of the inability of the Judicial System "to meet the 
wants of (the Colony’s) increased and ameliorated population 
and Commerce". Bent pointed out that the existing machinery 
was not satisfactory even when dealing with solvent debtors 
and he recommended that real estate be rendered "liable to all
just debts and demands, and to be seized and sold by virtue 
of the Process of the Supreme Court, in the same manner as
5personal chattels”. Notwithstanding this, the Letters Patent 
of 4th. February, 1814» contented themselves with confirming 
the authority of the Supreme Court and Governor’s Court (as 
thereby constituted) to imprison defaulting defendants! Such 
imprisonment could, in practice, be a burden to the successful 
plaintiff who was obliged to maintain the defendant with 
necessaries in prison if the defendant had insufficient estate 
or effects to maintain himself!
The "New South Wales” or Better Administration of Justice 
Act, 1823, (4 Geo. IV c. 96) declared it expedient to make 
provision for an equal distribution amongst creditors of the 
effects of insolvent debtors. Section XXII provided that, on 
the issue of process for the recovery of a debt from a resident 
in the Colony, or from a person carrying on business there, 
failure of the debtor to make full payment was sufficient 
authority for the Judges to summon him by public notice to 
attend in Court. One or more of the creditors could be appoin-
gted as provisional trustees "to discover, collect and receive" 
the estate under the control of the Court. If the debtor failed 
to attend in Court or did attend and was found upon examination 
to be insolvent, the Court could make an order accordingly, 
directing the realization of the insolvent’s estate to meet 
his debts and to distribute the proceeds rateably amongst the 
creditors. Trustees could be appointed for the benefit of 
creditors and provision was made for the investment or safe 
custody of the proceeds of realization pending distribution.
By section XXIII insolvents were afforded the opportunity of 
disclosing and surrendering their estates in which case, with 
the consent of a simple majority of creditors in number and 
value, the Court could issue a certificate having the effect 
of barring further personal actions against the debtor in res­
pect of his prior debts. This was a rudimentary form of a cer­
tificate of discharge; it would only be granted where the in-
solvent’s estate could return at least fifteen shillings in 
the pound and provided the person had not been declared in­
solvent more than twice previously. These sections were 
directly attributable to Francis Forbes who, writing in London 
in 1823» set out a number of points for inclusion in the New 
South Wales Bill, which included this notes "provisions de­
fining the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and 
to incorporate a short system of insolvent law, upon the prin­
ciple of the judicature act for Newfoundland (49 Geo. 3» Chap.
927)M. The latter Act, so far as is relevant here, invested 
the Court with power to collect and distribute goods of in­
solvents and to issue certificates of discharge.
Personal acquaintance with the needs of the Colony brought 
Forbes to the prompt conclusion that the provisions of the New 
South Wales Act were inappropriate. The English Legislature 
did not wish to concern itself with so small an administrative 
problem, and it was left to Forbes himself to rectify defic­
iencies by drafting r,An Act for the relief of Debtors and far 
an equal distribution of their Estates and Effects amongst 
Creditors" 11 Geo. IV No. 7, which became law on 2nd. April, 
1830. By this Act, where it was shown that a debtor before 
execution of process was unable to pay his debts in full, any 
Judge or the Court itself could summon the debtor to appear 
for examination as to his affairs. Meanwhile, such debtor 
could be restrained from dealing with his property and, if 
there were any risk of fraud or waste, one or more creditors 
could be appointed provisional trustees of his estate. The 
Court, following examination of the debtor or, in the event 
of his absconding, on formal proof of his insolvency, could 
declare him insolvent and order the sale of his assets and 
the rateable distribution of the proceeds amongst his cre­
ditors, for which purpose three or more creditors could be 
appointed trustees. Where the total debts exceeded £250 the 
Court with the assistance of two assessors could enquire into 
the circumstances of the insolvent’s financial dealings and
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any creditor could appear and give evidence accordingly. Such 
enquiry could declare that the debtor was not insolvent, in 
which case the initial proceedings were superseded. Relief 
could promptly be granted to an insolvent who made a ”full and 
true disclosure discovery and surrender” of his estate and con­
formed to the orders and directions of the Court. On the one 
hand an imprisoned debtor would be released, on the other hand 
a debtor who was not imprisoned would have the benefit of the 
stay of process so as to be exempted from imprisonment. If a 
debtor failed to make the required disclosure, discovery and 
surrender he was liable to detention, if in custody, otherwise 
to arrest and imprisonment. With the approval of the majority 
in number and value of the creditors a certificate could be 
granted by the Court to a discharged insolvent. This was evi­
dence of his discharge and could be pleaded in bar to suits for 
recovery of debts or damages accruing prior to the declaration 
of insolvency. Provision was made in the Act for the punish­
ment of insolvents who were guilty of wilful misrepresentation, 
concealment or fraudulent disposal of their assets.
The 1830 Act did not afford protection in respect of Crown 
debts or offences against public revenue, statutes of the realm 
or of the Colony; nor did it discharge an insolvent from lia­
bility in respect of a number of actions for malicious injury - 
criminal conversation, seduction, breach of promise and damages 
for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, trespass and others - 
though in these cases a plaintiff could consent to the insol­
vents discharge. Section 11 of the Act recited that wit some­
times happens that persons who are prisoners in execution in 
gaol for debt or damages” would often ”rather spend their sub­
stance in prison than discover and deliver up the same towards 
satisfying their creditors”. To remedy this it was prescribed 
that prisoners failing to make satisfaction within three months 
could be required by their creditors to submit to the Court a 
proper statement and account on oath of their assets. There­
upon the Court could order an assignment of those assets for
the benefit of the creditors taking action and, on paying out 
any other creditors, the prisoner was to be discharged. Where, 
however, imprisoned debtors had no prospect whatever of satis­
fying their creditors at any time, they could apply to the Court 
after three months for an order to be discharged out of custody 
on giving a full account of their financial position and assign­
ing for the benefit of creditors such estates as they possessed 
and on signing warrants of attorney authorizing the entry of 
judgements against them rendering their after-acquired assets 
liable for the balance of their debts without the need for 
sci. fa. to revive those judgements. This provision came closest 
to those operative under the English Bankruptcy law.
The Act had the effect of requiring the opening of a new 
administrative office of the Court. As Forbes observed "it 
became necessary to keep an office open, separate from the 
Office of the Supreme Court, for the Deposit of the Books and 
Papers of Insolvents, which might be consulted at all times
during office hours by Creditors in the presence and under
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the Superintendance of a responsible Clerk". This was the 
first time in the Court*s history that it had become necessary 
to manage any branch of jurisdiction separately from the other 
branches; though the arrangement was one of convenience only 
and did not have the effect of creating an entirely separate 
jurisdiction.
Forbes* Act was limited to expire in 1832 and it was 
allowed to lapse. Governor Bourke said of it: "In 1830,
an Act was passed ... containing all the Bankrupt Clauses 
of the English Acts and much of the regulations and Machin­
ery, by which the Estates of declared Insolvents are (or 
have been Until lately) administered in England. After a 
trial of nearly two years, this System was found Unsuitable
to the State of Society in the Colony, and many frauds are
ll
alleged to have been practised under cover of the law".
Indeed it could be said to have imported into the Colony 
some of the confusions existing in England though the dual
operation of the bankruptcy and insolvency laws. Changes 
were promptly made by "An Act for the relief of Debtors in 
Execution for Debts which they are unable to pay" - 2 Wm. IV 
No. 11 of 6th.March, 1832, which was as stringent as Forbes’
Act had been mild. In outline, this legislation, which was 
also of limited duration, was continued by 5 Wm. IV No. 4»
6 Wm. IV No. 18, 2 Vic. No. 14 and 4 Vic. No. 24 before beiig 
repealed by 5 Vic. No. 17.
The 2 Wm. IV No. 11 commenced by enabling debtors im­
prisoned for debts which they could not possibly pay to peti­
tion the Court for release after having suffered detention for 
three months; for this purpose special days were to be appoin­
ted by the Judges. An examination of a petitioning debtor 
would be carried out at which creditors could attend in oppos­
ition or otherwise to question the debtor. If the debtor 
fraudulently concealed or misrepresented his affairs he became 
liable to a penalty under the Act of three year's imprisonment 
and a similar penalty limited to two year's duration applied 
if the debtor was found to have contracted the debt fraudulently. 
Costs were a charge against the debtor in each case.
On discharge of an insolvent under this Act, his effects 
could immediately be seized and sold by the Sheriff and distri­
buted rateably amongst the creditors. "of all the methods of 
winding up an estate which could be devised by the wit of man", 
said The Australian, "that, by the means of the Sheriff's sale, 
appears the worst, the most unjust, unthrifty, and in every 
way the most objectionable. The agents in the scramble sin­
gularly distinguish themselves by mercilessness, recklessness, 
and ignorance. They act in the most entire irresponsibility.
Haste and confusion are the circumstances of the Sheriff's
izsale, waste and depreciation are its results". If the cre­
ditors were not fully satisfied it was sufficient for them to 
demonstrate to the Court "at any time after the discharge of 
such prisoner" that he was in a position to pay the balance 
whereupon further execution could be levied and the Court
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could authorize further proceedings to be taken until the cre­
ditors had been paid in full. If the debtor refused or failed 
to assign after-acquired property on which execution could not 
be levied the Court could imprison him until he agreed to make 
the assignment. Not until that stage had been reached did the 
Act permit satisfaction to be entered on the judgement. The 
only concession allowed after discharge was that the debtor, 
in the discretion of a Judge, could be released from further 
imprisonment. The contrast which these measures bear to the 
humanity of Forbes1 legislation speaks for itself: the 1832
statute was clearly framed for the relief of creditors rather 
than for the relief of debtors. The injustice of the measure 
could even extend amongst the creditors themselves, allowing 
some to have preference over others. "Nothing can be worse 
than the existing state of the practice (for law there is none) 
which obtains in the colony in cases of insolvency. A man who 
finds himself on the verge of failure, can, by power of attor­
ney, make over a large portion of his assets to a favoured 
creditor, to the prejudice of the general body of creditors.
On the other hand, it is in the power of one creditor to pre­
vent an equal distribution of the estate, by refusing to 
acquiesce in such decision ... Above all, the future acquired 
property of the insolvent is liable to his previous debts, thus 
compelling him during the remainder of his residence in the
13colony, to become either a rogue or a pauper”.
The Act was continued in force in toto for a further two 
years by 5 Wm. IV No. 4 of 8th. July 1834. Towards the close 
of 1837 the need for some relief was so pressingly felt that
Mr. Justice Burton drew a Bill which was laid before the
. ^Council but was not passed. The Bill was originally prepared 
by the Judge when in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and 
it became law there. It was applied at the instance of the 
Judge in substantial part in Van Diemen’s Land; however,
Attorney General Stephen appended some clauses of his own, 
giving the Court severe inquisitorial powers, which made the
measure very unpopular. The Australian gave this account of 
the reasons for the rejection of the Bill when it was sub-
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mitted in New South Wales: "The learned Judge ... recognised
no distinction between Insolvents and Bankrupts, He so framed 
his law, that persons who felt themselves in a state of insol­
vency might go before a Judge, make an affidavit of such 
insolvency, and at the same time place in the hands of the Court 
an exact statement of their liabilities and assets, transferring 
the latter, without reservation into the custody of the Court.
At such a stage of the proceedings it was ordained that a Master 
of the Court should be required by the Judge to take particular 
cognizance of the insolvent's effects, and having duly and pru­
dently realised the assets, should rateably divide the same 
amongst the creditors generally. The insolvent in the mean 
time should be protected against arrest under any circumstances 
whatsoever, and a maintenance -pro tempore be allowed to him at 
the discretion of the Court. No imprisonment should be per­
mitted except in case of fraud, and for the purpose of discov­
ering fraud sufficiently, stringent powers should be vested in 
the hands of the Master. In the case of the insolvent not 
making, in due time, a voluntary cession, it was competent 
for a certain number of creditors to make application on oath, 
to the Court, certifying their belief in the debtor's insol­
vency, in which case a commission for enquiry might issue.
"Now, it did so happen, practically, that the labour of 
acting as Insolvent Commissioner, would have fallen upon the 
Registrar, who, feeling that a great addition to his duties of 
administrator of intestate estates would thus devolve upon him 
became hostile to the Bill, and took every reasonable means, 
which, in honour, he was able, to occasion its rejection. ...
Nor did the Bill find favour in the eyes of another gentleman 
of very considerable weight, we allude to that respectable 
officer of the Court, Mr. Gurner. This gentleman unfortunately 
took it into his head that the Bill was complex and cumbrous 
in its details; he declared that he did not understand it,
and no doubt he felt nervous at having to deal with, and con­
stantly to act upon, a measure, which he did not comprehend 
thoroughly, ... Now we put it to any lawyer to say, whether 
so far from being complex, the Bill is not, considering the 
nature of the subject it had to deal with, extremely pers­
picuous. It is remarkable for nothing more obviously than a
15masterly simplicity”.
In 1838 a sub-committee of the Legislative Council was
appointed to consider the Insolvent Debtors* and Imprisonment 
16for Debt Bills, the former being Burton's Bill in its original 
draft. The committee gave its report in 1839 from which it 
appeared that twenty-six of thirty-seven witnesses were favour-
17able to the general principles of Burton's Bill. The others 
did not so much dispute the form of the Bill, but considered 
its substance too extensive for the then existing state of the 
Colony and the committee itself agreed that the details of the 
proposed law were too complex. The committee placed heavy re­
liance on the evidence of Stephen, J., and adopted his recom­
mendations for amendments, based on his own variations of the 
Van Diemen's Land law, recommending that the Bill as drafted 
by Burton be withdrawn.
Giving evidence in 1838, John Gurner, Chief Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, emphatically stressed his views of the compli­
cation and expense of the Bill. "I am no advocate for Bank­
rupt Laws myself”, he asserted, "I think the country would be 
far better without them. I think this Bill will afford a 
greater facility to a dishonest Debtor, than it will be of 
benefit to the Creditor. I think the parties who would get 
credit, would evade the punishment denounced, and that it 
would be almost impossible to bring home a case to a party, 
to enable the Court to award a punishment; from what I saw 
of the old Insolvent Law, parties disposed to commit frauds, 
would do it in such a way, as to render it impossible to detect 
them. My own impression as to the old Insolvent Law, is, that 
the greater part of the cases which came before the Court, were
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brought forward by the friends of the parties, and with a very
few exceptions, nothing further was done than to get the party
declared insolvent, and nothing further has been done to this
day; and in the greater number of cases, the books and papers
which were lodged at that time in Court remain there now, and
neither the insolvent nor the creditors, have received any
18benefit from them”.
Alfred Stephen saw in the New South Wales Bill the same 
objections which he had discerned in the Van Diemen's Land 
measure - the absence of power to imprison on stay of discharge, 
the inadequacy of provisions as to proof of debts and the want 
of an official Provisional Assignee. He gave this summary of 
his views: "I think that these several reasons are all power­
ful, in favor of an extensive change in those Laws. If, how­
ever, I had formed no such opinion, I should still say that 
any Law was better, on this subject, than the present defective 
Insolvent Act of this Colony; which is opposed to every prin­
ciple of right Legislation: - since it protects the incar­
cerating Creditor alone, to the exclusion of every other, and 
then leaves the Debtor to be taken in execution again, by any 
other Creditor, only to go through again the same ineffective 
process for liberation: - whilst it affords no means whatever, 
for securing an equal distribution of property, at any time: 
but, leaving the Debtor a prey to every successive attack,
affords him no relief, until he has no property left to pay 
19anybody”.
Speaking of the statutory extension of 1840, 4 Vic. No.
24, The Australian said: ”We think that in simply renewing
the old Act, his Excellency adopts the best course open to 
him. It is absolutely necessary that no legislation upon 
this matter should be entered upon without much forethought, 
and an ample discussion. ... We are quite aware that his 
Honor the Chief Justice holds very strong opinions relative 
to this subject. It is the conviction, we apprehend, of the 
learned member, that trade in the colony can never be in a
sound or respectable state so long as there is no more strin­
gent law relative to failures of merchants than is the case 
at present, ... The Chief Justice, in his speech in Council 
relative to this subject, also dwelt forcibly, we recollect, 
upon the hardships endured by insolvent prisoners, by reason 
of the obduracy of creditors, and from the said insolvents 
being unable to rid themselves of their liabilities by making 
an oath of insolvency. In spite, however, of the startling 
picture drawn by the learned member of the sufferings of 
debtors, it did appear upon the return ... that the number of 
debtors so confined was very small, and that the state of the 
case was decidedly over coloured".
In 1841 there were two relevant enactments - 5 Vic. No. 9 
and 5 Vic. No. 17. The first was styled "An Act for the fur­
ther Amendment of the Law and for the better advancement of 
Justice" which only related in part, namely sections 33 to 37, 
to Insolvency. Governor Gipps said of these sections that they 
were "in the present acknowledgedly imperfect state of our 
Insolvent Laws, ... I trust calculated to produce good re­
sults. ... The Merchants of Sydney appear now desirous to
zi
have the measure, which was generally objected to in 1840".
The derivative of Burton’s Bill in 5 Vic. No. 17 laid 
down for the first time in the Colony a representative Insol­
vency Law designed to give relief to debtors. It was called 
"An Act for giving relief to Insolvent Persons and providing 
for the due Collection Administration and Distribution of 
Insolvent Estates within the Colony of New South Wales and 
for the prevention of Frauds affecting the same". It was 
based, as has been noted, on the law applicable in Cape 
Colony and took effect on 29th. December, 1841. The act re­
cited the need to provide for those who "by misfortune and 
without having been guilty of fraud or dishonesty are or may 
become insolvent" and empowered the Chief Justice to appoint 
a fit and proper resident of Sydney to a new office as Chief 
Commissioner of Insolvent Estates, and to appoint any other
51
ministerial officers required. The Judges generally had power 
to levy the fees in Insolvency matters.
22The Sydney Morning Herald of 17th. August, 1842, re­
garded as ill-conceived an impression which had arisen in the 
community that the Act was designed to protect dishonest deb­
tors from the claims of their creditors. However, it pointed 
out that this would continue as a practical result unless cre­
ditors took upon themselves ’'to see the Act properly enforced”. 
They could assist themselves, so the journal counselled, by not 
being "blinded by the paucity of assets appearing in the insol­
vent's schedule”. "The Act will never work", it asserted, "un­
til such creditors make it a positive and determined principle 
never to sign a certificate under any circumstances, until a 
dividend shall have been declared, and the creditors have an 
opportunity of ascertaining that the insolvent has acted hon­
estly, both in his previous conduct, and in the surrender of 
all his property". The journal also drew to the attention of 
debtors what it described as the risk and inconvenience which 
they would incur by taking the benefit of the Act. They would 
have to give up the whole of their estates including after- 
acquired property until discharged; they would be forbidden 
to leave the jurisdiction of the Court or even to go to remote 
parts of the Colony, they were obliged to submit to public 
examination, their wives could be examined and they could 
render themselves liable to transportation for fifteen years 
on committing certain offences under the Act.
The feeling of many creditors as to the operation of the 
Act was well summarized by an anonymous correspondent to the 
Sydney Morning Herald on 31st August, 1843s "As insolvency 
has become a regular traffic, I find there are few who have 
escaped, and in many cases others to an enormous amount; how 
many have gained credit has been astonishing; but what is more 
surprising, I find that many who have taken advantage of the 
Act, which must have been intended for the real insolvent, 
may be seen riding in their carriages, gigs, and horses, keeping
their villas, &c, &c, as if they were actually in full trade, 
keeping up costly establishments".
A preliminary distinction was made between debtors1 and 
creditors* petitions, but thereafter, once the matter was 
operative pursuant to the Act, the procedure was identical, 
and the former were complete on surrender of estate, the latter 
after adjudication by the Court. By section 3 any Judge could 
accept the surrender of the estate of a petitioner declaring 
himself insolvent. This operated whether the debtor was in 
prison or at large - an extension of the English law (which 
applied this benefit only to debtors in execution). The Judge 
was to call for such proof of insolvency or make such examin­
ation as he considered necessary before referring to the Com­
missioner the sequestration of the estate for the benefit of 
the insolvent’s creditors. An analogous power existed with 
regard to petitions by representative parties having the ad-
Z,U>ministration cf the estates of other persons.
A report of the first meeting of creditors convened under
the Act is contained in The Sydney Morning Herald of 18th Feb- 
25ruary 1842. The procedure adopted at that meeting was that 
"in those cases where payment had been secured by warrants of 
attorney, the creditors were sworn as to the truth of its con­
tents, and the debt being a bona fide debt. Where a judgment 
had been obtained for a debt, the creditor, not having formal 
proof of judgment, was called on to prove the debt in the same 
manner as it was proved in the court when the judgment had been 
obtained, and unless the record was produced and proved, the 
costs of obtaining that judgment were not allowed. In cases 
where the amount claimed was represented by a promissory note, 
the plaintiff was required to give proof of the handwriting 
of the insolvent, and in no case was the insolvent’s admission 
of the debt being due received as evidence, although repeatedly 
tendered"•
By section 13 any Judge could accept a petition by a cre­
ditor praying for the sequestration of the estate of a person 
who had committed any one of a number of defined acts of
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insolvency* The petition was to be supported by affidavit
evidence in proof of the debt alleged and security was to be
26  Z7given. Provided the debt amounted to at least fifty pounds
the Judge had authority by order under hand to place the in­
solvent's estate in the hands of the Commissioner for seques­
tration. These powers extended to the sequestration of estates
28 2,9of companies or partnerships and of deceased estates.
Acts of insolvency were defined by section 5. Until such
an act was committed the creditors were armed with no power to
compel sequestration. The acts consisted, in effect, of the
following:
A) where a person having property in the Colony departed 
from the Colony.
B) where a person having property in the Colony and, being 
out of New South Wales, remained absent or departed from his 
dwelling house; subject to the proviso in each case that it 
be established that such person intended to defeat or delay 
his creditors.
C) where a person being subject of the "sentence of any com­
petent Court" failed to satisfy the same or to make available 
sufficient disposable property to allow of such satisfaction.
D) where a person made a fraudulent alienation, gift, 
surrender, delivery, mortgage or pledge of any of his estate, 
goods or effects or gave any fraudulent warrant of attorney 
or cognovit actionem. In this regard section 6 limited such 
dealings to those made by a person who at the time was actually 
insolvent and who entered into the transaction without valuable 
consideration.
All alienations, transfers, gifts, surrenders or deliveries 
of any property after a person had contracted a debt and within 
twelve months of his commission of an act of insolvency or the 
sequestration of his estate were liable to be set aside summarily 
at the suit of the creditor injured thereby^0 Such dealings, 
when having the effect of preferring any creditor after com­
mencement of insolvency or within sixty days of sequestration
1  31order, were absolutely void, excepting where the transaction
was with a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and
for a just price or in satisfaction of a debt. All such
dealings after the making of a sequestration order were like- 
33wise void. By section 11 all "acquittances surrenders or 
discharges" of debts or of security for debts, payment or 
delivery of which had not been actually and bona fide received 
and having the effect of depriving creditors of the benefit of 
such debts, were void when made by a person actually insolvent 
or contemplating the surrender of his estate or knowing that 
insolvency proceedings had been commenced against him or within 
sixty days of a sequestration order. The following section 
prescribed that all payments made to a creditor by a person 
not compellable by legal process to make them, at a time when 
he knew himself to be insolvent, were deemed fraudulent, with 
specified exceptions in the case of good faith.
After a sequestration order was obtained, a copy was lod­
ged with the Sheriff for notation and delivery to the Chief
3»vCommissioner who was the proper officer by his messenger to
35seize and attach the insolvent's estate, inclusive of movable
property. In practice, the Sheriff and his officers also
3 7acted as the Commissioner's messenger. Thereafter the peti­
tioning creditor was to take out against the debtor a summons 
to show cause why the estate should not be sequestrated for
38the benefit of creditors generally and on the return thereof 
the Court would receive proof and determine whether the order
for sequestration be confirmed or superseded or the petition
39dismissed. It was obligatory for the petition to be dismissed
k-oif shown to be unfounded, vexatious or malicious. If seques­
tration were superseded, other creditors having provable debts 
were enabled by section 28 to secure its revival. Immediately 
on lodgement of order for sequestration with the Sheriff, exe- 
cution of any other judgement or process was stayed as were
kitother actions against the insolvent, subject to the appointment 
of trustees to continue any action for damages in an uncertain 
sum so that the decision of the Court could ground a specific
proof in the distribution of the insolvent’s estate* Again, 
an insolvent in legal custody on other process of the Court 
was to be released either absolutely or conditionally in the
Lbdiscretion of a Judge. Any legal action commenced by an in­
solvent person prior to sequestration order was stayed at once 
until the trustee of his estate elected whether to prosecute 
or discontinue it, provided that the insolvent could continue 
in his own name and benefit any action for personal injury or
44-wrong done to himself or to any member of his family. By 
section 55 a sequestration order had the effect of divesting 
title from the insolvent or persons administering his estate 
and vesting it in the Commissioner for the purposes of the 
sequestration.
Sections 34 and 35 of the Act dealt with the convening 
by the Chief Commissioner of public meetings of creditors.
Two such meetings were to be notified, the first for the re­
ceiving of proofs of debts and the second for the same purpose 
and for the election of a trustee. The second meeting could 
be dispensed with if the estate were under £100 in value and 
an immediate ranking of proving creditors could proceed. A 
third meeting was later to be convened by the Commissioner to 
receive a report from the trustees.
Debts were to be proved by affidavit or such other mode 
of proof as the Commissioner should require and he had power 
to reject proofs subject to a right of appeal to any Judge.
The Commissioner was to state the appropriate accounts be- 
tween the parties in the case of mutual debts or mutual credits 
and to accept proofs of debts actually contracted by the insol­
vent to pay creditors at future dates, subject to conditions 
as to interest on dividends and the voting rights of such cre- 
ditors. Any creditor holding a pledge or lien as security was 
obliged to value it and deduct it from the total amount of his 
proof, voting only in respect of the balance then remaining/'9 
Where a debt depended upon a contingency, the creditor could 
not prove until the contingency happened unless he applied to
57
the insolvent’s trustee to set a value upon the debt. Ele­
mentary provisions as to preferential creditors were laid down 
by sections 41 and 42. By the former, landlords were entitled 
to priority in respect of six months rent with right to rank 
pari passu with other creditors for the balance, while the 
latter enabled clerks or servants of an insolvent to be paid 
preferentially six months salary or wages.
At the public meetings of creditors only those having
sidebts of £50 sterling or more could vote, either personally or
52-by agent appointed in writing. Where a second meeting was held,
not more than three trustees were to be chosen for the collec-
53tion, administration and distribution of the insolvent estate. 
All creditors eligible to vote could participate in the election 
of trustees and any interested person was accorded a right of 
complaint to the Chief Commissioner against the trustees appoin­
ted, provided that he acted before the election was confirmed 
by the Supreme Court. The Court itself had power to appoint 
a provisional trustee under section 50 pending the meeting's 
decision. As soon as the appointment of trustees was confirmed 
by the Court, title to the insolvent's property was divested 
from the Commissioner and vested in them for the uses and pur- 
poses of the sequestration with power to sell and dispose of 
any goods or chattels of which the insolvent was the reputed 
owner. The trustees could litigate suits by or against the
55insolvent in their discretion. Trustees were liable by section
57 to be removed for misconduct or absence from the Colony and
in such cases, or on a trustee's death, the vacancy was to be
57filled at a fresh election duly confirmed by the Court. Pro­
vision for trustees to resign was contained in section 93* Any 
trustee could call a general meeting of the creditors and re­
quire their directions as to the disposal of any part of the 
estate. Such meeting had to be called on the petition of 
one-fourth in value of the total number of creditors. By 
section 78, trustees could compound or compromise debts due 
to the estate and could submit disputes to arbitration. In
addition to the power of sale granted by section 55 they could
by section 79» on giving notice in the Government Gazette, sell
any of the insolvent’s estate, real as well as personal - with
the exception of wearing apparel, bedding, tools of trade and
household furniture of the insolvent and his family, subject
to authorization by the creditors. The trustees could also
proceed with or abandon, as they deemed best, any agreement
which the insolvent made for the purchase or exchange of any 
60
real property. Detailed accounts were to be kept by the trus- 
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tees and a formal statement of account and plan of distribution 
were to be prepared by them and submitted to the Court.
The Act imposed severe penalties on any insolvent who made 
default in complying with its provisions. By section 66 no in­
solvent could leave the jurisdiction or move to remote places 
within the Colony until the trustees* account and plan of dis­
tribution had been passed or prior consent given by a three- 
fourths majority of the creditors. If these provisions were 
not observed, a Justice of the Peace on the information of any 
trustee, creditor or interested party could issue a warrant 
for the insolvent’s arrest, on which he could in due course be 
committed to gaol. An insolvent could at any time be examined 
before the Court or Commissioner concerning matters showing 
secrecy or concealment in his dealings and in relation to his
63
estate generally and he was liable in default to be apprehended
and sentenced to ’transportation” for seven years or imprison-
ment for three years or lesser periods in either case. Refusal
to comply with the requirements of the second meeting of cre­
ssditors was a ground for commital pending compliance. In cases 
where wilfully fraudulent insolvency was established, section 
73 provided for punishment by ’’transportation” for a maximum 
of fifteen years and a minimum of five years or imprisonment 
for a maximum of five years and a minimum of three years. Im­
prisonment of uncertificated insolvents for failure to meet 
their debts was expressly provided for by section 100.
After receipt by the Commissioner of the trustees* accounts
and plan of distribution, the documents remained open to objection
66
during a reasonable time by the insolvent himself or any aggrieved
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creditor or other interested partyt Any person objecting had 
to make application to the Court and obtain a rule calling 
upon the trustees to show cause why the plan should not be
ggamended, subject to the determination of which, the Court had 
jurisdiction on the trustees' application to confirm and allow
69the plan of distribution. This had the effect of a final judge­
ment as between insolvent and creditors and as to the amount 
of any debts, unless admitted by the Court after that time and 
before final distribution. Once the plan had been allowed, 
the trustees on demand of the creditors were to distribute the
70estate.
Following the third meeting of creditors and completion
of any necessary examination, the insolvent could apply to the
creditors for a certificate of their consent to his discharge.
If this were granted by at least three-fourths in number and
value of the creditors, application could be made to the Court
71for the certificate to be allowed. However, the insolvent was
not entitled to such certificate if he had committed the crime
rzof fraudulent insolvency. When the Certificate was allowed by
the Court, the insolvent was forthwith discharged from all
debts due by him at the time of the surrender of his estate
and from all other claims or demands provable against the 
T3estate. Such certificate was sufficient evidence of release
from any cause of action arising on debts due at the time of
surrender of the insolvent's estate and the making of the se-
7Vquestration order.
The Court was invested by section 103 with power to make 
rules, orders and regulations for the execution of the Act, 
the form and manner of proceeding and the scale of fees.
The Act, in summary, demonstrated a new and liberal app­
roach to the problem of commercial debt. Imprisonment was 
recognized as a useless remedy and a deprivation of civil 
rights, though it was not abolished. The attempt to protect 
the insolvent's assets and to make a proper distribution was 
far more satisfactory than had previously been the case. Burton 
in his practice book "The Insolvent Law of New South Wales" 
epitomized his intentions in these words: "Sufficient care
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it may be hoped ... has been taken that no person shall be
divested of the administration of his estate without good
cause; to say nothing, in this place, of the ample remedy
which the law provides, if any one so pursue him maliciously.
But the way in which alone creditors can proceed, after the
commission of such acts as these, also ensures his protection
against either surprise or unfounded persecution; and in this
will be found a beneficial departure from the English bankrupt
laws: Bo docket can be struck, or fiat issue against him, of
which he is ignorant; he cannot be made subject to the law
without having an opportunity of defending himself, if he can,
vsbefore the Supreme Court”.
Lord Stanley, however, had views of a different kind - 
"On the Insolvent Debtors Act, No. 17, Her Majesty's Decision 
is suspended. At this distance from the Colony, it is impossible 
to estimate aright enactments so numerous and minute, and re­
lating to matters of which the interest and the significancy 
are so peculiarly local. This is one of those Laws, which can 
be brought to no satisfactory test but that of experience. After 
it shall have been in operation for two Years, you will have ac­
quired such an insight into the defects and advantages of the 
Law as will enable you with confidence to report on the actual
76results of it". This seriousness of attitude was dictated by 
parsimony rather than a sense of justice. Governor Gipps had 
foreshadowed this. In 1842 he had written to the noble Lord;
"I thought it proper to resist the demands, which were made 
upon me to create New offices under this Act, to be a burthen 
on the public revenue; and that it is consequently provided, 
by the 1st Clause of the Act, that the Commissioners and others 
to be employed in carrying it into execution are to be appoin­
ted by the Chief Justice, and to take such fees as may be
77allowed them by orders issued from time to time by the Judges".
To this came the uncompromising reply: "I think that the
Patronage given to the Chief Justice by the first clause 
should be vested in the Crown, or in the Governor acting
61
on Her Majesty’s behalf* The responsibility of a Judge for
the right execution of a Trust of this kind is so nearly no-
minal that I apprehend he is not the proper depository of it”.
So there was nothing to do but to change the law and,
while the amendments were in the draftsman’s hands, a Select
Committee of the Legislative Council took the opportunity of
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considering the insolvency law generally. It was already ap­
parent that the law could not meet the troubled financial pro­
blems of the day. The Australian, which such a short time be­
fore had gushed superlatives in praise of the measure, now said 
of it: ”The Insolvent Law is working very badly. A large num­
ber of disreputable persons have taken ample advantage of a 
measure, which, excellent as it no doubt is in many parts, is 
found practically to work entirely in favour of the debtor, and 
to the severe detriment of the creditor. ... The fact is that 
the law is not sufficiently stringent. It is to be sincerely 
trusted that the Judges will cause a reform in the Court; that 
they will place the highly responsible office of Commissioner 
in more able and efficient hands; and that they will give to
the administration of this portion of justice, more scrutiny
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than has hitherto been exercised”. The Select Committee was 
convened in November, 1843, and gave its report a month later. 
The Committee expressed the view that ’’the principle of the 
Insolvent Act is founded in justice and reason, and that the 
abuses, frauds, and waste of property, which have undoubtedly 
to a considerable extent attended the working of the Act, may 
be attributed in a great measure to the unparalleled distress
Q 1
of the times”.
To the Governor's alarm, the Committee, in addition to 
the fiscal amendments demanded by Lord Stanley, proposed 
several dramatic changes, which became embodied in a Bill 
passed as 7 Vic. No. 19* These changes were:
(1) a recurrence to the system of voluntary assignments (which 
had been legalized under 5 Vic. No. 9 but abolished by 5 Vic. 
No. 17).
(2) the appointment of official assignees to manage estates
(Governor and Judges alike were embarrassed by this, Governor 
Gipps observing: wIt was proposed that the appointment of
Official Trustees (sic) should be given to the Governor; but 
I declined it on the ground that the Government has nothing to 
do with the Administration of Insolvent Estates, and that, ... 
it would be scarcely possible to make the Public believe that 
the Government was not responsible for their good conduct, and
for any losses or deficiencies which might arise out of their
82/misconduct”).
(3) to give the Chief Commissioner power of committal for con­
tempt.
(4) that the power of granting certificates of discharge be 
taken from creditors and vested in the Judges. (Alfred Stephen 
considered that this power might be delegated to the Commiss­
ioner, but the Act compromised by transferring it to the
83Commissioner and the Judges).
(5) that allowances be made to insolvents in the Commissioners 
discretion.
(6) that imprisonment for debt be abolished, being ”a cause 
of unmixed evil”.
The last was a momentous step. ”1 at first thought that 
I could not give my assent to this enactment”, wrote the Gover­
nor to Lord Stanley, ”and it was only after considerable doubt 
and hesitation that I did so. It appeared to me that, in a 
matter of so much importance, a Colonial Legislature ought 
scarcely to take the lead of Parliament; and I even doubted 
whether an enactment, which went on to deprive creditors of a 
right, which (whether it be a barbarous one or not) the Law of 
England has for Centuries allowed to them, might not be re­
pugnant to the Law of England. On the score of repugnancy 
however my scruples were removed by the Law Officers of the 
Crown and Mr. Justice Burton, who, as your Lordship is aware, 
has taken a leading part in everything relating to the Laws 
of Debtor and Creditor in the Colony”.
Shortly before the above provisions were enacted, a set 
of three Bills was submitted to the Council at the instance
of W. C. Wentworth, and passed. The second of these for the 
prevention of the wasting of the property of insolvents, be­
came 7 Vic. No. 4. The object of the Act was "to facilitate 
the granting of Letters of License to persons who, though un­
able to meet their immediate engagements, may be in possession 
of property, which, if fair prices could only be obtained for 
it, would be sufficient to satisfy all their creditors. A 
Letter of License has, under this Act, the effect of protecting 
the individual receiving it from the operation of the Insolvent 
Law, and of leaving him in the management of his own property; 
whereas if he became insolvent, it would be handed over under 
the Insolvent Law to the management of Trustees". Yet this 
did not inspire the Governor to expect much benefit "the ten­
dency of it being to increase the "bolstering up", as it is
8Tcalled, of persons in a tottering condition". He therefore 
assented to it with considerable hesitation as he felt that it 
would increase or prolong the indebtedness of the Colony.
Lord Stanley’s reply in its usual acerbity declared that:
"As that Law will expire in little more than two years from 
its date, The Queen will not disallow it. But neither can Her 
Majesty be advised expressly to sanction it. Until it shall 
have expired by the lapse of time, it will therefore continue 
to operate. But you will understand yourself as being dis­
tinctly prohibited from again assenting to a Law enabling a 
debtor to continue in possession of his property, and to avoid 
the ordinary legal responsibility to any one of his creditors 
under shelter of a license granted for that purpose by his 
other creditors"!6
The 7 Vic. No. 19 became law on 21st. December, 1843* It 
was styled "An Act to amend an Act intituled An Act for giving 
relief to Insolvent Persons and providing for the administration 
of Insolvent Estates and to abolish Imprisonment for Debt".
It dealt in the first instance with the scale of fees taken in 
the Court and extensively modified them. It also provided on 
the administrative side that the rules of Court authorized under 
5 Vic. No. 17 could only take effect on being laid before the
Legislative Council for approval. These clauses embodied the 
amendments which Lord Stanley had demanded.
To protect conveyances and assignments executed in con­
formity with sections 33 and 34 of the Advancement of Justice 
Act from being the basis of acts of insolvency it was prescribed 
by section 8 of 7 Vic, No, 19 that such documents would be 
deemed not to be fraudulent or void. However, a Judge could 
on petition of the creditors, summon the insolvent to give an 
account of his affairs before and after the conveyance or assign­
ment in question and, if his explanations were not satisfactory, 
he could be committed to prison. As a safeguard, section 9 re­
quired trustees appointed under such conveyances or assignments 
to keep accounts and to submit these to the Court when required, 
subject to penalties for misconduct. Purchasers bona fide and 
for value were not obliged to make any enquiry when dealing with 
such trustees, in accordance with protection afforded them by 
section 11 of the Act.
As has been noted, a new title of Official Assignee was 
constituted by this amendment, though the Judges generally dis- 
liked the innovation. The Chief Justice could appoint as many 
fit persons as necessary to be Official Assignees of Insolvent 
Estates. This power avoided that previously held by any of the 
Judges to appoint provisional trustees, and made it optional 
for creditors to elect any trustee or assignee^0 Forthwith on 
the appointment of an Official Assignee as assignee of an estate, 
the insolvent’s title vested in him alone or jointly with an
91elected trustee if the creditors so exercised their discretion. 
The assignee had the same title to transfer as the insolvent
Ctp_rhad enjoyed immediately on the sequestration of his estate.
Speaking in anxious tones, foreseeing no doubt the wrath 
of his overlord at the arbitrary extension of the statute by 
the colonial Committee, Governor Gipps apologetically reported 
on the measure that it ’’grew in favor every day with the Public;
I waited as long as I could for objection from any quarter, but 
none came; and I consequently, though only on the same day 
that I prorogued the Council, gave in Her Majesty’s name my
assent to the measure”
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Such presumption was too great for the Law of England to 
tolerate quietly - ”the Act ••• raises questions of such per­
manent importance that Her Majesty’s decision on it will be 
suspended, until I shall be in possession of a Report, which 
you will make as speedily as may be as to the effect which may 
have actually resulted from the Law, since the Enactment of it 
in December 1843".^ Hot content with this, Lord Stanley demanded 
also a report from the Judges and from some of the principal 
merchants and landholders. So the tiresome procedure of making 
enquiries began again. His Excellency considered that 7 Vic.
No. 19 should be confirmed - a view which the attorneys of the 
Court, most of the Judges and some of the Crown Law Officers 
vigorously opposed on technical grounds. The Governor’s own 
observations certainly carried great force as against these:
”1 have had abundant occasion”, he said, ”to observe the evils 
which are produced in the Colony by the facility with which 
credit c.an be obtained, and by the prevailing passion for liti­
gation. The abolition of Imprisonment for debt is calculated,
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I believe, to check both these evils”.
The British Government’s attitude on the Colonial Insol­
vency Law was unpardonably negative. It would not take time 
to prepare a comprehensive legislation for the Colony, yet when 
Acts were submitted by those who might be expected best to know 
the Colony’s needs they were effectively vetoed. This was at 
a time when the Colony's economy was in a perilous position 
and credit was seriously depressed. Governor Gipps was alarmed 
by the ”extent to which Insolvency has occurred amongst all 
classes of the Community, even among men who were a short time
97ago considered in wealthy circumstances”. Against this back­
ground the Legislative Council spent considerable time in en­
deavouring to reach a remedy and, by 1844, it directed a further 
Select Committee to report on the existing state of the Insol­
vent Law.
The work of this Committee was somewhat overshadowed by 
a discovery which led to the passing of 8 Vic. No. 15. The
discovery was ‘that the existing law made no provision for a 
trustee to make a legal transfer of title to a purchaser from 
him. "The mystery is”, the Sydney Morning Herald censoriously 
asserted, "not so much that the defect should have occurred in 
the original enactment, as that it should not have been dis­
covered by the Council and its Select Committees whilst framing 
and discussing their two or three successive Amendment Bills; 
that it should have escaped the notice of the learned CHIEF 
COMMISSIONER of the Insolvent Court, and of the several orders 
of practitioners therein; and especially that the legal advisers 
of purchasers of sequestrated freeholds should have overlooked 
so radical a blemish in their clients1 titles. How the blunder 
was at last found out, and to whose sagacity the public are
98indebted for its timely exposure, does not appear”.
The 8 Vic. No. 15 was one of two Insolvency statutes passed 
in 1844# It was preceded by 8 Vic. No. 6 ”An Act to further 
amend an Act intituled An Act for giving relief to Insolvent 
Persons and providing for the administration of Insolvent Es­
tates and to abolish Imprisonment for Debt” which operated in 
Port Phillip only. The 8 Vic. No. 15 had a similar title and 
did take effect in the Colony. It recited that doubts had 
arisen as to the nature and duration of the estate and inter­
est of trustees of insolvent estates and as to their powers to 
effect conveyances; the deficiencies were at once rectified. 
Trustees were to take the estate of their insolvents in such 
estate or interest as the insolvents respectively had, with 
power to convey title accordingly.
There remained difficulties in the disposal of an insol­
vent’s estate by his assignees or trustees, particularly in 
that the expenses were so high and that the existing legislation 
left some loopholes so far as the title to the insolvent’s pro­
perty was concerned. To resolve these ”An Act to remove diffi­
culties in the disposal administration and distribution of In­
solvent Estates” was passed in October 1846 as 10 Vic. No. 14. 
Upon a judicial order for the appointment of an official assigne
or for the sequestration of an estate after the passing of the 
Act, the whole of the insolvent’s real and personal estate was
to vest in the assignee or trustee for such estate or interest 
as the insolvent had in it. Where an assignee was appointed 
by the creditors, the official assignee*s exclusive title would 
be converted into a joint title with the elected officer. Either 
assignee could effectively convey, assign, release or assure any 
part of the insolvent*s real or personal estate by deed and pur­
chasers, mortgagees or other persons dealing with the assignees 
were relieved from enquiring whether the directions of the cre­
ditors had been obtained and as to the authority generally of 
the trustees to convey. This did not, however, operate to ex­
cuse trustees or assignees from the *'unobservance or nonper­
formance** of their duties. On the insolvent's release from 
sequestration the residue of his property was to re-vest in 
him. Two statutes may be mentioned here which had a slight in­
fluence on the Insolvency Law: 13 Vic. No. 12 of 1849» an Act
to prevent the escape from the Colony of fraudulent debtors 
whereby writs of ca. re. and ca. sa. were enabled to be executed 
on Sundays: 17 Vic. No. 17 was an Act for the appropriation of
unclaimed balances in Intestate and Insolvent Estates.
Abuse of the power which 5 Vic. No. 17 and 7 Vic. No. 19 
had vested in creditors to give directions to assignees and 
trustees led to its curtailment in 1857 by 20 Vic. No. 24.
This required that the directions of the creditors had first 
to be ratified by the Chief Commissioner before they could become 
binding. A formal appeal to any Judge was allowed from the 
Commissioner's decision.
An Act declaratory of the powers of any Chief Commissioner 
of Insolvent Estates with regard to the issue of certificates 
of discharge was found necessary in 1853 in the 17 Vic. No. 32. 
The Chief Commissioner was further enabled by an amending Act 
of 1855» 19 Vic. No. 33, to enquire into all charges of fraud­
ulent insolvency with powers of committal and all the authority 
of a Justice of the Peace. Not until 1861 was the Chief 
Commissioner's own office regularized by the fixing of an 
annual salary (£1000) and the granting of a statutory assurance 
of tenure of office during "ability and good behaviour". This
was effected by 24 Vic. No. 20, the Insolvency Commissioner’s 
Act, which also prescribed that the Commissioner be a barrister 
or attorney of at least seven years standing. Master Deffell 
unenthusiastically wrote to the Chief Justice that he would 
endeavour to discharge the joint duties of Master in Equity and 
Chief Commissioner "as did the late lamented Judge Milford for
H 9 9some years prior to 1856. Very extensive authority was accorded 
to the Chief Commissioner by An Act to amend the Laws relating 
to Insolvency, 25 Vic. No. 8 which became law on the 26th. 
December, 1861. That officer was to have all the authority and 
powers of a Judge of a Court of Record and the powers and juris­
diction vested in and exercised by the Supreme Court or any of 
the Judges thereof but only with regard to the sequestration 
or release of estates, the direction and prosecution of exam­
inations, ordering payment of dividends, confirming plans of 
distribution and accounts and supervising payments by an insol­
vent person on becoming able to satisfy his creditors. An 
appeal was reserved to the Supreme Court. The Commissioner’s 
approval or refusal of certificates of discharge was no longer 
a matter for ratification by the Court and the Commissioner was 
declared to have control and direction over the Official Assig­
nees. All sales of any insolvent’s property by private contract 
had to be approved in writing by the Commissioner. Much of the 
jurisdiction of the Court was thus divested from it and placed 
in the hands of a ministerial officer.
The same Act created a position of Registrar in Insolvency - 
an administrative appointment concerned with the preservation 
of the records and keeping of the books and accounts of the 
Insolvency Department and with the taxation of costs. Meetings 
of creditors and proofs of debts could, by order of the Com­
missioner, proceed before the Registrar.
In 1862 a Select Committee of the Legislative Council was 
■100appointed to consider an attempt at consolidation called the 
Insolvent Law Consolidation Bill drafted by Mr. Commissioner
' i  o iMcFarland, the then Chief Commissioner of Insolvent Estates.
The Bill was expressed to abolish the office of Chief Commissioner
and to transfer to a separate Court the jurisdiction exercised 
by that officer and by the District Commissioners and Official 
Assignees in Insolvency.
Giving evidence before the Committee, McFarland said of 
the existing local Acts of Parliament that they were not "to 
say the least of it, suitable to the present circumstances of 
the Colony, and to the magnitude of the commercial and other 
interests at present affected by it; that (they are) defective 
in many respects, injurious to the general body of creditors in 
insolvent estates, and an inducement to fraud”. So far as juris­
diction was concerned, the Commissioner thought that his own 
office was judicial in all respects but in name and went on to 
observe that "up to the present hour there is not in this Colony 
any Court of Insolvency; nine-tenths of the jurisdiction in 
Insolvency is vested in the Chief Commissioner under the 25th 
Victoria No. 8, sections 4, 5» 6, 7 &c., and the remaining tenth
103still remains in the Supreme Court ..• The Chief Commissioner 
virtually and substantially, has within himself, nearly all the 
Insolvency jurisdiction - but still he does not constitute a 
Court, and he is not a Court; there is no Court of Insolvency
'LOU-in the Colony and I know that this operates injuriously”.
The Committee was not favourably impressed by the proposal 
to abolish the Chief Commissioner's office and recommended its 
retention. It further recommended that the Court of Insolvency 
should be precluded from trying criminal offences against the 
Insolvent Law unless the insolvent himself should consent to 
its jurisdiction. The matter did not become of significance as 
the Bill was discharged from the paper after the return of the 
Committee's report.105
It was uncertain under the then existing legislation 
whether the requirements of proof of insolvency had been entirely 
satisfied in the orders of the Chief Commissioner made in the 
early 1860's. To remedy this 27 Vic. No. 4 "An Act to render 
valid certain orders of Sequestration in Insolvency" was passed 
in December 1863, whereby all orders made were deemed effective 
notwithstanding deficiencies of proof. In 1867 an Act to
facilitate proceedings in Insolvency, 31 Vic. No. 9> became law. 
This was designed to simplify the proof of debts by companies 
by permitting a duly constituted agent of a corporation to pre­
sent petitions and make any necessary oaths in the corporate 
name. This would apply whether the creditor were in the Colony 
or absent from it. Default in payment to creditors by an Official 
Assignee named William Perry led to a special enactment, 36 Vic. 
No. 16 for distribution of the funds. Of passing interest is 
"An Act to amend the law of Arrest and Imprisonment on Civil 
Process", 37 Vic. No. 11 of 1874. By section 5 of that Act any 
person in custody pursuant to a judgement under a writ of ca. sa. 
or ca. re. was entitled to be discharged on the sequestration 
of his estate when the Chief Commissioner absolutely or condit­
ionally so ordered, but subject to restrictions on the debtor’s 
departure from the Colony.
What may be described as the first (and indeed the last) 
consolidating Insolvency Act was introduced in 1874 - 38 Vic.
No. 1 - An Act to expedite and lessen the expense of proceedings 
in Insolvency. This Act prescribed that the Insolvency Juris­
diction of the Supreme Court was to continue to be exercised as 
"a superior Court of Record of Law and Equity". Orders of Court 
in Insolvency were to have the same force and effect as judge­
ments at Law or decrees in Equity. It did not (with the excep­
tion of a portion of 5 Vic. No. 17) repeal prior Acts, but sti­
pulated how many and what portions of the earlier statutes con­
ferred jurisdiction in the first instance on the Chief Commiss­
ioner. To this extent the Commissioner was accorded cumulatively 
with authorities already vesting in him all the powers possessed 
and exercised by the Supreme Court or any Judge whether in Cham­
bers or in open Court. An appeal from District Commissioners to 
the Chief Commissioner and from the Chief Commissioner to the 
Court was reserved. The Commissioner was to be one of a panel 
with two Judges to frame general Rules of Court in Insolvency, 
other than Rules on appeals. For the purposes of the then 
Companies Act, the Commissioner was deemed to be "the Court"
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BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
The Bankruptcy Act of 1887 entirely changed the structure
of the Insolvency Jurisdiction and gave to the reconstituted
department the title of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, which was vested in the Judge in Bankruptcy. The judicial
powers thus remained with the Court, the great advantage being
that a single tribunal was at last established, obviating the
need which had sometimes arisen of resorting to various Courts in
respect of matters arising out of one and the same estate. A more
dramatic alteration was the merging of the office of Chief Commissioner
of Insolvent Estates in the new Judgeship (subject to modified
pension rights) pursuant to section 128. This was a necessary
consequence of the very wide powers vested in the Chief Commissioners
since the institution of their office under 5 Vic. No. 17» The
Commissioner had only performed ministerial duties and so did
not constitute a tribunal in his own rights he was therefore
limited to the specific matters delegated to him by statute.
Because of this, suitors were again under necessity at times of
proceeding in other jurisdictions. In one recorded case six
actions had to be prosecuted in respect of the same estate in
separate Courts - the Supreme Court at Common Law, the Supreme
Court in Equity, the Insolvency Court, a County District Court,
2a Sydney District Court and a Police Court.
The Judge was enabled by section 130 of the 1887 Act to decide 
all questions of priorities and all other questions whether of law 
or equity or questions of fact in any case in Bankruptcy coming 
before him. However, the Judge had a discretion to refer matters 
of fact to a jury and could grant new trials in respect of such 
matters. ’’The 130th section of the Bankruptcy Act is intended by 
the Legislature to give the Judge in Bankruptcy as full cower of 
dealing with all matters that arise before him as formerly could 
have been obtained in the other jurisdictions of the Court, either
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at law or in Equity. The provision is a most beneficial one,
because instead of obliging the Bankruptcy Court to relegate to
the other jurisdictions the matters which arise before the Court
itself, the Judge in Bankruptcy is able to deal with them as fully
and finally as if they had come before the Primary Judge in Equity
or before one of the Common Law Judges”, per Owen, CJ in Eq., in 
s
Re Samuel Wilson. The Judge, being a member of the Supreme Court 
could sit in other jurisdictions, and the Act expressly contemplated 
that other Judges would take his place in vacation or during his 
absence or illness, unless an Acting Judge in Bankruptcy were 
appointed. The Judge’s orders were enforceable in the same manner 
as other orders of Supreme Court Judges. The Judge could exercise 
the whole or any part of his jurisdiction in Chambers and could 
delegate to the Registrar in Bankruptcy such powers as he considered 
expedient. The Judge ordinarily would not interfere with the 
Registrar’s discretion after delegation though an appeal from the 
Registrar was so much a re-hearing that the practice was for the 
Judge to substitute his own discretion for the Registrar’s in 
reaching his decision. Any person having a right of audience 
before the Chief Commissioner had that right preserved qua the 
Judge pursuant to section 134 of the 1887 Act. The Judge was not 
amenable to the writs of Prohibition or Mandamus, but an appeal 
lay to the Pull Court from his decisions under section 135* The 
Judge himself could not be a member of the bench on the appeal.
By 60 Vic. No. 29, section 135 was amended to provide that appeals 
should be by way of re-hearing and this was confirmed by section 
138 of the 1898 Act. The consolidation, however, failed to repeal 
section 135 of the 1887 Act thus causing a palpable inconsistency, 
especially as Re Farrar had laid down that appeals under the 1887 
Act were not re-hearings so that only the original evidence could 
be considered on the appeal. The then Chief Justice expressed
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regret and surprise in reaching this decision hut could see no
authority in the Act from which the Court could exercise more than
a power of appeal proper. His Honour said: "From the outset I
confess I have been unable to see why the Bankruptcy Act should
not have given to this Court the same powers as the Equity Act
gave it. I am unable to see any good reason why we should not
have the power of re-hearing cases which have been determined in
the Court of Bankruptcy, just as we have in cases determined by
The Chief Judge in Equity. ... I am of opinion that in order
that the right of re-hearing should be given to the Appellate Court,
it must be given by express words, or must be given in such a way
that the Appellate Court would have the same right of re-hearing
aas was the case before the Equity Act of 1880 was passed”. Innes, J., 
agreed that "the safest course, and in fact the only course, is to 
say that the Legislature has by the Bankruptcy Act precluded the 
Judges from conferring upon themselves a jurisdiction which the 
Act has not conferred".
The Bankruptcy Jurisdiction was autonomous and, unless a Court 
of Equity contained some jurisdiction which the Bankruptcy Court 
did not, there could be no suggestion of restraining Bankruptcy 
proceedings by injunction. Owen, CJ in Eq., held in Nicholls v.
to
Say we11 "The Equity Court is asked to interfere with the verdict 
on the ground that the verdict has been improperly obtained. It 
is contended that there was fraud in regard to the award and the 
conduct of the arbitrator, and the Court ought not to have acted 
on the verdict - that the Court of Bankruptcy is as capable of 
determining as this Court. Therefore, there is no ground for 
going out of the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court into the 
jurisdiction of the Equity Court for that purpose". A similar
i)
decision was reached by the Full Court in Re Wordsworth, which
nwas applied by Manning, J., in Re Thornley where he said "it is
my clear duty to remove to this (the Bankruptcy) Court all 
questions dealing with bankruptcy”.
The Act of 1887 made provision for the appointment of District 
Registrars in Bankruptcy and other necessary ministerial officers
•4.
who were all to be officers of the Supreme Court. The existing
staff of the Insolvency Court was to be taken over on this basis
isand to operate under the Bankruptcy Act. All such officers were 
to be remunerated out of consolidated revenue, with the curious 
anachronism that District Registrars were permitted in addition to 
take the fees received to their own use. The last-mentioned 
provision was deemed to have been repealed by 60 Vic. No. 17 and 
was accordingly omitted from the 1898 statute. The 60 Vic. No. 29 
made provision for the appointment of acting Registrars in the 
event of illness or indisposition of a District Registrar. Official 
assignees or trustees were also officers of the Court - their 
principal obligation to the Court being the payment of a percentage 
of the funds realized in the estate to the Treasury. The juris­
diction of the Registrar in Bankruptcy was prescribed with great 
particularity by section 141 of the 1887 Act and in much expanded 
terms by section 143 of the 1898 Act. A District Registrar had 
identical powers and jurisdiction in respect of examinations, 
issuing of summonses, enquiries or accounts.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1887 (51 Vic. No. 19) drew quite
n
substantially unon legislative reforms in the English Act of 1883.
It was much concerned with principles of public morality by 
promoting honest trading and raising the standards of commercial 
credit. At the same time it preserved in the creditors of a 
bankrupt fairly wide liberty to get in the bankrupt’s assets and 
to satisfy their own claims. Because the official control was of 
a limited kind, the Act did not entirely achieve its intentions.
The Act was divided into eight parts, which will here be
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considered, in turn.
PART_I Proceedings from Act of Bankruptcy to Discharge
Eleven acts of hankruptcy were specified, commission of any 
one of which rendered a person liable to be declared a bankrupt. 
Assignment to trustees for the benefit of creditors was the first 
ground. It could not be availed of unless the petitioning creditor 
represented at least one fifth in value of all creditors. The 
Supreme Court held in In re McCulloch that a creditor not referred 
to, or inaccurately referred to in a deed of assignment would not 
be bound by it. The second act of bankruptcy was the conveyance
ZOof the bankrupt's property with intention to defeat creditors.
This differed from the English Act, which required that the 
conveyance be fraudulent; so that it was sufficient in the Colony 
simply to show an intent (whether fraudulent or not) on the part 
of the bankrupt to defeat his creditors. Accordingly, an assign­
ment made on the eve of trial of a suit in anticipation of an 
adverse verdict manifested a sufficient intention to found an act
XTof bankruptcy. It was necessary, however, that the intention 
exist on both sides. By section 4 (l) (c) transfer or charge of 
property which would be void as a fraudulent preference if a 
sequestration order were made in fact, was made a further act of 
bankruptcy. Departing from or remaining out of the Colony, leaving 
or keeping house and wilful absence with intent to defeat or delay
itcreditors were also grounds. Again, if execution were levied and 
goods sold, but payment to a creditor refused, or if a person 
filed in Court a declaration of inability to pay debts or filed a 
bankruptcy petition against himself, acts of bankruptcy were 
committed. If a creditor obtained a final judgement against a 
debtor, or a bankruptcy notice were served, failure of the debtor 
to comply within the time limited was an act of bankruptcy, 
subject to any counter-claim or set-off. It is interesting to
observe the decision in Roberts v. Hill whereby a married woman
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possessed of separate estate could not be rendered liable under 
this section merely by service of a bankruptcy notice unless she 
had a protection order under 22 Vic. No. 6 s. 4* A ground existed 
under sub-section (h) if a debtor gave notice to his creditors that 
he had suspended or was about to suspend payment of his debts; 
under sub-section (i) if a person had been declared bankrupt in 
a British Court and not discharged; and under sub-section (j) if 
the majority of creditors at a meeting at which the debtor admitted 
his insolvency called on him to present a petition against himself 
and he did so. By section 8 (ll) it was also made an act of 
bankruptcy for a person to pay money or give security to a 
petitioning creditor after sequestration order made.
No jurisdiction was conferred on the Court to annul acts of
bankruptcy and rules of Court made to this end were declared void
z&
by the Privy Council in King v. Henderson. Lord Watson made this 
analysis: ’’These Acts define, with great minuteness, the various
ways in which an act of bankruptcy may be constituted, ore of them 
being by a bankruptcy notice under s. 4(2) of the principal Act. 
When an application is made for a sequestration order, which 
complies with the requirements of ss. 6, 7 and 8 of the same Act, 
ample discretion is vested in the Judge either to grant or refuse 
the petition; and, if a sequestration order be made, it may 
subsequently (s. 5(H)) "be discharged or annulled. But whilst 
the Judge may, in his discretion, competently refuse to follow up 
an act of bankruptcy by issuing a sequestration order, the statutes 
give him no jurisdiction to annul an act of bankruptcy, or to 
declare that it never was committed. There is no authority to be 
found for the procedure of the learned Judge, save in the 51st of 
the General Rules framed by the Court, which provides that »’When 
the Judge makes an order setting aside the bankruptcy notice, he 
may at the same time declare that no act of bankruptcy has been
committed by the debtor under such notice”. Now the only power 
which the Court has to frame rules is conferred by s. 119 of the 
principal Act, and it is strictly limited to rules ”for the 
purpose of regulating any matter under this Act.” In the opinion 
of their Lordships, a rule empowering the Judge to make a declaration 
that no act of bankruptcy had been committed under the notice, is 
in no sense a regulation either framed or calculated to carry out 
the objects of the Act. It is, in their opinion, the new creation 
of a jurisdiction which the Legislature withheld, it is inconsistent 
with and so far repeals the plain enactments of the statute, and 
it takes away from creditors the absolute right which the statute 
gave them of founding a petition for a sequestration order upon
2f\
the bankruptcy notice”.
The Judge was enabled by section 5 to make a sequestration 
order on proof of the commission of an act of bankruptcy. This 
was a new concept in the law of the Colony as it originated the 
idea of bankruptcy as a legal status actually affecting the 
personality and rights of the debtor. Even under the English 
legislation of 1883 a person was still left in the hands of his 
creditors to be adjudicated bankrupt, the Court’s ’’receiving order” 
merely permitting the creditors to proceed. The Judge's authority 
in the Colony was delegated to the Registrar in the case of
3cdebtors' petitions.
The conditions precedent to the making of an order were
that a liquidated debt of at least fifty pounds be due by a debtor
domiciled or usually resident in New South Wales who had committed
an act of bankruptcy not more than six months before presentation
of the petition. Creditors' petitions had to be verified by 
3*affidavit. This could be sufficient proof if the debtor failed 
to appear, but the Judge had discretion to refuse to make an order 
if dissatisfied with proof, or to allow the petition to stand over 
or be withdrawn. He could also stay or dismiss a petition where
an appeal or motion for new trial was pending, and could stay
proceedings to try questions relating to the debt, if the debtor
disputed it, but subject to security. Otherwise, a petition
v.could not be withdrawn without leave of the Judge which had to be 
obtained in solemn fashion after proving the determination of a 
settlement by affidavit. Debtors' petitions had merely to allege 
inability to pay debts, whereupon the Court was obliged to make an 
order, provided the proper form had been used.
It was apparent then that the administration of colonial 
estates in bankruptcy was primarily a matter for the Court. Of 
this Manning, J., said in Re Badgery: "When the Bankruptcy Act 
was passed the old Act (5 Vic, No. 19) relating to deeds of 
assignment was repealed and one must conclude, therefore, that in 
the opinion of the Legislature it was inexpedient to provide in 
any way for the compulsory administration of the estate outside 
of the Court of Bankruptcy, or, in other words, that prima facie 
all estates should be administered by the Court. The reason is 
fairly obvious: (l) That as a general rule the supervision of
the Court over the trustee is desirable; (2) that the inquisitorial 
powers of the Act can be applied to investigate the position of the 
debtor and favoured creditors; (3) that transactions can be 
impeached as preferences.
"It was, however, seen that possibly some estates might be 
wound up to the greater advantage of all the creditors by trustees 
outside the Court, and it was, therefore, provided that when a 
petition was presented against a debtor who had assigned his estate 
at Common Law for the benefit of his creditors, such trustees should 
have notice of the hearing of the petition, and the Judge was 
invested with power to dismiss the petition if he was satisfied 
that it would be for the advantage of creditors that the winding up 
should proceed under an assignment deed.
"This discretion, I think, should be exercised in cases where
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it is beyond, doubt clear that the estate can be easily 
administered, and that no question of law is likely to arise, 
and where the estate may have to be nursed in order to be realised 
to the best advantage; but if it is made to appear that questions 
of law will arise, the Court ought not to deprive any creditor - 
that is, any creditor to a substantial amount - from having the 
estate wound up in bankruptcy, and especially where there is any 
question of preferences, for preferences are generally nice questions 
of law, and there is no way of impeaching them except in the
l»aBankruptcy Court”.
Section 5 of the Act prescribed that, on the making of a 
sequestration order, a debtor became bankrupt and continued so 
until he was discharged or the order was annulled. Section 10 
extended this by defining the effects of the order. All the real 
and personal property of a bankrupt, or the whole of his estate in 
it, vested in an official assignee named in the order (or in any 
special manager appointed after sequestration order under section 
13). This applied to property of the bankrupt existing at the 
date of the commission of the first available act of bankruptcy, 
or acquired subsequently, whether between that act and the order 
or after the order. Any other property, for instance that within 
the reputed ownership of the bankrupt, was excluded. The relation 
back of the assignee’s title to the commission of an act of bank­
ruptcy marked the restoration of an old law, the doctrine of 
relation back having lapsed in the Colony after 5 Vic. No. 17« 
Immediately on the making of a sequestration order no person, 
without special leave, had any remedy against the bankrupts and 
signing judgement on a debt constituted a ’’remedy” for this 
purpose. However, secured creditors were protected to the extent 
that their title accrued prior to the material act of bankruptcy.
The Judge had power by sub-section (4) to stay actions or process
against the property or person of a debtor and could discharge him
out of custody, such discretion to he effective after presentation 
of petition and before sequestration order. As soon as a sequestration 
order was made, sub-section (2) became applicable. In addition, by 
sub-section (6) all actions or proceedings at law or in equity 
commenced by the bankrupt were stayed pending the official assignee's 
election whether to prosecute or discontinue them.
***Speaking of this sub-section in Re Summerhayes, Manning, J., 
said: "By our Act, s. 10, sub s. 6, which is similar to 5 Vic.
No. 17 s. 33, the official assignee, where a person who has brought 
an action has subsequently become bankrupt, has to elect within 
four weeks after notice whether he will prosecute or discontinue it.
If he can discontinue the action, it is admitted that he can bring 
another action in his own name, just as any other person who dis­
continued an action could do; but if he allowed the time to pass 
even by one day, it is said that he is then to be in the position 
of having absolutely abandoned all right of action; that is to say, 
he is in a worse position if he lies idle than if he absolutely 
refuses to have anything whatever to do with the action. I do not 
think that can be the meaning of this section. I think these words 
were put in to provide for the three courses open to the official 
assignee - (l) to go on, (2) stop, or (3) do nothing". To the 
argument that a common law suit could not be considered before the 
Bankruptcy Court where the official assignee had failed to give 
notice of his election to proceed within the prescribed time, his 
Honour replied: "If (the official assignee) is allowed to 
discontinue the proceedings and give notice of it, I do not see 
how on any reasonable ground whatever he can be in a worse position 
because he did not formally elect to do one thing or another. I 
think the official assignee has perfect liberty to proceed now, 
notwithstanding the jud.gment in the Court of common law, and that 
he has chosen to take proceedings in this Court he has done rightly.
In my opinion, all matters brought either by or against the official
assignees ought to he dealt with in this CourtM.
Following the making of a sequestration order, the debtor 
was to prepare a statement of his affairs showing his assets, 
debts and other liabilities, particulars of his debtors and creditors
*f7and of security given* Failure to comply was contempt of Court. 
Thereafter the first meeting of the bankrupt’s creditors was to be 
held at which he was to submit to such further examination as to
«V*his affairs as the meeting should require. This examination was 
discretionary, whereas the public examination before the Judge 
prescribed under section 18 was mandatory and any creditor had the 
opportunity of attending at the latter to question the bankrupt as 
to his affairs and the causes of his failure. The creditors could 
consider proposals for a composition or scheme of arrangement, 
determine whether the bankrupt be permitted to retain his personal 
effects, authorize the official assignee to allow the bankrupt’s 
retention of tools of trade and wearing apparel above the value 
of £20 and appoint a trustee or committee of inspection. Any such 
directions had to be submitted to the Judge for ratification, thus 
restoring the requirement of section 1 of 20 Vic. Wo. 24» That
statute and 5 Vic. Wo. 20 s. 17, which did not impose any
obligation to approach the Judge, were alike repealed by the 1887 
Act. Defell, J., held that section 16 re-established the old
practice in insolvency law and that it did not operate to enable
creditors who had failed to attend the meeting, to appear in Court 
and oppose a majority decision. In the case of estates under £200 
in value only one meeting of creditors was necessary, otherwise 
the official assignee or trustee could summon further such meetings 
at any time.
In addition to the power under section 16, the creditors
were enabled at any meeting by special resolution to entertain a
Stproposal for a composition or scheme of arrangement, subject to
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ratification by a further meeting and by the Judge. It may be 
noted that this machinery was defective in omitting any provision 
for annulment of bankruptcy on acceptance of scheme or composition. 
The Judge had an undefined discretion to refuse approval to a scheme 
or composition if he considered its terms unconducive to the benefit 
of the general body of creditors. If he approved, the debtor was 
at once released from all claims of creditors which could have been 
proved in the bankruptcy. If default were made in payment of an 
instalment under a composition, a creditor under the old law could 
sue for his whole debt, but the combined effect of section 10(2) 
and Rule 80 under the 1887 statute was to preclude the bringing 
of any action without leave of the Judge. Sub-section 11 of 
section 19 provided an alternative remedy whereby such a creditor 
could apply for annulment of the scheme. A further constructive 
change was made by the Act concerning the enforcement of schemes. 
Under the old law, deeds of assignment were prone to be set aside 
if attacked, but section 19(10) enabled the Court or any Judge 
summarily to enforce the provisions of the scheme.
The creditors, whether there was to be a scheme or not, 
could at any meeting elect one or two trustees in addition to the
Siofficial assignee. Alternatively the selection of additional 
trustees could be left to the Committee of Inspection. It was 
evidently intended that these provisions would operate in cases 
of undue technicality or difficulty, the expense involved being 
prohibitive in the ordinary course. The Judge had to approve the 
election of a trustee, whereupon the estate of the official assignee 
or trustee previously in office divested in favour of the new 
appointee. Not until section 26 was provision made for the 
constitution of a Committee of Inspection as referred to above.
This could be appointed by ordinary resolution from among the 
number of the creditors at the meeting and qualified to vote or
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their proxies - the total number to be not more than five nor less 
than three. The Committee was to superintend the administration 
of the bankrupts property for which purpose it was to meet at 
least once each month and could act by majority resolution at such 
meetings. The function of the Committee remained merely an 
additional safeguard for the creditors.
Bankrupts had stringent duties imposed upon them by section 27 
of the Act. These included lodging statements of affairs, 
delivering to the official assignee all books of account and 
financial records, submitting to public examination, attending at 
creditors' meetings and supplying the official assignee or trustee 
with information or assistance. Heavy penalties, including arrest,
sr
were stipulated for non-compliance or improper or fraudulent conduct.
Where, previously, the release of the bankrupt's estate and 
his person from liability had been interdependent, the 1887 Act 
rendered them distinct. Two cases were prescribed by sections 34 
and 35 respectively in which an estate could be released: in the
first place where a scheme or composition had been accepted and 
approved; and, secondly, where the bankrupt paid his creditors in 
full or obtained a legal acquittance of the debts due to them. 
Manning, J., described the obtaining of approval to a scheme under 
section 34 as a "cumbrous method", but the procedure of release 
under section 35 be thought "useful" and to have justified itself, 
although it had no English legislative equivalent. "Whether the 
release be granted under s. 34 or s. 35» there would be no enquiry 
as to "commercial morality", because the bankrupt is not absolutely 
free of the Court till he has obtained his certificate of discharge, 
or an equivalent order, that the release shall so operate, and all
ft
such questions would arise on such application for the certificate".
The result of the release was to vest the bankrupt’s property 
(otherwise undisposed of) in his name as if his estate, to that
extent, had not been sequestrated; though the section failed to 
specify how a trustee under a scheme or composition was to retain 
title, if the scheme or composition were the basis for the release. 
After three months from date of sequestration the bankrupt could 
publish notice of his intention to apply for a certificate of
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discharge, but immediate application could be made if his estate
had already been released under section 2,6 . The official assignee
and all proving creditors had to be notified and could appear and
be heard personally or by counsel. At such hearing the Judge
could grant or refuse an absolute order of discharge or make a
conditional order of discharge or suspend the operation of the
sequestration order. Section 37(3) provided that the Judge was
to take into consideration a report by the official assignee or
trustee as to the bankrupt’s affairs or conduct, which report was,
by section 40, prima facie evidence of the statements contained
in it. This was a further variation of the old law in that the
Court was relieved from the virtual necessity, previously existing,
of relying upon the majority decision of the creditors. It was
thus the official assignee's duty to bring to the Court's notice
all matters which it ought to consider and all facts which could
siassist in deciding whether a certificate should be issued. Having 
furnished his report the official assignee became functus officio. 
Three new grounds for refusing or suspending a certificate of 
discharge were laid down in section 3 8  by sub-sections (b), (c) 
and (n) respectively. The first was where the bankrupt had 
wilfully delayed surrendering his estate or had avoided sequestration 
to benefit one or more creditors to the prejudice of others: the
second where the bankrupt had continued to trade or obtain credit 
up to £50 after knowing himself to be insolvent: the third that
the bankrupt had carried on business by means of fictitious capital - 
for example where a bankrupt carried on business under his own name
60
with capital belonging to his wife, or commenced to carry on
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business without any capital at all. A certificate of discharge 
did not release the bankrupt from debts on recognizances or at 
the suit of the Grown or any person for offences against any 
public revenue statute, or at the suit of the sheriff or other 
public officer on a bail bond. The Colonial Treasurer was to 
certify his consent to the discharge which then operated to 
release the bankrupt from all other debts provable in the 
bankruptcy.
PART II Administration of Property
This part of the Act dealt with the nature of debts 
provable in bankruptcy and the mode of their proof. Section 45 
prescribed, in effect, three categories of provable debts: those
present or future debts and liabilities to which the debtor was 
subject at date of sequestration order; those to which he might 
become subject before discharge by reason of obligations incurred 
before sequestration order; and demands in the nature of unliquidated 
damages arising from contract, promise or breach of trust. It was 
in the last of these categories that the Act made a change in the 
Colonial law as unliquidated claims could not previously be proved. 
The extension did not operate to allow a bare possibility of an 
unliquidated claim arising out of a contract not ended by 
bankruptcy to be proved.
The Act dealt in greater detail than previous Colonial 
legislation with preferential debts. Section 48 gave absolute 
priority of payment to wages and salary of servants of the bankrupt 
within six months of the sequestration order, or to wages of 
labourers or workmen for time or piece-work during the same period — 
neither payment to exceed £50. The following section gave a further 
priority in respect of debts due to apprentices as reimbursements 
of their indenture fees, and section 50 gave preference to three 
months' arrears of rent at the suit of the bankrupt’s landlord. 
Section 52 defined the classes of property which could be divided
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amongst the bankrupt's creditors. The inconsistent position was 
reached that the official assignee's title to such property- 
related back under section 51 only to the commission of the 
first act of bankruptcy within three months of the presentation 
of the petition. This was described by one commentator as "a slip 
caused by a careless use of paste and scissors in adapting the
t>3
English Act of 1883n, which had reduced the period of relation 
back from six to three months, but this was not otherwise operative
t> *funder 51 Vic. No. 19. As a practical result creditors presenting 
petitions had to avoid alleging more than one act of bankruptcy, 
if the earliest occurred more than three months prior to 
presentation of.their petitions. "This", said Manning, J., in 
Re Fischer, "is only one of numerous errors of a like kind m  
our Act, and the result is that it may be necessary in some cases 
of voluntary sequestration to have a distinct adjudication to 
catch a transaction which could not be reached by the -^elation 
back of three months".
Sections 53 bo 5$ dealt with the effect of bankruptcy on 
antecedent transactions, particularly the restriction on the rights 
of creditors under execution or attachment, the avoidance of 
voluntary settlements and of fraudulent preferences. With regard 
to fraudulent preferences, the Act operated without regard to the 
intentions of debtor or creditor; any alienation would be void 
under it if it had the effect of preferring any then existing
bTcreditor to another. The law was thus relegated to its condition 
before 25 Vic. No. 8 so that the official assignee could go 
behind all alienations of a debtor who was unable to pay his debts 
as they fell due, or knew that proceedings had commenced for 
sequestration of his estate or who alienated property within 60 
days of the sequestration order - even though the person dealing 
with the bankrupt exercised good faith and gave value.
Section 57 prevented the official assignee from taking title 
to any property disposed of by the bankrupt to a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice. In Re Bond the Chief Justice 
gave this account of the legislation: "The effect of ss. 57
and 58 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1887, first came under consideration 
in Davey’s Case (10 N.S.W.L.R.Eq. 179)> when Mr. Justice Owen went 
very fully into the matter, and as a result decided "that the three 
sections read together provide that a payment made by a bankrupt 
to his creditors is valid, though having the effect of preferring 
an existing creditor, provided the preference is not fraudulent 
and in itself an act of bankruptcy, and provided it is made before 
a sequestration order and without notice of any available act of 
bankruptcy.
"This ruling was followed and approved of by Mr. Justice Manning 
in the case of In re Jackson (11 N.S.W.L.R. Com. Law 303)*
"The matter has now for the first time come under the 
consideration of the Pull Court, and we are asked to review these 
decisions. The matter has been very fully argued, and after careful 
consideration during the argument and since we have come to the 
conclusion that the ruling of Mr. Justice Owen in Davey's Case is 
correct and contains a full and precise exposition of the law upon 
this subject. It is argued, however, that Davey's Case was one of 
payment to a creditor, and therefore protected by sub-clause (a) 
of s. 57; but here this being an assignment of property comes under 
sub-clause (c) of that section, that the consideration for the 
assignment being a past debt it is not an assignment by the 
bankrupt for valuable consideration, that the former lav/ under 
5 Vic. No. 17 did not protect a transaction of this kind, and that 
to hold such a transaction protected would entirely frustrate that 
salutary object sought to be gained by the provisions contained 
in s. 5 6 •
"We have no doubt that the Bankruptcy Act has in this respect
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altered the law, has brought it more in conformity with the English 
law upon this branch of the subject, and was intended to ameliorate 
a law which many considered to work unjustly as between a bankrupt
70and his creditors”.
The official assignee was to take possession of all of the
bankrupt's movable property as quickly as he could, to which he
71was placed in an analogous position to a receiver. The official
assignee could disclaim any onerous property pursuant to section 62,
as result of which the bankrupt's rights and interests therein were
determined as from date of the disclaimer. The official assignee
was invested with fairly extensive powers by section 63 and he
could exercise these independently of a Committee of Inspection.
They included powers to sell property, to give receipts, to prove
for debts and to execute instruments. Powers exercisable with
consent of the Committee of Inspection included the carrying on
of the bankrupt's business, the institution or defence of any legal
proceedings, mortgaging of the bankrupt's property, making of
compromises and arrangements and selling the bankrupt's property 
7iprivately.
Within four months of sequestration the official assignee
73or trustee was to file an account and plan of distribution. The
latter was to be approved by the Judge and was held in the
Registrar's office for a limited period so that creditors could
■7*4.inspect it and raise objections, as could the bankrupt or any 
7 sinterested party. On disposal of any objections the Judge had 
power by section 71 to confirm the plan, though if no objections 
were raised the practice was for this to be delegated to the 
Registrar. When the official assignee had realized all of the 
bankrupt's property he was to declare a final dividend and give
notice of the last date for lodgement of claims before proceeding
7<, *»7to payment. Any surplus was payable to the bankrupt.
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PARTS I I I  -  V I I I
P a r t  I I I  o f  th e  A ct  d e a l t  w ith  " C r e d i t o r s '  T r u s te e s  and 
O f f i c i a l  A s s i g n e e s "  c o v e r in g  i n  s e c t i o n s  80  -  84 t h e i r  re m u n e ra tio n . 
O f f i c i a l  a s s ig n e e s  were to  he a p p o in te d  by the  Governor i n  C o u n c i l
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and were to  g iv e  s e c u r i t y .  F o l lo w in g  s e c t i o n s  made p r o v i s i o n  f o r  
rem oval o r  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  o f f i c i a l  a s s ig n e e s  and f o r  th e  f i l l i n g  
o f  v a c a n c ie s  i n  t h a t  o f f i c e  d u r in g  th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  a bankrupt 
e s t a t e .  Much w id e r  c o n t r o l  by c r e d i t o r s  o v e r  o f f i c i a l  a s s ig n e e s  
and t r u s t e e s  was a cco rd e d  by the A ct than had p r e v i o u s l y  been 
o o s s i b l e .  Hence, r e g a r d  was to  be had to  the d i r e c t i o n s  o f  
c r e d i t o r s  by r e s o l u t i o n  a t  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g s ,  and an a s s ig n e e  was 
o b l i g e d  to  summon m e e tin g s  o f  c r e d i t o r s  to  a s c e r t a i n  t h e i r  w ish e s
T ?
i f  he were r e q u e s te d  by them o r  thought i t  n e c e s s a r y .  The bankrupt 
o r  any c r e d i t o r  c o u ld  a p p ea l t o  the Judge a g a i n s t  any a c t  o r
%o
d e c i s i o n  o f  a s s ig n e e  or  t r u s t e e  and th e  Judge co uld  i n v e s t i g a t e  
and d e a l  w i t h ,  o f  h i s  own i n i t i a t i v e  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  any i r r e g u l a r i t y  
i n  th e  perform ance  o f  th e  o f f i c e r s '  d u t i e s .  At l e a s t  t w ic e  y e a r l y  
th e  a s s ig n e e  o r  t r u s t e e  was to  submit h i s  o f f i c i a l  a c co u n ts  f o r  
a u d i t ,  the  books b e in g  p r o p e r ly  k e p t  in  a cco rd a n ce  w i t h  s e c t i o n  
96. At l e a s t  once i n  e v e r y  y e a r  the a s s ig n e e  or  t r u s t e e  was to  
subm it a s ta te m e n t o f  the  p ro c e e d in g s  in  th e  b a n k ru p tcy  w hich  was 
t o  be exam ined. The R e g i s t r a r  was to  keep a B a n k ru p tcy  E s t a t e  
A ccount i n t o  w h ich  th e  funds r e c e i v e d  by th e  a s s ig n e e  o r  t r u s t e e  
were to  be p a id  but w ith d r a w a ls  f o r  w o rk in g  p u rp o ses  co u ld  be 
made w i t h  th e  R e g i s t r a r ' s  a p p r o v a l .
P ro ced u re  under the A ct  was r e g u l a t e d  by P a r t  I V 1 the 
f o l l o w i n g  P a r t  d e a l t  w i t h  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  A ct  to  p a r t n e r -  
s h i n s ,  d e ce a se d  d e b t o r s ,  m a rrie d  women and to  s p e c i a l  c ir c u m s ta n c e s .  
Owen, J . ,  p o in te d  out in  In  re  Hidden S t a r  Gold M in in g  C o . ,  P i c k e r i n g 's  
Case t h a t  s e c t i o n  109 w h ich  p re v e n te d  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e
B a n k ru p tc y  A ct to  a s s o c i a t i o n s  r e g i s t e r e d  under the Companies A ct  
l e f t  an anomalous s i t u a t i o n .  The A ct 38 V i c .  No. 1 p ro v id e d  t h a t
in certain cases of the winding up of companies proceedings could 
he taken before the Chief Commissioner of Insolvent Estates, 
subject to appeal to "the Court" which, for the purposes of the 
Companies Act, meant the Supreme Court in its equitable juris­
diction as exercised by the Primary Judge. Accordingly, when the 
powers of the Chief Commissioner were by section 127 of the 
Bankruptcy Act transferred to a Judge of the Supreme Court without 
appropriate modification being made elsewhere, the Primary Judge 
came to exercise an appellate jurisdiction over another Judge of 
equal standing and co-ordinate jurisdiction. Part VI specified 
indictable offences under the Bankruptcy Act and Part VII dealt 
with the jurisdiction of the Court - which has been considered 
in much greater detail above. Finally, Part VIII dealt with 
miscellaneous provisions of which a significant section was number 
150, permitting service of notices by prepaid post in the absence 
of other directions - an appreciable simplification of the earlier 
law.
Some difficulty occurred in construing the Court's power 
to administer deceased estates in Bankruptcy. This was resolved 
by Manning, J., in Re the Estate of Weingarth where he said:
"Under our old Insolvency Act there was provision made for the 
administration in the Insolvent Court of the estates of deceased 
persons; but in England, prior to the passing of the Judicature 
Act of 1875> there was no similar provision, and then the estates 
of deceased persons were necessarily administered in the Chancery 
Court, and in that Court preferences were allowed, and could not 
in any way be impeached.
"By s. 10 of the Judicature Act it was provided that, in 
administering the estates of deceased persons, the rules of (the) 
Bankruptcy Act should apply, and consequently preferences by 
executors or administrators were no longer allowed.
"Sect. 125 of the English Bankruptcy Act of 1883, so it seems
to me, carried the law no further, and that appears also to have 
been the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Re Gould (4 Mor. 202).
"What passed to the official receiver under the 1883 Act was 
the estate of which the deceased was possessed at the time of his 
death, and that estate was to he dealt with as provided for by
s.125.
"Here, as I have previously stated, the Insolvency Court has 
for years past been administering the estates of deceased persons 
who turned out to be insolvent, and it seems to me that our 
Legislature in passing our Bankruptcy Act declined to follow the 
English Act of 1883, but desired to keep up the jurisdiction the 
Courts here previously possessed".
The Bankruptcy Act was almost immediately supplemented by 
the Bankruptcy Act Amendment Act of 1888, 52 Vic. No. 11 which 
inter alia, gave the Court wider jurisdiction to make vesting 
orders and defined the official assignee’s powers to convey title. 
This was followed by a more extensive amendment in 1896 in the 
Bankruptcy Acts Amendment Act, 60 Vic. No. 29* The last was 
destined to have a very short life, as the reforming spirit of 
statute consolidation at the end of the nineteenth century resulted 
in the emergence of an entirely new Bankruptcy Act - No. 25 of 1898. 
This followed very closely the division of Parts established in the 
I887 enactment.
Little change was made by the 1898 Act to the acts of 
bankruptcy defined in 1887» The fraudulent preference section 
(s. 4(l)(c)) was, however, subject of some interesting litigation. 
Davey’s Case assumed that fraudulent preferences were of themselves 
acts of bankruptcy and this decision was subsequently applied, 
putting an end to the doubts which had long prevailed on the point:
Soas, for instance in Humphrey v. McMullen where it was held that, 
under the Insolvency Acts, the law in New South Wales followed 
that existing in England before the passing of the colonial statute
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of 1869* Section 10 dealing with the effect of sequestration orders 
was also modified to clarify what "property of the bankrupt” would 
vest in the Official Assignee.
A source of confusion existed after the passing of 60 Vic. 
ho. 29> concerning section 21(l) of the principal Act. This was 
rectified in section 2l(l) of the 1898 consolidation which dealt 
with the appointment of creditors’ trustees. Under the old law it 
had been possible for the creditors to nominate trustees in addition 
to or in place of the official assignee. The 60 Vic. ho. 29 deleted 
the words "in place of" in section 21(l) but did not make corresponding 
changes in other sections of the Act. The amendment had the practical 
effect of abolishing trustees in bankruptcy, as the official assignee 
was obliged to wind up the estate and the appointment of an additional 
trustee constituted a needless expense. One section redrawn partially 
in consequence of the change to section 2l(l) was section 24 dealing 
with the vesting of a bankrupt's estate in the official assignee.
A significant amendment to section 42(5) gave an indication 
of the wider scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The sub-section 
provided that in effect a certificate of discharge should be issued 
by the Registrar after an order accordingly had been made by the Court. 
The 1887 Act referred to the order being made by the Judge and 
60 Vic. No. 29 added the words "or Registrar". It was apparent 
that the Court did not include the Registrar and that the Court 
was the proper tribunal to make such an order, for which reasons 
the consolidation appropriately altered the wording.
A considerable amount of litigation cast doubts on the 
operative scope of sections 56, 57 and 5^  which dealt with 
preferences and protected transactions. The leading section was 
56 whereby every alienation, transfer, gift, surrender, delivery, 
mortgage, or pledge of any property and every warrant of attorney 
or judicial proceeding made, taken or suffered by any insolvent person 
having the effect of preferring any existing creditor, whether
fraudulently or not, was void. The two following sections 
provided, in effect as regards section 57 that approved trans­
actions by the bankrupt would remain valid if they had taken place 
before sequestration order and the other party involved acted 
bona fide for value and without notice; and, as regards section 58 
that a duly registered conveyance or assignment in trust for creditors 
had been made, provided the trustee acted bona fide and without 
notice of proceedings to sequestrate the bankrupt's estate. The 
construction had consistently been laid down by the Supreme Court 
that sections 57 and 58 were provisos to section 56. Salusbury's 
Lav/ and Practice in Bankruptcy made the following appraisal of the 
result: "The construction put upon the three sections seems to 
maintain to a great extent the hardships which the Act of 1896 was 
apparently intended to remedy. An available act of bankruptcy is 
any act of bankruptcy available for a bankruptcy petition at the 
date of the presentation of the petition on which a sequestration 
order is made; and a petition may be grounded on an act of bankruptcy 
v/hich has occurred within six months before the presentation of the 
petition; so that no transaction, even to the extent of a bona fide 
advance, is safe; if the borrower becomes bankrupt within six 
months of the transaction and the Court is satisfied that the
borrower's intention was fraudulent, however innocent the lender 
s»
might have been".
Section 123 permitted a bankruptcy to be presented by and 
against a married woman in respect of her separate estate, thus 
making a considerable advance on the earlier legislation. A married 
woman having a separate estate, whether or not carrying on a trade 
independently of her husband could in consequence be made bankrupt 
for non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice in any case where she 
could be sued as a feme sole.
Ultimate reassurance that the Bankruptcy Department remained 
within the province of the Supreme Court was afforded by the
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memorandum appended to the Act by the Commissioner for Consolidating 
the Statute Law. "In section 127 of 51 Vic. ho. 19 the whole of the 
then existing jurisdiction in insolvency was declared to be the 
bankruptcy jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and was vested in the 
Judge in Bankruptcy. The same Act gave additional powers, which 
were to be exercised, not b;y the "Court" but by the "Judge", and it 
uses throughout the expressions "the Judge" - "the Court or Judge". 
This is somewhat confused, and raises some doubts and obscurities.
It might be argued, for example, that in an appeal on any of the 
newly-created matters of jurisdiction the Supreme Court had no 
jurisdiction at all. Then by 60 Vic. ho. 29» section 29(l)> all 
appeals from the Judge in Bankruptcy are by way or re-hearing, as 
in Equity appeals. It has seemed, therefore, better throughout 
this consolidation to speak of the jurisdiction as being that of 
the Court, exercised by the Judge or Registrar, as the case might 
be. The Judge in Bankruptcy, Mr. Justice A. H. Simpson, on being 
consulted, entirely concurs in this view".
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LUNACY JURISDICTION1
On 2nd April 1787 Governor Phillip was issued with his 
commission by which he was given a great number of powers 
necessary for the foundation of the Colony and, among these, 
was one specifically directed to the position of lunatics and 
the insane in these terms:
'•And whereas it belongeth to us in right of our Royal 
Prerogative to have the custody of ideots and their 
estates and to take the profits thereof to our own use 
finding them necessaries and also to provide for the 
custody of lunaticks and their estates without taking 
the profits thereof to our own use.
And whereas while such ideots and lunaticks and their 
estates remain under our immediate care great trouble 
and charges may arise to such as shall have occasion to 
resort unto us for directions respecting such ideots and 
lunaticks and their estates Wee have thought fit to en­
trust you with the care and committment of the custody 
of the said ideots and lunaticks and their estates and 
Wee do by these presents give and grant unto you full 
power and authority without expecting any further special 
warrant from us from time to time to give order and war­
rant for the preparing of grants of the custodies of 
such ideots and lunaticks and their estates as are or 
shall be found by inquisitions thereof to be taken by 
the Judges of our Court of Civil Jurisdiction and there­
upon to make and pass grants and committments under our 
Great Seal of our said territory of the custodies of all 
and every such ideots and lunaticks and their estates to 
such person or persons suitors in that behalf as accor­
ding to the rules of law and the use and practice in 
those and the like cases you shall Judge meet for that
trust the said grants and committments to be made in such 
manner and form or as nearly as may be as hath been here­
tofore used and accustomed in making the same under the 
Great Seal of Great Britain and to contain such act and 
convenient covenants provisions and agreements on the 
parts of the committees and grantees to be performed and 
such security to be by them given as shall be requisite 
and needful.”
There, for some time, the power remained. Judge-Advocate 
Bent did not include a suggestion for a Lunacy department in 
his many proposals for the constitution of a Court of civil 
jurisdiction. The Letters Patent of 1814 establishing such 
Court made no provisions affecting lunatics and the matter 
seems only to have been raised in 1820 when Field, J., in wri­
ting to Commissioner Bigge, said: "Although the equitable
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is given by the present char­
ter in very general words, yet I think ... that the custody of 
Idiots and Lunatics which the Governour has at present under 
his commission should be transferred to this chancery as the 
whole is included in the courts of equity at Calcutta and 
Columbo"t
5In this proposal the Commissioner concurred and his views 
were given recognition by the inclusion in the Letters Patent 
of 13th. October, 1823^ (the so-called third Charter of Justice), 
of section 18, which provided: "And we do hereby authorize the
said Supreme Court of New South Wales to appoint Guardians and 
Keepers of Infants and their Estates according to the order 
and Course observed in that part of our United Kingdom called 
England and also Guardians and Keepers of the persons and Es­
tates of Natural Fools and of such as are or shall be deprived 
of their understanding or reason by the act of God so as to be 
unable to govern themselves and their Estates which we hereby 
authorize and empower the said Court to enquire hear and deter­
mine by inspection of the Person or by such other ways and
means by which the truth may be best discovered and known".7
Inconsistently, 4 Geo. IV c. 96, while investing the newly con­
stituted Supreme Court with "Jurisdiction in all cases whatso- 
8ever" remained silent on the specific authority of the Court 
in matters of lunacy.
The earliest surviving instance of the operation of the 
Governor's power in this regard appears to be a record in the 
State Archives of an indemnity dated 1801 relating to a lunatic's 
estate. It is of passing interest to observe that the document 
was made between the notorious Simeon Lord and John McArthur.
It is in these terms: "Whereas H E the Govr of this Terry hath
by a Commission under the seal of sd Colony and bearing date 
the day of Novr in the year of our Lord 1801 given and gran­
ted the custody of C B a declared Lunatick together with all 
his goods chattels credits and effects of whatsoever kind or 
nature the same may be and which are now in this Territory with 
J M'cArthur Esqe in conjunction with the Revd S. M. Clark And 
Whereas it appears that the Estate & personal property of the 
said Lunatick is likely to become subject to many claims and 
demands of debt which must necessarily involve the sd J McA 
Esqe in many suits at Law before the Court of this Colony as 
well as ultimately before H M in Council how Know Ye that I 
S L of Sydney Merchant do by these presents and at all times 
hereafter save and keep harmless and indemnify him the aforesd 
J McA his and every of his heirs E A & A and his and every of 
his Lands Tenements Hereditaments Stock and all other his pro­
perty of whatsoever kind or nature the same may be from all 
costs charges and expences in Law or Equity and from all damages 
whatsoever he shall or may pay sustain or be put out for by 
reason or upon account as Commissioner as aforesaid Hereby bin­
ding myself my Heirs E A and Assigns in the due performance of
9all matters things and circumstances touching the same".
Hot long afterwards a more formal machinery was set in 
motion for the care of the mentally unfit, and as early as 1805 
juries were called to make enquiry whether a person was a luna­
tic. The occasion was on 18th October 1805, when one Charles 
Bishop was found by the jury to be incapable of governing himself
his chattels and tenements.
In 1810 a board of three surgeons replaced a jury in fin­
ding Alexander Bodie labouring under such serious mental de­
rangement as to justify the Governor in appointing Committees 
of his estate. This board evidently continued in operation
but it did not replace the inquest by jury, as one writer has 
12.suggested, for the jury procedure was clearly in evidence in 
the civil jurisdiction of the Judge-Advocate's Court. Jonathan 
Burke McHugo, Super Cargo of the Brig "Active" was examined in
_  13February 1812 by two surgeons who certified that he suffered 
from a "severe mental derangement"'.1' Judge-Advocate Bent thought 
it advisable to proceed by Information, rather than Petition, as 
the lunatic had no relatives in the Colony and the appointment
75was a matter of "mere discretion" on the Governor's part. This
procedure was adopted after issue of a Commission "in the nature
16of a writ de Lunático Inquirendo" under the territorial seal and
17 jgthereupon a "respectable jury" of twelve men was assembled. They 
found that "the said Jonathan Burke McHugo is at the time of tak­
ing this Inquisition of an unsound mind and doth enjoy lucid In­
tervals so that he is not capable of the government of himself 
his tenements goods, and Chattels, and that he hath been in the 
same state of lunacy for the space of Three Weeks last past and 
upwards; but how or by what means the said Jonathan Burke McHugo
so became Lunatic the Jurors aforesaid know not, unless by the
19visitation of God". The Governor accordingly appointed Com­
mittees of McHugo's estate. Such strict procedure does not 
appear always to have been applied. Bigge's Report on the Ju­
dicial Establishments refers to the case of Michael Hoare, a 
convict who, although stated by a surgeon to be only feigning
insanity, was committed to the Castle Hill asylum at the direc­
totion of the Rev. Samuel Marsden as visiting magistrate. "It 
seems somewhat extraordinary", said Commfesioner Bigge, "that 
Mr. Marsden should have taken upon himself to decide upon his 
insanity without a previous reference to (the surgeon), but it 
appears that this power has been exercised both by himself and 
Mr. McArthur upon their own view of the prisoners whom they
10
considered to be lunatics, and whenever their custody in the 
gaol became ... a cause of annoyance and disturbance to the 
other prisoners, or to the neighbourhood1'.
The change consequent upon the investing of jurisdiction 
in the Court by the Letters Patent of 1823 seems to have been 
of no practical significance for several years. In 1828 the 
Sydney Gazette reported that: "A commission of lunacy, the
first, we believe that has been held in the Colony, was sum­
moned at the Court-house, on Wednesday last, to enquire into 
the fact of mental imbecility alleged against Mr. James Birnie 
of Sydney, and to decide on the propriety of committing the 
management of his affairs for the benefit of his family, to 
other hands. Dr. Bland stated, that, to his knowledge, Mr. 
Birnie has been labouring under mental imbecility with oc­
casional fits of madness, for the last twelve months, and in 
his opinion was utterly unfit to be entrusted with the manage­
ment of his own affairs. Dr. Macleod deposed to the same ef­
fect, whilst the testimony of the medical gentlemen was cor­
roborated by several other witnesses who detailed specific in­
stances in support of their opinions. The verdict of the Jury
was, that Mr. James Birnie was of unsound mind, and incapable
22.of managing his own affairs". A similar commission in 1829 
led to the finding that Colonel Johnstone's widow was insane, 
but enjoyed lucid intervals, whereupon an application was made 
to the Supreme Court to appoint trustees of her estate.
It is convenient to note here that the first mental hos­
pital in the Colony was founded in 1811 at Castle Hill by
ZU.Governor Macquarie. The far-sighted humanity of this Vice-Roy 
is seen in the instructions which he gave to the Superintendant 
of the Asylum. In summary they were that he should "pay the 
most particular attention to the cleanliness and comfort" of 
the inmates and not allow the Keepers "to exercise any unneces­
sary severity" towards them. The food for the lunatics was to 
be "properly dressed and regularly served out to them at the 
proper hours"; a "good garden" was to be cultivated to ensure 
a constant supply of vegetables "particularly potatoes and
10i)
cabbages”; and strict compliance was to be made with the di­
rections of the surgeon in charge of the Asylum. A report 
was to be furnished to the Governor every month. This stan­
dard unfortunately was not maintained after Macquarie's adminis­
tration: the Castle Hill establishment was closed and trans­
ferred to ”a wretched hired Building without outlet of any
Z<o
kind” at Liverpool, the rent of which was paid "out of the 
Military Chest” , prompting Governor Bourke in 1835 to propose 
the urgent construction of a permanent building at the expense 
of the Colony. Until 1843 the successive asylums were regu­
lated first by the law of England for the time being and then, 
in the years following 1828, by the English law operative im­
mediately prior to the passing of 9 Geo. IV c. 83, subject to
2J7
the directions of the colonial government.
The first New South Wales statute dealing specifically 
with the persons of the mentally ill was the Dangerous Luna-
¿ j >
tics Act, 7 Vic. No. 14, which was not passed until 1843, though
there had been an earlier Act dealing only with property rights,
the Imperial Acts Adoption Act, 5 Wm. IV No. 8, which adopted
¿3
the English Persons Under Disability Act, amending the law re­
lating to the property belonging to idiots, lunatics and per­
sons of unsound mind. The want of statutory authority was em­
phatically brought to official notice by the recovery of dam­
ages against a magistrate who had made an order with govern-
30ment approbation regarding the estate of an alleged lunatic. 
Governor Gipps in his message to the Legislative Council on 
the passing of the Act observed that the measure was necessary 
"that no uncertainty may remain as to the course of proceeding 
which is to be adopted, in respect of the custody of insane 
persons”3! The same Act in addition to dealing with those who 
had been found not guilty on the ground of insanity, went on 
to make provision for the safe custody of and prevention of 
crimes being committed by persons insane. If any person were 
apprehended under circumstances denoting a derangement of mind 
coupled with intent to commit suicide or some crime for which,
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of the Peace on having the person brought before them could 
call to their assistance two legally qualified medical prac­
titioners. If, upon view and examination those practitioners 
expressed their opinion that he was a dangerous lunatic or 
idiot, or if upon any other proof the Justices were able to
their satisfaction to form the same opinion then they could
32.commit him to a gaol, house of correction or public hospital 
to be kept in strict custody. Thereafter the person could only 
be discharged by order of two Justices of the Peace (one of 
whom was to be one of the Justices who signed the warrant for 
custody), or by one of the Judges of the Supreme Court, or by or­
der of the Governor that he be removed to a public lunatic asy­
lum. Nothing in the Act was to prevent friends and legal offi­
cers seeing the person at any reasonable time. The Act further 
provided that, if any relative or friend entered into a recog­
nizance for the peacable behaviour and safe custody of the idiot 
or lunatic they could have him released into their care and pro­
tection.
The requirement of evidence of two medical practitioners 
carries over into many sections of the Act, including the power 
of the Governor (still a prerogative and not a judicial power) 
to direct persons under sentence of imprisonment or transpor­
tation to be removed to a lunatic asylum and, in section 3, to 
direct insane persons committed for trial to be removed to a 
lunatic asylum. Section 5 of the Act provided for the release 
of a person where two legally qualified medical practitioners 
certified that he or she was not insane or a dangerous idiot 
and was able to go at large with safety. Such certificate, if 
sent to the visiting Justice, or in his absence to the keeper 
of the gaol or house of correction, was to be transmitted forth­
with to the Governor, who was then required to order liberation. 
Section 7 of the Act brought to the Colony an English provision 
relating to Court visitors, in requiring that five visitors be 
appointed to each lunatic asylum within the Colony, one of whom 
was obliged to visit each asylum at least once in every week 
and to make reports to the Colonial Secretary. Two of the visitors
I l l
were to be appointed by the Legislative Council according to
the Act as first passed, but Lord Stanley censured this severely
as a "usurpation ... by the Legislature of administrative fun- 
33ctions" and ordered its suspension until the Governor should 
have recommended its repeal to the Council.
Though the title of the Act extended merely to dangerous 
lunatics, section 11, obviously borrowed from an 1828 English 
Act,** made provision for any insane person to be received into 
a lunatic asylum. On the application of one or more relatives 
or guardians of an insane person, together with the written 
sanction of one of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the cer­
tificate of two legally qualified medical practitioners that 
they had examined and found such person to be of unsound mind, 
the Governor was given power to direct that person*s detention 
in such lunatic asylum as he might appoint. This was the first 
introduction into local law of the curial assistance to the 
Governor being exercised by a Judge alone, rather than by the 
old procedure of Judge and Jury of twelve. A form of medical 
practitioner's certificate was first prescribed by Rules of
35"Court of 3rd July, 1867. There being no Poor Law in New South 
Wales the cost of removal and maintenance of insane persons was 
to be defrayed by the Colony, provided that no insane person 
being a convict confined in any asylum should be supported out 
of any funds of the Colony either locally or generally. Rela­
tives were given power to agree with the Superintendent for 
maintenance in an asylum of lunatics and idiots. It may be 
noted that the Poor Laws did have an indirect effect on the 
development of the lunacy legislation of the Colony through 
the practice which English Justices of the Peace, Overseers 
of the Poor and Churchwardens had adopted of farming out poor 
lunatics to private asylums. But the indirectness of their 
operation in the Colony was emphasized by Dowling, C.J., with 
whom Burton and Willis, J.J., agreed in Regina v. Schofield 
when he said: "We must take judicial notice that there are no
Poor Laws in this Colony, and no poor in the legal sense of
the word".
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This Act was amended by the Dangerous Lunatics Act,
3i 499 Vic. No. 4, and again by 9 Vic. No. 34 and later, in 1868,
4>oby 31 Vic. No. 19, which, for the first time, set up lunatic 
reception houses and gave power to justices to commit luna­
tics to a reception house instead of to a gaol, house of 
correction or public hospital. This was an important exten­
sion of judicial power. The same Act gave authority for the 
establishment of privately conducted licensed lunatic asylums 
and gave the Governor authority to commit a lunatic to such a 
licensed house, provided that he was not to do so in the case 
of prisoners under sentence, or persons under committal, for
any criminal offence. In this, the effect of an English Act 
vof 1774 is apparent, especially in the long chain of sections 
dealing with licensing, the keeping of records and medical case 
books, the reporting to the Colonial Secretary of escapes, 
deaths, discharge or removal, and the monthly inspections by 
visitors appointed for that purpose. It may be mentioned that 
31 Vic. No. 19 followed at least four earlier attempts to amend 
the Lunacy Laws. In 1859 the Legislative Council read and re­
ferred to the Assembly a Bill to simplify proceedings under 
Commissions of Lunacy. The Bill was not considered that year 
and was postponed when resubmitted in 1860. In 1862 the Legis­
lative Council purported to pass “An Act to Regulate Private 
Lunatic Asylums” but the Assembly rejected this on the grounds 
that it should have originated in the lower Chamber^3 A further 
Bill introduced into the Legislative Assembly in 1863 was dis- 
charged without having been read. In 1865 a “Lunatics Further 
Protection Bill” was put forward, but, when it came before the 
House, Forster moved:
“That the Question be amended by omitting all the words 
after the word”That”, with a view to inserting in their 
place the following words:- “the Law regulating admission 
to Lunatic Asylums requires to be amended, and that a Bill 
for the purpose ought to be introduced with a little delay 
as possible (2) That an Address be presented to the Gover­
nor, respectfully acquainting His Excellency with the pur­
port of the foregoing Resolution“ 5^
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The Speaker having overruled the amendment for impropriety in 
proposing to present an address to the Crown regarding a Bill 
yet before the House, the original question was put and nega­
tived.
A Committee appointed by the Legislative Assembly to re­
port on the existing lunacy law advised the House that "further 
legislation in reference to Lunacy is imperatively called for". 
It was as result of this that 31 Vic. No. 19 was enacted. The 
justification for the Committee’s sense of urgency may be guaged 
from some of the evidence laid before it. One Magistrate aver­
red that some persons of undoubted sanity had been committed to 
asylums at the instigation of others with improper motives. He 
gave this example "Myself and a brother Magistrate prevented 
two very respectable persons from being sent to Tarban Creek.
In one case his relatives brought an old gentleman up believing 
him to be insane, and they swore he was insane; but myself and 
Captain Scott thought it was done for the sake of getting his 
property, and we solicited a friend of ours, a solicitor, to 
take up the case, and it was proved to our satisfaction that 
the man was perfectly sane,,{t7 The Clerk of Petty Sessions in 
Sydney considered the whole system susceptible of improvement, 
especially to rectify the hurried nature of the examinations 
and the insufficiency of grounds on which persons were found 
insane. Of the medical evidence he remarked that the practice 
appeared to offer a premium to make a man out to be mad. It 
arose in this fashion - "the Police Surgeon first examines the 
party charged, and if he belives the case is one that ought to 
be sent on to the lunatic reception house, a second medical man 
is called in. They give their evidence before the Magistrates; 
and if the two medical men give evidence each of them is enti­
tled to a guinea, whereas if only one medical man is examined 
the practice is that he does not get any fee at all; so that 
although I believe at present there is no want of care exer­
cised in coming to a conclusion, still the system strikes me 
to be wrong";
The combined effect of section 5 of 31 Vic. No. 19 and
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order the removal of a person to an asylum gave rise to a very 
significant clash between the judiciary and the administration 
in 1874. Sir Hercules Robinson, the then Governor, made a 
short visit to Fiji and announced that he would not appoint an 
Administrator in his absence. This decision appears to have 
irritated Sir James Martin, the Chief Justice, who evidently 
expected that he would be sworn in as Lieutenant-Governor. Per­
haps he intended to force a resolution of his grievance by re­
fusing to give his certificate for the admission of one McNamara 
to an asylum, on the grounds that such certificate would be use­
less in the Governor*s absence. Writing to the Minister for 
Justice, who had demanded an explanation, the Chief Justice said: 
It ... very plainly appears (l) that the Governor is the 
person to order the removal of the lunatic to an asylum 
(2) that he is to take this course only if he shall think 
proper which implies the exercise by him of his own per­
sonal judgment and (3) that he alone is the person to de­
termine to what asylum or licensed house the lunatic is 
to be sent. As I am officially informed that the Gover­
nor is absent from the Colony and as I know that until he 
returns or an Administrator is sworn in the supposed luna­
tic referred to by you in your letter cannot be legally 
sent either to an asylum or to a licensed house I have 
deemed it right not to deal at present with the papers 
submitted to me ... If it be contemplated by the Govern­
ment as I infer by your allusion to this responsibility 
to send anyone to a lunatic asylum without the express 
personal sanction of the Governor given by him after a 
personal examination of the facts there is the greater 
reason why I should not be giving my sanction while the 
Governor is away and the Government is committing so 
great a violation of the Law.
A very vigorous exchange of feelings between the Minister and 
the Judge ensued, the tone of which may be gathered from the 
closing lines of the Minister:
I have not desired, and in no portion of my letter have I
attempted, "to instruct the Judges how their duties are 
to be performed”• On behalf of the Government I called 
your attention to the duties imposed by law upon the 
Judges in the matter under review, and pointed out the 
line of separation between such judicial duties and exe­
cutive authority, and it cannot be asserted that the 
Government have "no concern" in this matter, I may, 
however, point out that you have taken upon yourself to 
instruct the Government in the performance of duties 
with which a Judge of the Supreme Court has "no concern"? 
The Minister then referred to Hargrave, J,, who not only vol­
unteered to sign any certificate of admission required in 
Lunacy, but trenchantly criticized the refusal of the Chief 
Justice to perform the duty which the Act imposed;
As to the legality of my declining to delay my reports. 
&c., after official notice of the Chief Justice's claim,
I consider that as a Judge of the Supreme Court my oath 
requires me not only to perform every judicial duty 
"without fear, favour or affection", but also without 
any "denial or delay" &c. The 44th section of Magna 
Charta, and the 29th section of Henry the 3rd Charter, 
have always been the great rule in all questions of 
judicial duty, and forbid all postponements of "justice 
or right" ... As to the construction of the words used 
in the 11th section of the 7th Vic, No. 14, and 5th 
section of 31st Vic. No. 1 9 - 1  cannot concur in the 
Chief Justice's construction of the words "if he shall 
think proper" as implying any other duty in the Gover­
nor than as in the numerous other matters in various 
statutes and in the general administration of Govern­
ment, which require the approbation of the Governor to
51the final action of the Executive authority.
There can be no doubt that Hargrave, J., was right in his 
view and that the Judges must of necessity have supplied 
their certificates whether the Governor was in the Colony or 
elsewhere.
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Before considering the next major enactment in the Lunacy- 
Act of 1878, three smaller statutes may he mentioned. The 
first was 11 Vic. No. 27 of 1847, an Act "to render valid the 
acts and appointments of parties as ... Committees of the per­
sons and estates of Lunatics under orders made by the Primary 
Judge in Equity”. It was on the basis of this Act that Rules 
of Court of 13th February 1850 prescribed that the practice 
in Lunacy matters would follow as closely as possible the 
practice in Equity and that the same fees would be payable.
The next, 13 Vic. No. 3 of 1849 amended the law ”in respect 
to the safe custody of persons dangerously insane and the care 
and maintenance of persons of unsound mind", and the last, 24 
Vic. No. 19 (i860) was "to make better provision for the cus-
55tody and care of Criminal Lunatics". The legislative position 
before 1878 was very far from satisfactory and was described 
as a "barbarous and cruel system ... the darkest blot in our
*>if.character as a community".
The decision of the Pull Court in In the matter of Macken-
55zie Bowman may also be noted here. It arose from section 6 of 
22 Vic. No. 14 "An Act to expedite Suits and Proceedings in 
Equity and to facilitate the despatch of Business in the Sup­
reme Court in Banco" (1858). The material part of the section 
provided that "the Supreme Court may be holden before and by 
the Primary Judge in Equity ... for the exercise of the juris­
diction of the Court in cases of lunacy, and over the persons 
and property of such as are of unsound mind". This was inten­
ded to regularize the practice of hearing lunacy matters in 
the Equity Court. Counsel sought to show that this meant 
that the Primary Judge's decisions in Lunacy were final and 
could not be subject of appeal. The Court did not accept the 
submission, holding that the jurisdiction of the Pull Court 
had not been taken away nor transferred to the Primary Judge, 
"but simply the Primary Judge is enabled equally with the Court 
to hear lunacy cases". So there was an effective appeal to 
the Pull Court, the procedure of which followed that exercised 
in England by the Lord Chancellor at the time of the "Charter
of Justice” , Accordingly, appeals in Lunacy were in the nature 
of rehearingsf7
The Lunacy Act of 1878, 42 Vic. No, 7, was a comprehen­
sive and detailed statute which made elaborate provision for 
the care of the mentally ill and of their estates and, in the 
form of its consolidation by the Lunacy Act of 1898, laid down 
the pattern of lunacy law in New South Wales for the next 
eighty years. The statute at once expressly repealed all 
prior colonial Lunacy legislation with the exception of sec­
tion 6 of 22 Vic. No. 14, which was however repealed by neces- 
sary intendment in section 92 of the 1878 Act. In In re W. M. 
the Pull Court was called upon to determine whether the com­
bined effect of the 1878 and 1898 Acts was to cut down the 
Court’s jurisdiction in Lunacy to that expressly or by neces­
sary implication conferred upon it. It was argued that, as 
17 Pd. II chapters 9 and 10 were, to the extent of their oper­
ation in the Colony, repealed by the 1878 Act, the powers con­
ferred by clause XVIII of the ’’Charter of Justice” were im­
pliedly taken away. The Court held that the statute of Edward 
II was declaratory only of the common law and that its colon­
ial repeal had no effect on the ’’Charter of Justice”, or its 
extended provisions pursuant to 9 Geo. IV c. 83. In the judge­
ment of Owen, J.:
I cannot see that the Lunacy Act of 1878 repeals or takes 
away the general powers of the Court. So far as the 
Court is concerned, it only substitutes a new mode of en­
quiry by petition to the Court itself, for the old mode 
of enquiry by commission de lunatico inquirendo. I, 
therefore, am of opinion that the powers conferred on 
the Court by the Charter of Justice still remain vested 
in the Court as fully under the new process as under the
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old process by commission.
Thus, the statutes did not affect the jurisdiction of the Sove­
reign as the fountain of justice; and, as to the commitment 
to custody of the persons of lunatics, it only cut down his 
prerogative right to take the property of lunatics regarded
as derelicts and to put the proceeds in his privy purse. 
Counsel's contention for a total repeal was, in the view of 
Walker, J., a confounding of jurisdiction with procedure: 
the alteration in the mode of exercising the jurisdiction 
was an entirely different thing from repealing the jurisdic­
tion itself?0
Section 4 of the 1878 Act was repeated verbatim in the 
1898 Act. It retained the criminal procedure by providing 
that, upon information on oath before a Justice, if it appea­
red that any person was insane and without sufficient means 
of support or was wandering at large or was discovered under 
circumstances indicating that he was likely to commit some 
offence against the law, the Justice was given power by order 
under his hand to require a Constable to apprehend him. Con­
stables finding persons so wandering or under such circumstan­
ces were given a general power, without any order, to appre-
62.hend and take them before two Justices. Section 5 of the 
1878 Act was also repeated verbatim in the 1898 Act and used 
the same procedure of information on oath to a Justice in the 
case of persons deemed to be insane and not being taken proper 
care of, or being cruelly treated. Any constable could give 
that information upon oath to a Justice who could himself 
visit and examine the person and make inquiry into the case, 
or order a medical practitioner to examine him and give a 
written report of his opinion. If it then appeared that the 
person was insane and not under proper control and care or was 
cruelly treated or neglected by any relative or other person 
having charge of him, the Justice was to require a constable 
to bring him before two or more Justices. Both Acts contained 
a provision requiring the Justices before whom such person was 
brought to call to their assistance any two medical practition­
ers who had previously examined the person apart from each
fe ii-
other and had given the requisite special certificate. The 
Justices were to proceed in all respects as if such person 
were brought before them in a Court of Petty Sessions and 
were given power to direct him to be removed into some hospital 
for the insane or licensed house and to be received into and
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detained there accordingly. The power of the Supreme Court 
to find persons insane was preserved.
66The Governor was given power to appoint hospitals, and
67to grant licences for houses and premises, for the reception 
and temporary treatment of the insane and to declare wards of
69any hospital to be wards for the temporary reception of the 
insane. The detention of insane patients in reception houses,
TOgaols or public hospitals beyond fourteen days was prohibited 
unless a medical officer certified that such persons were not 
in a fit state to be removed or would be benefited by remaining 
there, in which event the removal was postponed.
Justices could order the discharge of a person from any 
reception house, gaol or public hospital on receiving a cer­
tificate from the medical officer that he was of sound mind 
or might, with safety, be discharged to the care of a relative
7f 72,or friend. Both the 1878 and 1898 Acts made provision for
hospitals for the criminally insane, and in substance, repea-
73ted the terms of an English Act of 1800 and the New South Wales 
71fAct of 1843 as to persons charged with offences who were ac­
quitted on the grounds of insanity. Provision was also made 
for an Inspector General to be appointed by the Governor in
7 5Council to visit and report on hospitals and licensed houses,
with power to order the removal or transfer of patients, or
7 7their entire discharge. The person signing an order or re­
quest for a patient's admission could similarly obtain his
7 1>discharge, unless the patient were dangerous or physically un-
79fit. Statutory procedure for declaring persons insane and 
for the appointment of Committees of their estate was in­
cluded in Part VII of the two Acts.
By the 1878 Act, the constitution of a separate Lunacy 
Department was effected. This was particularly apparent in 
the appointment of an entirely new ministerial officer, called
%othe Master in Lunacy, to administer the Department.
The Act abolished the old procedure by commission de 
lunatico inquirendo and empowered the Supreme Court by any 
of its Judges to declare a person to be of unsound mind and
incapable of managing his affairs and, if necessary, to appoint 
a committee. Thereafter the reference was to the Master as to 
the administration of the lunatic’s estate. The Court was also 
made the proper tribunal to declare that an insane person had 
recovered and to order his release from its control and to dis- 
charge any committee. Procedure was by petition with support-
S3ing affidavits and the hearing would proceed before a Judge un­
less he, or the Court, ordered that the matter be referred to 
a special or common jury. Trials of certain questions before 
the Master and jury could be ordered? Where a person had been 
found insane by legal proceedings in the British Empire, the 
presentation of a proper copy of that determination was suf­
ficient to ground the Supreme Court's power to appoint a com­
mittee with regard to the lunatic's estate in the Colony? Ap­
peals lay from the decision of a single Judge to the Pull Court 
under section 104.
Part VIII of the Act was devoted to the constitution of 
the Master's Office, that officer's powers and duties, and the 
management of the estates of insane persons. The Master was 
to undertake the general care, protection and management or 
supervision of the management of the estates of all insane per­
sons and patients in New South Wales. He was also to supervise 
and enforce the performance of the obligations and duties of 
all committees. To this end the Court could order that a luna­
tic's property be sold or otherwise dealt with under the Mas- 
ter's control, the expenses incurred being charged against the 
estate. The Master could prosecute all enquiries which might 
be necessary and he could summon persons to appear before him, 
administer oaths, take evidence and recognizances and require 
the production of books and other records. He enjoyed these 
authorities generally and in respect of any reference made to 
him by the Court?0 Unless the Court otherwise directed, the 
Master was in every case to conduct a next-of-kin enquiry and 
certify to the Court the identity of such persons?1 A large 
number of other particular powers relating particularly to 
accounts and reports were also specified.
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Section 141 conferred on the Master a general authority 
to deal with the estates of insane "patients*' (these were de­
fined by the Act as being those lunatics detained in hospitals, 
reception or licensed houses, and were distinct from insane 
"persons"). He could take summary proceedings to recover any 
real or personal property wrongfully detained from a patient 
and was to get in and pay into Consolidated Revenue in trust
95for a patient any moneys which were payable to him. However, 
as was pointed out in Re George King: "The right of an insane
patient to deal with his property is not taken away by the Act, 
but by the general law, that a person of unsound mind cannot 
alienate. The powers of care, protection, and management con­
ferred on the Master do not divest the patient of his estate, 
or take from him, if shewn to be at the time of sound and dis­
posing mind, the power to dispose of his property. In every 
case the capacity or incapacity of the patient must be proved; 
and if such capacity be proved, the patient can alienate by 
deed as he undoubtedly can by will"?5
The Master could disburse funds from the patient's estate 
for maintenance and he could manage and care for the patient's 
property including the sale, letting or other disposal of it?4*
An important and unusual power was laid by section 146 which 
enabled the Court to direct a personal examination of an insane 
patient by the Master; and for the Court, on having the Mas­
ter's report, to make orders for the appointment of a guardian 
of the person or estate of the patient or, alternatively, of a 
receiver of the patient's estate; and could make further orders 
as to the application of the patient's income. The general mana­
gement of the estates of insane persons by committees under 
authority of the Court was provided for in detail by sections 
148 to 175 of the Act.
It is unnecessary here to consider the Lunacy Act No. 45 
of 1898 as it was very little concerned with the Court's Juris­
diction. It may, however, be noted that the Act in defining 
"Court" accepted as fundamental that the Lunacy Department was 
a distinct Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, though the term
"Judge” was taken to mean any Judge of the Supreme Court. Con­
sistently the word "Court" should surely have been defined as 
"the Supreme Court" not as "the Supreme Court in its Lunacy 
jurisdiction".
12 3
N O T E S
1. For the relationship between Colonial and British Law on 
this subject reference may be made to "Historical Notes 
on the Law of Mental Illness in New South Wales". Mr. 
Justice J. H. McClemens and J. M. Bennett, (1962), 4 SLR, 
49.
2. HRNSW, I Pt. 2, 64. Identical provisions were contained 
in subsequent Commissions; for example, Governor Hunter, 
HRNSW II, 113, G-overnor Bligh, HRNSW V, 631.
3. HRA IV/I, 77, otherwise called the Second Charter of 
Justice.
4. Id. 861.
5. Bigge’s Report, 55.
6. HRA IV/I, 509.
7. Id. 518.
8. Id. 648.
9. State Archives No. 1113, Supreme Court Papers Bundle 30, 
Item 18.
10. Sydney Gazette. 24th. November, 1805. This was an early 
example of the summoning of a jury in New South Wales.
The twelve "good and lawful men" having said "on their 
oaths" that Bishop was a lunatic, the Governor committed 
his estate to John McArthur and Samuel Marsden, "they 
having voluntarily accepted the same from motives of 
humanity".
11. Quoted in "The Lawn of Australian Psychiatry", Professor 
John Bostock, (1951), privately published, Mitchell Lib- rary, Q362.2/B, 17.
12. IcL. 18. This seems to have been an assumption drawn by 
Professor Bostock from the appointment of three surgeons 
by Governor Macquarie in Bodie's Case.
13. What is probably the first colonial certificate of in­
sanity by two medical practitioners is preserved in the 
State Archives, Walsh and Redfern to Campbell, 1st. Feb­
ruary, 1812, Colonial Secretary, In-Letters, Bundle 6,
CS8, 18.
14. Ibid
15. Id- 
16 . Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ibid
Bent to Macquarie, undated, 21. 
Report of the Inquisition, 4th. 
Bent to Macquarie, undated, 25. 
Report of the Inquisition, 31.
February, 1812, 30.
20. Bigge's Report, 19.
22. 30th. May, 2 col. 4.
23. Sydney Gazette. 19th. March, 1829, 2, e.
24. A complete account of this and later mental hospitals is 
contained in Bostock, on. cit. 18 et seq.
25. Op cit. 21. Quoted from a manuscript source in the Mit­
chell Library.
26. HRA i/XVII, 631.
27. Governor's Despatches (Mitchell Library A1233), 43.
28. "An Act to make provision for the Safe Custody of and 
prevention of Offences by Persons dangerously Insane 
and for the Care and Maintenance of Persons of Unsound 
Mind".
29. 11 Geo. IV and 1 Wm. IV, c. 65.
30. HRA I/XXIII, 287.
31. Ibid.
32. This was the first time that Magistrates and Justices 
in the Colony were invested with such power. Governor 
Gipps thought that this justified the charging of main­
tenance of the dangerously insane against public funds
of their respective districts of residence; the Council, 
however, declined to sanction the proposal. HRA i/XXIII, 
288.
33. HRA I/XXIV, 58.
34. 9 Geo. IV, c. 40.
35. Quoted in P. H. Linklater, "The Statutes Relating to 
Equity and Lunacy and in Force in Hew South Wales" (1879), 
200 .
36. Ex parte Clarke (1896) 17 HSWR, 249; R. v. Schofield 
(1838) 1 Legge, 97.
37. Id. 102.
38. "An Act to alter and amend an Act intituled 'An Act to 
make provision for the safe custody of and prevention of 
offences by persons dangerously insane and for the care 
and maintenance of persons of unsound mind", 1845.
39. A summary of the objects of the statute is contained in 
HRA I/XXV, 119.
40. "An Act to amend the Law for the care and treatment of 
the Insane".
41. 14 Geo. Ill, c. 49.
42. Journal of the Legislative Council, Vol. 5, Pt. 1, 91.
43. V & P 1862 (1), 581.
44. Id. 1863-1864 (l), 1024, 1400.
45. Id. 1865-1866 (l), 98.
46. Id. 1868-1869 (3), 507.
48. Id. 523.
49« Papers transferred from the Attorney-General's Department
to the Mitchell Library (A1537-3), 148 and 149» 5th.October, 
1847.
12
5 0. Id. 141, 9th. October, 1847.
51. Id. 142, 26th. October, 1847.
52. Stephen's Practice, Supplement, 64.
53. Vide Journal of the Legislative Council, Voi. 7, 639 et seq.
54. Edward Pratt to the Colonial Secretary, 28th. March, 1866, 
Parkes' Correspondence, N-O-P, 547, Mitchell Library,
(A926).
55. (1867) 6 SCR, 399.
56. Of 1823, i.e. the third.
57. Ex parte Posbery. (1904) 4 SR, 74.
58. (1903) 3 SR, 552.
59. At 567.
60. At 569.
61. Section 4 (l).
62. Parkes' Correspondence, op. cit., 549.
63. Section 5.
6 4. Section 6 in each Act.
65. Section 14 (1878), section 16 1(1898).
66. Section 17-18 (1878), Part II (1898).
67. Section 24 (1878), section 31 (1898).
68. Section 45 (1878), section 52 (1898).
6 9. Section 48 (1878), section 55 (1898).
70. Section 49 (1878), section 56 (1898).
71. Section 51 (1878), section 58 (1898).
72. Part V in each Act •
7 3 . 39 & 40 Geo.. HI, c. 94.
74. 7 Vic. Mo. 14.
75. Part VI in each Act.
76. Part VI (2) in each Act.
77. Section 87 (1878), section 96 (1898).
78. Section 84 (1878), section 93 (1898).
79. Section 86 (1878), section 95 (1898).
80. Master Holroyd as Master in Equity automatically assumed 
the office on 16th. May, 1879, hut his staff of clerks was 
not appointed until August of that year and the office was 
not in full working order until early in 1880 - V & P 1880
1881 (2), 51
81. Section 92.
82. Section 93.
83. Section 94.
84. Section 97.
85. Section 98.
86. Section 102.
87. Section 105.
88. Section 106.
89. Section 108.
90. Section 109.
91. Section 120.
92. Section 142.
93. Section 143.
94. 9 NSWR Eq., 1.
95. At 6.
96. Section 144.
ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION
(PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION)
By the Letters Patent of 2nd April, 1787 (commonly called 
the First Charter of Justice, or the warrant for that Charter)* 
the constitution of a Court of Civil Jurisdiction was declared. 
Authority in matters of Probate was bestowed for the first time 
in compendious terms: "And Wee do further Will, Ordain and
Grant to the said Court full power and Authority to Grant pro­
bates of Wills and administration of the personal Estates of 
Intestates dying within the ... Settlement".
A grant of Probate was made by the Civil Court at least 
as early as 1796, but the majority of cases were intestacies - 
Judge-Advocate Dore himself died not only intestate but insol- 
venti' An early form of a grant of Letters of Administration 
is preserved in the State Archives in the Estate of John 
Shapcote* The document is in the following form:
" Cumberland At a Court of Civil Judicature, held by
to wit Order of the Governor, at Sydney, in the
County of Cumberland, in the Territory of 
New South Wales, this 20th day of July in 
the Year of Our Lord 1790
Prpi.nt (The Judge-Advocate(Revd. Richard Johnson
"Mr. John Peter Shapcote, came before them, and claimed Adminis­
tration of the Estate of his late Father, Mr. John Shapcote, a 
Lieutenant in His Majesty’s Navy, who died on board the Neptune Transport, at Sea, intestate.
And having taken the Oath annexed, and entered into the Bond (with 
two Sureties) required by the Act of the 22 &23d of Car. 2 Cap 10, 
Letters of Administration were accordingly granted him, and Saturday 
the 24th Lay of this instant Month of July appointed for him to 
appear, and bring in and exhibit an Account of his said Administrat­ion".
This grant was made on the applicant’s entering into a 
bond in the sum of £80 sterling with Judge-Advocate Collins 
and submitting his accounts - which he accordingly did in the 
most minute detail^ Within a decade the form of grant of
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Letters had commenced to take on greater maturity, as in the
7Estate of William Stevenson:
"By virtue of the Power and Authority given to the said Court 
of Civil Jurisdiction by certain Letters patent under the great 
Seal of Great Britain bearing date the second day of April one 
thousand Seven hundred and Eighty Seven for granting Probates 
of Wills and Letters of Administration to the Effects of per­
sons dying within the Settlement and Territory aforesaid We do 
hereby issue these Our Letters of Administration unto them the 
said Shadrach Shaw and Simeon Lord requiring and empowering 
them to collect all the Goods Chattells Credits and Effects of 
the said William Stevenson deceased which may be in this Terri­
tory and Such Goods Chattells Credits and Effects Well and 
truly to administer and dispose of according to Law and to the 
Oath which they the said Shadrach Shaw and Simeon Lord have 
taken and entered into and they the said Shadrach Shaw and 
Simeon Lord are hereby required to exhibit before the Judge 
Advocate for the time being or before the Court of Civil Juris­
diction a full just true and perfect account of their Adminis­
tration whenever they shall be called upon or required so to 
do”.
The Letters Patent of 4th February, 1814, commonly called
gthe Second Charter of Justice, in establishing a "Supreme"
Court with Civil Jurisdiction, devoted considerable attention 
to establishing its authority to grant Probates of Wills or 
Letters of Administration. "It may frequently happen that 
the Estate and Effects of Persons, dying in our said Colony of 
New So. Wales and it’s Dependencies, are wasted and embezzled 
and their Debts contracted there remain unpaid, for Want of a 
proper Authority vested in some proper Person or Persons re­
siding therein to take Care of the same"? to remedy "which 
Mischief" the Court was enabled on proof of a Will to grant 
probate under Seal to the executors named. This still applied 
only to personal estate. In intestate estates the Court could 
"grant Probates of Wills or Letters of administration with an 
Authentic Copy of the Will annexed" to the next of kin within 
the jurisdiction, to the principal creditor or to some other 
approved person on giving security!0 This did not have the 
effect of creating a separate Ecclesiastical or Probate Depart­
ment within the Court, even though this branch was described as 
"the Supreme Court of Ecclesiastical Judicature"1.1 It merely 
invested one and the same Court with these in addition to its 
other powers.
Mr. Justice Field who had a discerning eye for Court fees,
12*which he not infrequently appropriated to his own use, early
12 !)
made objection to the ’’flat rate” charge of £4 for each grant 
of Probate or Letters. He therefore prepared a scale of charges 
in 1817 which commenced at £2 and rose to £20, calculated on 
personalty only and on the basis that the ’few persons who die 
in the Colony with above £5,000 besides their real property, 
can well afford to pay £20”!* Macquarie was pleased to confirm 
this in what Field styled a ’’very handsome manner”!1*'
Field expressed concern to Commissioner Bigge at the in­
ability of the Registrar of the Court to apply for Letters of 
Administration ad colligenda in default of their being executors 
or administrators in the Colony. He considered that the estates 
of persons dying without ’will or kin” often ”became the subject 
of a scramble” because of the deficiency. Bigge agreed with 
this and reported: ”It has occurred, that upon the deaths of
convicts upon the passage to New South Wales, or where the in­
habitants of the remoter districts have died suddenly, posses­
sion has been taken of the effects without security or inven­
tory, and that very inefficient means have been adopted to give 
information or to transmit the proceeds to the absent relatives. 
To prevent these abuses I think it will be expedient to give 
the Supreme Court in New South Wales, as well as the court in 
Van Piemen’s Land, in cases where the next of kin or an executor 
when cited shall refuse to take out administration or probate, 
the power of granting letters ad colligendo (sic) or of adminis­
tration to the registrars of the respective courts for the pur­
pose of enabling them to collect the assets of deceased persons, 
and to sell and convert them into money under the direction of 
the court, the registrar being first required to give security 
for the payment and due account of all such monies as shall 
come to his hands by virtue of such administration”. The Com­
missioner also considered that the Registrar should be obliged 
to transmit to an officer called the ’colonial agent” a list 
of persons dying intestate in the Colony and a statement of 
their estates!7
i«In 1818 Governor Macquarie issued a Proclamation which re­
cited that many Executors were failing to prove wills and that
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unauthorized persons were in the habit of obtaining wrongful 
possession of deceased estates. After drawing attention to 
the penalties prescribed by 37 Geo. Ill c. 90 for failure to 
prove wills and the fact that such statute did not extend to 
the Colony, it went on to levy a fine of £50 against any exe­
cutor de son tort or unauthorized administrator who failed to 
take out probate or letters of administration within six calen­
dar months of the deceased’s death.
Judge-Advocate Bent in 1811 had proposed the establishment 
of a single Supreme Court with, inter alia, an Ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction9and this was echoed in 1821 by Judge-Advocate 
Wyldei° The proposal was at length realized in the so-called 
Third Charter of Justice, the Letters Patent of 13th. October, 
1823 on which the jurisdictions of the Supreme Court (as dis­
tinct from the 1814 Court) were founded. The Court was declared 
to be ”a Court of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction with full power 
to grant Probates under the seal of the said Court of the last 
wills and testaments of all or any of the Inhabitants of that 
part of the said Colony and its Dependencies situate in the 
Island of New Holland and of all other persons who shall die 
and leave personal Effects within that part of the Colony and 
to commit Letters of Administration under the seal of the said 
Court of the Goods Chattels credits and all other effects what­
soever of the persons aforesaid who shall die intestate or who 
shall not have named an executor resident within that part of 
the said Colony and its Dependencies or where the Executor 
being duly cited shall not appear and sue forth such probate 
annexing the will to the said Letters of Administration when 
such persons shall have left a will without naming any exe­
cutor or any person for Executor who shall then be alive and 
resident within that part of the said Colony and its Dependen­
cies and who being duly cited thereunto will approve and sue 
forth a Probate thereof and to sequester the goods and Chattels 
credits and other effects whatsoever of such persons so dying 
in cases allowed by Law as the same is and may be now used in 
the Diocese of London and to demand require take hear examine
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and allow and if occasion require to disallow and reject the 
accounts of them in such manner and form as is now used or may 
be used in the said Diocese of London and to do all other things 
whatsoever needful and necessary in that behalf Provided always 
and we do hereby authorize and require the said Court in such 
cases as aforesaid where Letters of Administration shall be 
committed with the will annexed for want of an executor appear­
ing in due time to sue forth the Probate to reserve in such 
Letters of Administration full Power and authority to revoke 
the same and to grant Probate of the said Will to such Executor 
whenever he shall duly appear and sue forth the same. And we 
do hereby further Authorize and require the said Supreme Court 
of New South Wales to grant and commit such Letters of Adminis­
tration to any one or more of the Lawful next of kin of such 
person so dying as aforesaid and being then resident within 
the Jurisdiction of the said Court and being of the age of 
twenty one years and in case no such person shall then be re­
siding within the Jurisdiction of the said Court or being duly 
cited shall not appear and pray the same to the Registrar of 
the said Court or to such person or persons whether creditor 
or creditors or not of the deceased person as the Court shall 
see fit. Provided always that Probates of Wills and Letters 
of Administration to be granted by the said Court shall be limi­
ted to such money goods chattels and effects as the deceased 
person shall be entitled to within that part of the said Colony 
situate within the Island of New Holland"?1
This was strictly a Probate Jurisdiction rather than an 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, as other matters such as juris­
diction in divorce which had been the province of the English 
Ecclesiastical Courts, were excluded. Section 15 of the Char­
ter required administrators of intestate estates to give secu­
rity by Bond to the Crown, enforceable at the suit of the 
Attorney-General under section 16. All executors and adminis­
trators were to pass accounts until their duties had ceased 
with personal liability in interest should they default. Thy 
were to abide by such order as the Court might in its discretion
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make for the distribution of assets. It was for the Court to 
allow such commission to Executors and Administrators as it 
deemed just and on condition that the requirements of the Act 
had been observed.
The Court* s authority under the Patent was ’placed beyond 
doubt’ by 4 Geo. IV c. 96 which, by section 10 conferred an 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in these 
terms; "And be it further enacted, That the said Supreme Courts 
respectively shall be Courts of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, and 
shall have full Power and Authority to administer and execute 
within IMew South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, and the Depen­
dencies thereof respectively, such Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction 
and Authority as shall be committed to the said Supreme Courts 
respectively by His Majesty’s said Charters or Letters Patent; 
provided that, in all Cases where the Executor or Executors of 
any Will, upon being duly cited, shall refuse or neglect to 
take out Probate, or where the next of kin shall be absent, and 
the effects of the Deceased shall appear to the said Judges 
respectively to be exposed and liable to Waste, it shall be 
lawful for the said Judges respectively to authorize and em­
power the Registrar, or other Ministerial Officer of the said 
Supreme Courts respectively, to collect such Effects, and hold 
or deposit or invest the same in such Manner and Place, and 
upon such Security, and subject to such Orders and Directions 
as shall be made, either as applicable to all such cases, or 
specially in any Case, by the said Judges, in respect of the 
Custody, Controul, or Disposal thereof’’**
It will be noted particularly that the jurisdiction so 
conferred was a jurisdiction extending over personalty only?*
Hor was it yet a thoroughgoing Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 
many of the powers of the Courts Spiritual still being with­
held. Nor again did it establish a separate Court, but the 
existing Court was given wider authority within its existing 
constitution?5
The statute 9 Geo. IV c. 83 as well as confirming the 
Third Charter of Justice*6rendered all English laws and statutes
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then in force (and not inconsistent with colonial laws) opera­
tive within the Colony, as result of which the Court was per­
manently assured of a Probate jurisdiction in which would be 
applied “the law, manner and custom of England and in particu­
lar of the Diocese of London, as far as it should be applicable 
in the then state of the Colony"*.7
Once the jurisdiction was laid down, the Court and legis­
lature seemed to withdraw from systematic supervision of de­
ceased estates for almost twenty years. Generally speaking, 
executors failing to prove were not pursued and their failure 
to file accounts was not penalized. The last serious attempt 
to deal with such defaults for a considerable time was a pro­
clamation by the Governor in 1826 which recited the tenth sec­
tion of the New South Wales Act and ordered that persons ac­
quainted with the wrongful disposal of assets in deceased es­
tates should give information accordingly to the Attorney-Generalt 
The proclamation seems to have been enforced in a desultory way.
In 1838 another superficial attempt was made to remedy 
this slackness. Mr. Justice Willis' energies in preparing new 
Rules of Court in Equity were simultaneously directed to pre­
paration of Probate Rules, in which form they remained largely 
in force until 1890. These also took the title of the Stan­
ding Rulest9 They provided for all applications for Probate
3 0and Letters of Administration to be made by petition supported 
in the former case by an affidavit of circumstances and par- 
ticulars of proof and in the latter case by an affidavit of 
death, particulars of estate and next of kin?* A creditor 
could apply for Letters of Administration on citing the de­
ceased’s widow and next of kin to appear and show cause why 
administration should not be granted to him?3 Provision was 
made for caveats to be entered against applications for PrO-
34.bate or Letters and the matter would then be set dowm to be
3  5heard before one of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the 
parties proceeding in substantially the same manner as at a 
trial at Lawf^
An effort to pursue the proclamation of 1826 was certainly
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made, but, after initial enthusiasm, abandoned to almost iden­
tical casualness. Rule 18 provided that "in all cases where 
the Executors of any Will shall neglect or refuse to bring in­
to Court such Will, and take out Probate of the same, or renounce 
the execution thereof, - a Citation may issue as of course, af­
ter the expiration of six weeks from the death of the Testator, 
at the instance of any Party interested in such Will directed 
to such Executors, calling upon them to bring in such Will, and 
take out Probate of the same, or renounce the due execution 
thereof".
The troublesome question of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
require accounts of executors and administrators was also raised 
by the Standing Rules of 1838. Reviewing the history of this 
measure John Gurner, who had formerly been the Chief Clerk of 
the Court stated to a Select Committee of the Legislative As­
sembly in 1845 that "Sir Francis Forbes when he first arrived 
in the Colony, gave instructions for it to be done, and a large 
number of citations were written out for the purpose, and some 
few issued, but I believe it was found almost impossible to
3*7carry it out, and it was, therefore, eventually abandoned".
Gurner himself doubted the authority of the Judges to make such 
a Rule.
The Standing Rules required all Administrators who had 
obtained their Letters within the preceding six years to file 
Inventories and pass accounts, such duties to be insisted upon 
in all future cases. It was, however, common ground that the 
provision was not seriously enforced. In the early 1840’s it 
was proposed to remedy this deficiency and to extend the oper­
ation of the Rule to executors. Alfred Stephen was decidedly 
of opinion that the failure of executors and administrators to 
file accounts was in direct breach of their oaths and that the 
Judges proposed to insist upon the filing of these documents. 
Rules of Court were accordingly passed in June 1845 which made 
the Court’s attitude quite olear: "Every person, to whom Pro­
bate or Letters of Administration shall hereafter be granted, 
shall within six calendar months next following, exhibit and
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cause to be filed in the Office of the Registrar and Prothono- 
tary, a full, true, and perfect Inventory of the goods, chat­
tels, and credits of the Deceased; - and shall, within fifteen 
calendar months after having obtained such Probate or Adminis­
tration, cause to be made and filed in the same Office, a full, 
true, and just Account of his Administration: - which Account 
shall be passed before the Court, or in Vacation before one of 
the Judges, at such time or times as shall be thereafter appoin­
ted for that purpose The Registrar was required on the first 
day of every Term to report to the Court the names of parties 
failing to comply.
Commenting generally on the jurisdiction to the Select 
Committee of the Legislative Assembly on the Moiefcon Bay Judge's 
Appointment Bill, Sir Alfred Stephen said that it included "the 
grant of Probates and Letters of Administration, and deciding 
all matters incidental thereto, such as the occasional dispen­
sing with sureties, or directing the amount of security to be 
less or more. Sometimes in determining whether the evidence of 
death is sufficient; or the party seeking to be administrator 
is the proper one; and so on. Occasionally an Ecclesiastical 
case will occupy in this manner half an hour; but I do not
39think more, and rarely quite so much".
It is apparent that the Court's jurisdiction in matters 
of Probate and Administration was not effectively exercised 
during the 1830's and 1840's. Applications for grants of 
Probates and Letters were regarded as ministerial matters for
uothe attention of the Chief Clerk of the Court with the result 
that they were doomed to perpetual delay and inefficiency be­
cause of inadequate Court staffing. Intestate estates came 
under the control of the Registrar of the Court and the dis­
honesty and irregularity practised in this department illus­
trate positively the nonchalence with which the Court for a 
long time regarded this segment of its jurisdiction. The 
duties in intestacies were added to the Registrar's Depart­
ment by Francis Forbes, with the principal object of giving 
Mr. Registrar Manning sufficient employment. Manning's office
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to this extent was not governed by Rules of Court or even sub­
ject to Court supervision for about ten years. As his position 
meant that considerable sums of money would pass through his 
hands, the British G-overnment demanded security from him which 
was only paid after most emphatic protests!11
The general scope of the Court's jurisdiction and of the 
nature of the Registrar's duties was reviewed in a report pre­
pared for the Governor by the Judges in 1832 to the following 
effect: "Whenever a party dies possessed of property in this
Colony, either intestate or otherwise, having no Executor or 
personal representative within the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, the Registrar is empowered, upon proper application to 
the Court, to collect the Estate and Effects of the deceased, 
and hold the same pursuant to the directions of the Statute 
9th George 4th, c. 83d, s. 12, until some person, duly Author­
ised, appears before the Court and claims Probate of the Will 
or Letters of Administration, as the case may require. When 
a person duly authorized appears, it is the practice of the 
Court to grant Administration upon sufficient security being 
given by bond, pursuant to the New South Wales Charter of 
Justice, 13th. October, 4 Geo. 4th. In cases where the party 
entitled to administration resides out of the Jurisdiction of 
the Court, a difficulty frequently arises in proving the legal 
claim and personal identity of such party. This difficulty, 
we apprehend, can only be remedied by an Act of Parliament, 
containing provisions analogous to those in the first Section 
of the Statute 54th Geo. 3rd. c. 15 enabling the party to go 
before some constituted public Authority within the United 
Kingdom and make Oath or affirmation of his identity, and 
prove his claim, after the manner therein prescribed; and, 
upon the same being duly certified and transmitted to some 
person authorized, by power of attorney, to appear in the 
Supreme Court to claim Administration, enabling the Court to 
grant Administration to such Attorney upon his giving the Bond 
required by the Charter of Jurtice for the due Administration 
of the Estate and Effects thus coining to his hands by represen-
13V
tation. The Attorney would be then enabled to transmit the 
effects of the deceased to the rightful claimant in England. 
Inasmuch however as Attorney's so appointed may oftentimes 
find difficulty in giving the requisite security in New South 
Wales for the due Administration of the Effects coming into 
their hands, particularly when such Effects are of small amount, 
we would suggest that in cases where such difficulty may arise, 
a power should be given by the same Act of Parliament to the 
Supreme Court to direct the Registrar, or other Ministerial 
Officer of the Court for the time being to Administer the Ef­
fects, subject to the Orders of the Court, without requiring 
any further or better Security than that already required of 
such Officer in his Official capacity; with a declaratory en­
actment that the receipt of the party or his attorney shall be 
a sufficient discharge of the Registrar, or other Ministerial 
Officer, for all Monies and Effects which he shall pay or de­
liver over to such party or his Attorney, under the Order of 
the Court".
In 1838, the year it will be recalled of the Standing 
Rules, Mr. Justice Burton suggested by happy chance that some 
further Rules be made circumscribing the Registrar's office 
and obliging the Registrar to bring in accounts concerning 
deceased estates and to lodge funds in his hands in Savings 
Bank account. The Judges agreed that this be done, with the 
most revealing result. Manning protested that the moneys
U2>paid into his hands were in some fashion his own to invest 
and that the interest on them was a return for his occupation 
of the office. He outspokenly objected to the proposed Rules - 
the Judges receiving "an indignant, and, indeed, a very vapour­
ing letter from Mr. Manning in which he moists upon the in­
dignity of being called upon to give sécurités.' and maintained 
his right to use the Suitors moneys for his own benefit"?4
The impression thus made on the Judges left no doubt that 
the Rules should be passed and passed they were. At the same 
time the Chief Justice suggested to the Governor that the Regis­
trar be compelled by statute to account for and deposit with
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the Government all the moneys in his possession. A Bill was 
prepared and passed as 1 Vic. Ho. 4, "An Act for the invest­
ment of moneys belonging to Intestate Estates by the Supreme 
Court in the New South Wales Savings’ Bank at Sydney". Manning 
was ordered to make his account which, when produced, indicated 
that he had kept no proper records at all and that he admitted 
to a debit balance (owing to the fund by himself) of just under 
two thousand pounds. The fund, when audited, was shown to be 
owed at least three thousand pounds by its custodian^ What 
greater amounts may have been thus misappropriated could only 
be guessed at, for most of the estates were those where adminis­
trators were out of the jurisdiction and the Registrar had fre­
quently been given powers of attorney on behalf of those en­
titled. It even appeared that estates had been vested in him 
in a personal capacity without ever coming under the nominal 
control of the Court.
Despite these warnings, the Judges and officers of the 
Government alike did nothing to rectify the obvious defalcation. 
"From that day all vigilance seems to have ceased. Prom 31st 
October 1838 to 27th October 1841, the Judges permitted Mr. 
Manning to go on receiving and misapplying Funds without once 
calling on him to account or exacting from him any security"^ 
Only when it was discovered in 1841 that Manning was actually 
insolvent, having by that time misappropriated almost £10,000 
more, was the seriousness of the position properly assessed.
Lord Stanley cast merciless blame upon the Judges for having 
failed to enforce their Rules and having remained idle when 
on notice of the Registrar's defaults. He demanded instant 
action to protect intestates’ estates, recommending the adop­
tion of English Rules of Court. Manning was suspended and his 
estate sequestrated in insolvency at the suit of creditors to 
a total of over £30,000. The estate realized 7id. in the pound 
which the administrators of intestate estates took -pari passu
u <zwith Manning's numerous personal creditors.
The Governor had no wish to accept any liability for an 
officer whom he regarded as under the exclusive control of the
13!»
Judges. However, the representatives of intestates made such 
compelling demands for redress that the Government was obliged 
to intervene. This it did by passing in 1849 "An Act to pro­
vide for the payment of claims on the late Registrar of the 
Supreme Court in respect of Intestate Estates’1 - 13 Vic. No.
44. The Statute recited that funds had been deposited at Sav­
ings Bank on account of deceased intestate persons and that a 
fund would be established from such moneys when unclaimed af­
ter a period of six years. With this fund claimants on the 
Registrar were ultimately paid.
In 1847 an Act was passed to reconstitute the supervision 
by the Court of intestate estates. This Act was 11 Vic. No.
24 - "An Act for the better preservation and managment of the 
Estates of deceased persons in certain cases”. It established 
a new office of Curator of Intestate Estates with the safeguard 
that any appointee should first give security in two thousand 
pounds. It was for the Curator, on receiving information on 
oath of the death of an intestate leaving personal estate in 
the Colony but no administrator, to apply to the Court for an 
order authorizing him to collect, manage and administer the 
estate. He had the like powers if the Executors of a deceased 
person’s will failed to take out Probate within six months of 
the deceased’s death. Stringent provisions were inserted as 
to the submission and passing of the Curator’s own accounts. 
Additional authority was invested in the Curator by an amend­
ing Act, 15 Vic. No. 8 of 1851. This was styled ”An Act to 
amend in certain particulars the Act passed for the better pre­
servation of the Estates of deceased persons”. It enabled the 
Curator to intervene where he was satisfied on affidavit 
evidence that a deceased's effects would otherwise be pur­
loined, lost or destroyed or that great expense would be in­
curred by any delay. This Act also contained an indemnity 
clause by which the Curator was not to be subject to any per­
sonal liability for anything done by himself or his agents in 
the performance of their official duties.
It will be observed that, up to this time, there had been
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by the Third Charter of Justice, 9 Geo. IV c. 83 and the in­
herited Ecclesiastical Law. Surprisingly enough, this remained 
so for a further forty years, no legislative attention at all 
being directed to the constitution of the Court in these mat­
ters until the passing of the Probate Act of 1890.
There were, in the intervening period, two Acts of Parlia­
ment governing the Court’s practice. The 15 Vic. No. 17 of
1851 established a new scale of Court fees. In 1858 the 22
Vic. No. 14 - ”An Act to expedite Suits and Proceedings in 
Equity and to facilitate the despatch of Business in the Sup­
reme Court in Banco” - declared that the Supreme Court was to 
be deemed held before and by the Primary Judge in Equity for 
the purpose of granting probates and letters of administration. 
This continued to be the practice until the Probate Act of 1890 
set up a separate Department.
It is convenient at this stage to mention some of the more 
important substantive statutes enacted in the Colonial period. 
This thesis is not concerned with their contents but rather to 
demonstrate by their paucity the lack of interest evinced by 
Parliament in advancing this branch of the law.
The earliest measure, 5 Wil. IV No. 8 simply adopted the 
Imperial Act ’for making better provision for the disposal of 
the undisposed of residues of the effects of testators”. This 
overcame the objection that the appointment of executors with­
out express dispositions of residuary personalty enabled such 
executors to retain the residue to their own use, by converting 
the position of executors into that of trustees for the parties 
entitled under the Statute of Distributions. Another adoption 
of English law was made in 3 Vic. No. 5 which introduced into 
the Colony the Wills Amendment Act of 1837 - 7 Wil. IV & 1 Vic. 
c. 26. This statute abolished many ancient laws and prescribed 
that every person could dispose by will of his real or personal 
property provided that such wrill complied with some elementary 
requirements. These were that every will should be in writing, 
signed by the testator, or for him by some person in his pre­
sence ”at the foot or end thereof”, the signature to be made 
or acknowledged in the presence of two or more witnesses present
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at the same time. The witnesses were to subscribe the will in 
the testator's presence, but were not bound to use any parti­
cular form of attestation. The only regular exception to these 
formalities was in the case of soldiers on active service or 
mariners or seamen being at sea. The expression "at the foot 
or end thereof" was enlarged under 17 Vic. No. 5 - "An Act to 
amend the Law with respect to the execution of wills".
The Act "to alter the succession to Real Estate in cases 
of Intestacy", 26 Vic. No. 20, may also be mentioned here. It 
was commonly called "Lang's Act" and was passed specifically 
to abolish primogeniture. "This important statute provided 
that, upon the death of the owner intestate as to any realty, 
such realty should pass to his personal representative, to be 
distributed as personalty amongst his next of kin, instead of 
to his heir. The interest to be taken by husband and wife, 
should, however, not exceed that formerly to be taken by him 
by the curtesy, or her dower, respectively". The changes made 
by it are clearly emphasized when tested against the prior law. 
Sir Alfred Stephen gave the following answers to a Select Com­
mittee of Parliament on Landed Property in Cases of Intestacy 
Bills "Landed property descends to the eldest son; or, if 
there be daughters, to them jointly; or, if there be no chil­
dren, in a regulated course of descent on the same principle; 
and, in the case of personal property, it goes to the adminis­
trator, or if none be appointed, then to the Curator of Intes­
tate Estates. ... In this Colony landed property has always 
been unqualifiably subject to the payment of debts, in the 
first instance, of every kind; whereas in England, ordinarily, 
the land was subject only to debts of a higher order, binding 
the heir - such as debts by recognizance, or bond, or other in­
strument under seal"?0
It is convenient to refer here to the most important de­
cision relating to the powers of the Ecclesiastical Court which 
was laid down by the colonial Supreme Court. This was In the 
Goods of James Blackwood5.1 a judgement of the Pull Court de­
livered in 1881. A testator died in London having appointed
14 ;
executors domiciled in Victoria, The assets in the estate 
were substantially in New South Wales, but no creditors were 
there. The Primary Judge, Hargrave, J., ruled that under the 
Charter of Justice he had no jurisdiction to grant Probate to 
the executors as they were not within the Colony. The Pull 
Court overruled the Primary Judge and held that the Court*s 
jurisdiction was identical to that of the English Ecclecias- 
tical Courts at the date of the third Charter of Justice and 
that the Court had power accordingly to grant Probate to an 
executor resident outside its jurisdiction. The judgement of 
the Chief Justice, Sir James Martin, is of the greatest sig-
52»nificance and is quoted here at length:
**It is not easy to construe the fourteenth section of the 
Charter of Justice. In England, it is sufficiently clear 
that, before the "Probate Act”, probate would be granted to 
an executor resident out of the jurisdiction, because, in 
the cases to which we have been referred, it has been argued 
that section 73 of that Act provides that, in certain cases, 
where application is made by a foreign executor, the Court 
may refuse probate. This implies that, but for that section, 
there would not exist power to refuse probate to such an exe­
cutor. The same power that the English Ecclesiastical Courts 
had is given to the Supreme Court of this colony by section 
14 of the Charter of Justice, except so far as they may be 
abridged by the terms of that section. By that section full 
power is given "to grant probates, under the seal of the 
said Court, of the last wills and testaments of all or any 
of the inhabitants of that part of the said colony and its 
dependencies situate in the said island of New Holland, and 
of all other persons who shall die and leave personal effects 
within that part of the said Colony”. That is a general power 
to grant probates - as large as the power vested in the English 
Courts at that time; and, therefore, includes the power to 
grant probate to executors out of the jurisdiction. Then come 
the words - ”and to commit letters of administration ... of 
the persons aforesaid, who shall die intestate, or who shall 
not have named an executor resident within the colony, or when 
the executor, being duly cited, shall not appear and sue forth 
probate, annexing the will to the said letters of administra­
tion, when such person shall have left a will without naming 
any executor, or any person for executor, who shall then be 
alive and resident within the said colony, and who, being duly 
cited thereunto, will not appear and sue forth a probate there­
of”. The question arises whether these words limit the power 
of the Court in cases where the executor is not resident in 
the colony. I am of opinion that the words do not so limit 
the power. They are intended to apply to the case of an exe­
cutor, residing in or out of the colony, on whose behalf no 
application has been made for probate, and thus to provide 
for administering the property of the deceased, that it should 
not be left unguarded. But where an application is made by 
the executor, then probate ought to be granted to him. This 
view is borne out by the like words in a later paragraph, to 
this effect - "Provided always and we do hereby authorise and 
require the said Court, in such cases as aforesaid, where 
letters of administration shall be committed with the will an­
nexed, for want of an executor applying in due time to sue 
forth the probate, to reserve in such letters of administration 
full power and authority to revoke the same, and to grant pro­
bate of the said will to such executor whenever he shall duly
appear and sue forth the same”. So that it would seem that, 
if an executor did not make his application in due time, then 
the Court had power to issue letters of administration with 
the will annexed, reserving power for the executor to come in 
and prove. This tends to show that the general power to grant 
probates to executors, wherever resident, is not limited, but 
that the clause provides that the estate may be protected if 
the executor does not apply. It seems to me that this probate 
ought to be granted”.
Sir William Manning as Primary Judge in Equity in the 
1880*s and also as a Legislative Councillor directed consider­
able attention to the need for a reformed jurisdiction for the 
granting of Probates of Wills and Letters of Administration.
He made many modifications to the Court's practice, one of 
the most important of these, so far as concerns jurisdiction, 
being contained in his decision in Vivers v. Vivers?3 This was 
a matter of administration which was governed by the fourteenth 
section of the Third Charter of Justice, to the intent that 
the Court could grant Letters to "any one or more of the law­
ful next of kin” of the deceased. Notwithstanding this, the 
course of practice for sixty years had been to grant adminis­
tration automatically to an intestate's surviving spouse with­
out reference to the next of kin. This followed the then cur­
rent practice in England. In Viver's Case a deceased's daugh­
ter sought a grant of administration in preference to the widow 
on the grounds that husband and wife were not next of kin at 
law so the Court had no power under the Charter to make the 
grant to a surviving spouse. This submission was accepted by 
Sir William Manning thus establishing for a time a practice 
whereby administration would only be granted to a spouse if 
the next of kin were minors or failed to appear on citation.
In 1885 Sir William Manning urged the government to bring 
down legislation to reconstitute the ecclesiastical jurisdic­
tion by establishing a Department of the Court with authority 
in matters of Probate and Administration. In accordance with 
his suggestions the Government gave directions for a Bill to 
be drawn and Mr. Justice C. J. Manning did so. The Bill was 
introduced into the Legislative Council and referred to a 
Select Committee which apparently never met with the result 
that the Bill went no further. However, its text was revised
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by Sir William Manning and Windeyer and Owen, JJ., and it was 
reintroduced in the Legislative Assembly in 1890. It took 
priority over an unofficial Probates of Wills Facilitation 
Bill presented in the same year.
The lastmentioned Bill had been particularly introduced 
to express disapproval of another innovation in practice made 
by Sir William Manning^4 From 1838 all applications for Probate 
or Letters were to be made on petition or motion to the Court 
but in 1881 the Judge virtually repealed the relevant Standing 
Rule. He made it mandatory that in all cases of estates of 
£500 or more in value such appearances were to be made in 
Court, in other words, the attendance of counsel was necessary. 
Such an attendance was even required for estates valued over 
£100 but under £500, though the attendance of a solicitor 
would be accepted in those cases. Only in estates under £100 
did the Judge allow the old procedure on simple petition to 
apply. The notorious politician, Mr. Crick, was very eloquent 
on the subject before the House. He had tried to obtain a 
grant himself on behalf of a poor widow. "The widow being in 
very straitened circumstances I went over myself to the late 
Mr. Justice Manning. I met him in chambers, and I said, MI am 
glad I met your Honor, as I desire probate of this will. The 
widow is in very straitened circumstances indeed, and it will 
probably be a fortnight before your Honor is in town again.
The papers have been certified by the proper officer as cor­
rect. They are correct, your Honor, and I now ask for probate*'. 
He said, "I cannot hear you". Thinking the unfortunate fun­
ctionary was slightly deaf, I spoke considerably louder. He 
said, "I cannot hear you". Well, I fairly roared at the judge. 
He said, "I hear you well enough, sir, but I wish to tell you 
that in a matter over £500 I cannot hear you". Desiring to 
get probate, and to get the matter through, I had to rush out, 
and I met some young man standing outside with a thin nose and 
horsehair on his head - I never saw him before - and I called 
him up. He assured the judge just exactly what I had told 
him - that the papers were correct - and probate was granted, 
ftiow, was not that a farce?^ Sir William Manning was, however,
quick to rejoin that he did not consider it within the scope
of a Judge's duties "that he should have a parcel of papers
pitched into his chambers, have to go through them all, and
form his own judgment, picking holes here and holes there,
and calling for an amendment here and an amendment there, be­
stcause he was not satisfied with the proceedings as they were".
He considered that the retaining of the legal profession was 
accordingly justified.
Speaking of the Probate Bill (which was passed into law 
as the Probate Act of 1890) the Minister of Justice pointed 
out the extremely unsatisfactory nature of the colonial Court's 
jurisdiction. No adjustment had been made to match the sweep­
ing away of the old ecclesiastical procedure in England in 
1857 and no attempt had been made to follow the English pre­
cedent of creating a Court with Probate jurisdiction. In sum­
mary he observed of the Bill that its principal object was 
"to conform the practice of granting letters of administration 
and probate with the newer practice - to bring our practice 
into something like a modernised form. ... Provision is made 
for letters of administration and probate being granted in 
cases where the amount does not exceed £500. Provision is 
also made that all real estate shall pass through the execu­
tors whether specifically devised or not. This is the prac­
tice in the adjoining colony of Victoria, and has been found 
to work very well. Then it is proposed that probate shall be 
proof of the will in all matters concerning real estate as in 
personal estate. That will materially lessen the cost to 
persons having occasion to go into court to produce a will 
in giving evidence as to their title to real estate. Another 
important matter is the recognition of foreign probate and 
letters of administration. Provision will be made for their 
recognition. That is also a step greatly in advance of our 
present practice, and will assimilate our law not only to the 
law of the various neighbouring colonies, but also to the
57English law.". This had the ancillary benefit of allowing 
the Court to deal with real estate as well as with personalty.
Despite the seeming simplicity and want of contention in
14
the Bill, the politicians contrived to protract its passage 
for almost a year. Particularly in the Legislative Council 
was it beset with trifling amendments argued at length and, 
usually, withdrawn without achieving anything. Sir William 
Manning pleaded for expedition. The Judge sitting in Probate 
matters declared that ’’not a week passes without my having to 
express publicly in court my hope that the Probate Bill now 
in your hands may speedily become law”.
At last the measure was passed and became Act No. 25 of 
54 Victoria? In reviewing the provisions which it made for 
the constitution of a Probate Jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court it is convenient to read with it the supplementary 
Amending Act 56 Vic. No. 30.
Section 4 of the principal Act left the Court's powers 
exactly where they were, in extent, but the exercise of those 
powers was virtually transferred from the Supreme Court to 
the Supreme Court in Probate Jurisdiction. The wording of 
the section was as follows: ’The jurisdiction and authority
heretofore vested in or exercised by the Supreme Court or 
the Primary Judge in Equity in respect of the estates of de­
ceased persons shall be vested in and exercised by the Sup­
reme Court in Probate Jurisdiction, and by such Judge as may 
from time to time be permanently or temporarily appointed in 
that behalf by the Governor under the title of the Probate 
Judge, or by any Judge of the Supreme Court acting for the 
said Probate Judge during his illness or absence or at his 
request”. It will be observed that this did not create a 
Court separately from the Supreme Court, but a jurisdiction 
within the Court. This is further apparent from the Act's 
interpretation of the term "the Court” to mean, inter alia, 
the Supreme Court in its Probate Jurisdiction. The juris­
diction was expressed by section 11 in wide terms, so wide
60indeed as to merit description as "unfettered” - "the Court 
shall have jurisdiction to grant probate of the will or ad­
ministration of the estate of any deceased person leaving 
property, whether real or personal within the Colony of New
South Wales". Further evidence of the essentially adminis­
trative nature of the new jurisdiction is afforded in the 
provision by section 5 that the Probate Judge could sit with 
the assistance of any Judge or Judges of the Supreme Court 
if he requested their attendance.
The consolidating statute, Act No. 13 of 1898, - the 
Wills Probate and Administration Act - confirmed by section 
40 the jurisdiction which had been established under section 
11 of 54 Vic. No. 25* It also, by section 33, vested in the 
Court "the jurisdiction and authority, prior to the coming 
into operation of the Probate Act of 1890, vested in or exer­
cised by the Supreme Court or by the Primary Judge in Equity".
From first to last, no statute in the colonial period was 
directed to a clear exposition of the "jurisdiction and 
authority" so referred to and this branch of the Court was 
left largely to rely on the practice established locally 
over the passage of years as adopted by Rule of Court.
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DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES JURISDICTION
There was no provision in New South Wales for the dissolution
of marriage by divorce or judicial separation at the time of the
founding of the Colony. According to English accounts, the Imperial
Legislature deliberately withheld such authority from the Letters
1Patent known as the First and Second Charters of Justice and it
refused to allow the adoption of British Divorce statutes in the
Colony. ’’The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction excepting that
which it derives by Act of Parliament and by the Charter of Justice
founded upon that Act, in both of which the extent of its pavers
and especially of its powers in Ecclesiastical causes is distinctly
defined. Upon reference to those Instruments, there will be found
no allusion in either of them to matrimonial causes, or to the
offences which Spiritual Courts in England visit with Ecclesiastical
Censures. This subject was duly considered when the Act and Charter
were originally passed, the omission was not accidental but
intentional, and, if it be fit to supply it, it can be done by no
2,
other authority than by Act of Parliament”.
Ellis Bent's recommendations for the remodelling of the
Civil Court included the establishment of a Supreme Court invested
with "full power to exercise all Civil, Criminal and Ecclesiastical 
3
Jurisdiction”, which would certainly have contemplated a divorce 
jurisdiction. Judge-Advocate Wylde adopted the same proposal in 
his own submissions^*
The deficiency was a source of genuine grievance from quite 
early stages of colonial society: even so puritanical a gentleman 
as Field, J., had submitted to Commissioner Bigge in 1820 that the 
Supreme Court required an Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which, after 
the fashion of Ceylon, should include matters in matrimonial causes 
as well as matters in probate and administration, "not for the 
purpose of pronouncing divorces in a society like that of New
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South Wales, hut for the sake of decreeing alimony to maltreated 
or discarded wives”. The Commissioner adopted this opinion, hut 
it was not approved in England, with the result that the 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction conferred on the Court hy 4 Geo. IV 
c. 96 was one for the disposal of testate and intestate estates 
only.
In 1825 legal minds in England and in New South Wales were 
alike reflecting on the want of matrimonial legislation. James 
Stephen Junior in advising Under-Secretary Horton presumed that 
the danger that powers to award divorces might he abused was the 
chief reason for their being withheld from most of the Colonies: 
’’otherwise it might seem difficult to assign any good reason 
why the parties should be indissolubly united, notwithstanding 
the most aggravated case of adultery which can be supposed,
(a
merely because they reside in a distant Colony”. In Sydney,
Attorney-General Saxe Bannister in submitting a number of
questions to Earl Bathurst on the operation of the Colonial laws
enquired whether the Court acquired jurisdiction ’’under the
ancient principle of Law that Justice shall not fail by the
failure of one of many Courts”, or whether enabling legislation
was to be awaited. ’’The necessity of a Court for the relief of
Wives is very great”, he said, ’’Perhaps Legislation will do but
little to remedy an evil, which is caused by a physical fact,
the disproportion of the Sexes. Individual misery would however
sometimes be assuaged by a Court of Almonry, and individual
depravity be exposed by a Court of Coercion upon gross
incontinencies. The subject is not an easy one. I have been
applied to very frequently to prefer informations in cases of
extreme Villainy, and could only find a doubtful jurisdiction
7
for a Common Law Misdemeanour”. Earl Bathurst’s reply, quoted 
above, was prepared in substance by Stephen, who had obviously
been instructed in unequivocal terms since expressing his own
view of colonial divorce. His advice was as follows: "It is ...
asked whether, as long as no ecclesiastical Court exists for the 
punishment of incontinency, or for allowing a separate maintenance 
and alimony to married women, the Supreme Court does not acquire 
a jurisdiction for those purposes. It is difficult to understand 
how such a view of the Subject should he seriously maintained.
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction at all, except by the Act 
of Parliament, and the Charter of Justice; in both of which the 
extent of its powers in ecclesiastical causes is distinctly 
defined. There is no reference, in either of these Instruments, 
to matrimonial causes, or to the Offences which Spiritual Courts 
in England visit with ecclesiastical censures. This subject was 
discussed when the Act and Charter were framed, and the omission 
was not accidental but intentional. It can be supplied (if it
8
be fit to supply it) by no other authority than that of Parliament".
On the same basis, the Letters Patent constituting the
Colony an Archdeaconry within the Diocese of Calcutta expressly
prevented Archdeacon Scott or his successors from exercising "any
9
Authority or Jurisdiction whatsoever in causes ... Matrimonial".
So that the matter might be beyond question, the very detailed
instructions given to Governor Darling directed "that you do not,
upon any pretence whatsoever, propose the Enactment of any Law
or Ordinance ... for the divorce of persons joined together in 
to
Holy Matrimony". There the matter rested for many years.
In 1853 an attempt was made to procure a divorce by the
only possible method in the Colony - a private Act of Parliament.
W. C . Wentworth introduced a Bill to annul the marriage of
n
Patrick Mehan and Emmeline Blake. The Council immediately 
asked the Judges whether such an enactment was within its 
competence, the Judges asserted that it was, so the Council 
passed the Bill. There the matter ended for, although the Bill 
was submitted for Royal assent, the British Government saw to it
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that Her Majesty was not troubled by having to consider the 
measure*
It is a little ironical to discover that Lord Stanley in
I858 sent a despatch in circular form to all colonial Governors
transmitting a copy of the Imperial Act "to amend the law
relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England” - 20 & 21
Vic. c. 85* On the grounds that uniform legislation in all
Colonies was desirable, the letter declared: "It is ... the
wish of Her Majesty*s Government that you should consult your
Council as to the expediency of at once introducing a measure
which shall incorporate, as nearly as the circumstances of the
Colony will admit, the provisions of the Act recently passed in 
tz
England”. Governor Denison, on receiving his copy, referred the
matter to the Executive Council of New South Wales which, after
debate "shelved” the measure because of a then impending
dissolution of Parliament. Evidently the proposal encountered
vigorous opposition from Martin (then the Attorney-General) on
the surprising ground that the Imperial statute was not working
13
satisfactorily in England. A question asked on the subject in
the Legislative Council in 1859 received the prophetic reply
"that this was one of the subjects that would come directly under
the principle of Federation; and that some action had already
been taken upon it in the Colony of Victoria, where a Committee
of the Legislature had prepared the draft of a Bill, which had
been sent up here; this Government, however, did not intend to
14
take any immediate steps in the matter”.
The want of any adequate law having thus been brought to 
public attention, moves were soon made to bring down legislation.
Only a few years later the Parliament of New South Wales 
was considering the first Bill to be submitted to regulate 
Matrimonial Causes in the Colony. On Friday, 6th June, 1862,
Mr. Holroyd presented "A Bill to amend the Law relating to Divorce
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and. Matrimonial Causes in New South Wales". It was read twice 
but became lost in Committee. It was a surprisingly comprehensive 
measure, reciting that it was expedient "to confer upon the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales jurisdiction in matters matri­
monial and also authority in certain cases to decree the dissolution 
of a Marriage". This was in no true sense a proposed amendment of 
any existing statute, but a constitution of a jurisdiction where 
none had existed before. The terms in which the Court was invested 
with new powers were these: "2. As soon as this Act shall come
into operation the Court shall possess and exercise jurisdiction 
in all causes suits and matters matrimonial except in respect of 
Marriage Licenses together with the jurisdiction conferred by this 
Act and the said jurisdiction and all powers and authorities by 
this Act conferred shall and may be exercised in like manner as 
the other powers jurisdictions and authorities given to or vested 
in the said Court.
3. No decree shall be made by the said Court for a Divorce
a mensa et thoro but in all cases in which a decree for Divorce 
a mensa et thoro might have been pronounced in England according 
to the law in force before the passing of the Imperial Act twentieth 
and twenty-first Victoria chapter eighty-five the Court may pronounce 
a decree for judicial separation*
4. Any Judge of the Court shall have full authority either alone 
or with one or more of the other Judges of the Court to hear and 
determine all matters arising therein under this Act except petitions 
for dissolving or annulling Marriage and applications for new 
trials of questions or issues before a Jury bills of exceptions 
special verdicts and special cases and except as aforesaid may
15
exercise all the powers and authority of the Court under this Act".
The Bill went on to provide that all petitions for 
dissolution or nullity of marriage were to be heard by the Pull 
Court, and that applications could be made by husband or wife on
15 ;>
petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Judicial separation 
would be ordered on the application of either party on the grounds 
of adultery, cruelty or desertion without cause for two years and 
upwards. The Bill also contemplated provisions for the payment of 
alimony and for the making of orders for the custody and maintenance 
of children. The law to be applied was governed by section 8s 
"In all suits and proceedings other than proceedings to dissolve 
any Marriage the Court shall proceed and act and give relief on 
principles and rules which in the opinion of the Court shall be as 
nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which 
the Ecclesiastical Courts of England before the passing of the 
said recited Imperial Act acted and gave relief but subject to the 
provisions herein contained and to the rules and orders under this 
Act".
An immediate public response was felt to the Bill, evident
at first in the presentation to the Legislative Assembly of a
large number of petitions from ministers of religion and their
congregations, objecting to the measure on religious grounds, and
complaining of the likely '’deplorable injury to public morality,
and to the permanency of those family relations which lie at the
16
base of all Christian civilization". As against this, some 
citizens of Sydney petitioned the House to proceed with the 
measure as a potential benefit to the community at large. "Your 
Petitioners beg most respectfully to state, that there are many 
persons, at present residents of this Colony, to whom the adoption 
of the Bill would have been a most beneficial measure, as by that 
means they would have been enabled to free themselves from the 
abject misery and degradation they at present have to encounter". 
Summarizing the position, the Sydney Morning Herald stated in an 
editorial: "The Divorce Bill before the Legislature at the
present moment has called forth strong expressions of sympathy 
and dissent, such as we must always expect when questions are
15«
involved that trench upon divided religious opinions. We do not
think, reviewing the whole question, that we could successfully
resist a hill for relief in certain cases, hut we have many
misgivings as to its ultimate effect, and as to the proportion of
good and evil which would result from such a law - and should he
glad to see its operation as limited as possible”.
The Bill did not come into operation at all, so the need to
limit it did not arise. The failure seems to have inspired David
Buchanan to take up the cause of the Bill which he did, in spite
of the Prime Minister's withdrawal of support, with ultimately
successful results. His first attempt in 1862 was a Bill to
amend the law relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes which
was read once, qualifying instantly for a number of public
petitions of protest, hut withdrawn and discharged on the second 
19
reading. In July of the following year he moved for leave to
introduce a Bill of identical terms which was also read once but
discharged before the second reading. In 1870 he introduced the
same Bill again when it was passed by the Assembly and sent to
the Council where it was not passed, the Council postponing its
second reading for six months at the expiration of which time it
20
was "inadvertently not set down amongst the Orders of the Day”.
The usual petitions followed - dozens
in identical terms - protesting "that judicial separations a mensa
et thoro would provide all relief that can reasonably be asked for
by persons who are themselves innocent; that no consideration for
the interests of guilty persons should have weight against the
interests of society at large; and that to give such liberty as
this Bill contemplates to divorced persons to intermarry with
the partners of their crime, would be directly to stimulate the
very evil which the Legislature is attempting to alleviate and to
21
sanction the crime which no doubt it desires to condemn”. The 
petitions received short treatment from Buchanan himself, as may
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be gathered from his speech on the second reading of this Bill
when he said of a group of petitions received from the Roman
Catholic community: "I say boldly that those popish petitions
are worth nothing. They emanate from poor, deluded, priest-ridden
slaves who have basely surrendered their thoughts, their minds,
their independence into the hands of men who live by deluding
them and whose system is built upon the ruins of human liberty,
the wilful and systematic falsification of God’s Word, and the
degradation and debasement of human nature itself ... I know
there will be a great deal of sentimental trash talked about the
danger of passing such a Bill as this. I can almost hear the rush
of that fearful tide of misrepresentation which is sure to set in
when such a measure as the one we are now discussing comes on the 
Z2
carpet”. This address is reported to have occasioned loud cheers 
from both sides of the House.
In March 1871 Buchanan moved:
”(l) That, in the opinion of this House, the law of this country 
in reference to Divorce should be assimilated to the law of England 
and the adjacent Colonies, with the exception of that part of the 
English Divorce Law which denies to the woman equal rights to 
those of the man.
(2) That the present state of the law of this country, in denying 
adequate relief, remedy/or redress in cases of infidelity to the 
marriage vow, is inconsistent with justice, and has necessitated 
application to this House for the remedy by private Bill which 
should be obtainable on application to the Courts of Law.
(3) That unde¿such circumstances this House is of opinion that
the Government should introduce a Bill, either this Session or
early next, or at their convenience, to assimilate the law of
this country in the matter of Divorce to that of England, with
23
the important exception above stated”. This was rejected by the
Legislative Assembly, but his earlier Bill to amend the law
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relating to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes when again put to the
Assembly in that year was passed and referred to the Council.
It was not returned and neither was an identical Bill passed by
the Assembly in 1872. An attempt by Mr. Stewart to bring in a
Bill to authorize Matrimonial Divorce in certain cases reached a
second reading, but expired on the counting out of the House. At
Buchanan’s seventh attempt, a Bill introduced in November, 1872,
Mto confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes” was returned by the Council with some amendments
and Royal Assent was reported in March, 1873«
As the Matrimonial Causes Act this measure became the
foundation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in Divorce. The
Act, also known as 36 Vic. No. 9» conferred jurisdiction in respect
of ’’matters matrimonial’’ and enabled the Court to decree dissolution
of marriages in ’’certain cases”. The Court's power extended to
divorces a mensa et thoro, suits of nullity or for dissolution of
marriage, suits for restitution of conjugal rights or for jactitation
and ”in all causes suits and matters matrimonial (except in respect
2.4-
of marriage licenses)”. In cases where a divorce a mensa et thoro 
would previously have been pronounced in England the colonial Court 
was enabled to pronounce a decree for judicial separation which had 
the same effect as a decree for a divorce a mensa et thoro prior 
to 21 Vic. c. 85. The Chief Justice or one of the Puisne Judges 
was to exercise the jurisdiction, with provision for an alternate 
Judge to represent him during his absence or illness. A right of 
appeal to three or more of the Judges was reserved by section 5 
of the Act. Provision was also made for jury trial of questions 
of fact and general or special verdicts could be returned with 
liberty to the parties to apply for a new trial. In all suits 
and proceedings other than for dissolution the Court was to apply 
as nearly as possible the principles and rules of the Ecclesiastical 
Courts in England effective before the passing of 21 Vic. c. 8 5*
15 »
Procedure in the Court was subject to rules and regulations
which the Court itself was authorized by sections 43 and 48 to
make and lay before Parliament, However, it was prescribed in
the Act that oral evidence in open Court was to be used as far as
possible and that where affidavit evidence was put in, cross-
examination and re-examination on it was to be allowed. In cases
of a wife's petition for judicial separation on grounds of
adulteiy, cruelty or desertion, husband and wife alike were
competent and compellable to give evidence. Commissions could,
by section 12, be granted for the taking of evidence of witnesses
out of the jurisdiction or prevented from attending Court by
illness or other special circumstances.
The constitution of the Court allowed of questions of fact
25
being tried by special or common Jury. It was not mandatory for
the Court to direct jury trial but, if it did so, the question had
26
to be reduced to writing. "The reason", said Parley, CJ., in 
27Jones v. Jones, "is that in Divorce there are no pleadings, in 
the proper sense of the word, and the different questions of fact
to be determined have to be gathered from the statements in the 
petition and answer; accordingly, it is deemed necessary that the 
exact questions in issue should be distinctly stated in writing,
28in order that the Court or the jury may know what they are trying".
Applications to the Court were by petition with supporting 
affidavit of verification and stating that there was no connivance 
or collusion between the parties. The Court was to direct the 
manner in which .service was to be effected and could entirely 
dispense with service in its discretion. The petitioner could be 
examined or cross-examined on oath. The Court had final authority 
in the awarding of costs, section 41 expressly declaring that 
there could not be any appeal on the subject of costs only. The 
enforcement of the decrees and orders of the Court was to
correspond to the practice in the Equity Court
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Section 14> which rendered the parties competent to give
evidence in any lega l proceedings under the Act led to an
2.9
in teresting technical construction in Jones v. Jones. I t  was
intended that the Matrimonial Causes Act should repeal that part
o f the Evidence Act o f 1858 ( 22 Vic. No. 7) which provided that
no spouse should he competent or compellable to disclose any
communication made by the other spouse during marriage. Inadvertently,
30
the Matrimonial Causes Act repealed part o f 22 Vic. No. 10, instead
o f 22 Vic. No. 7» and i t  was submitted that the Evidence Act
remained in force so that the Matrimonial Causes Act, being pro tanto
inconsistent with i t ,  must y ie ld . Holding that the leg is la ture had,
by necessary intendment, repealed No. 7 o f 22 V ictoria , rather
than No. 10, Windeyer, J. , observed that: "during a ll  my experience,
as a practitioner and as a Judge in the Divorce Court, I  can hardly
remember a case in which evidence o f this kind has not been given,
and I  cannot find that such an objection was taken or mentioned
during the time that the Court was presided over by his Honour
S ir W. Manning. For seven years, during which I  have presided,
such an objection has never been taken, and the uniform practice
o f the Court, as fa r  as I  can ascertain, is  to admit evidence o f
that kind. There is  hardly a case in which such evidence is  not
given . . .  I f  there is anything in the objection taken, the Act
31
w ill become unworkable".
Judicial separation was dealt with in a scattered fashion 
in the Act. Section 15 prescribed as the grounds, adultery, 
cruelty or desertion fo r  two years and upwards without cause.
Either husband or w ife could petition , but the making o f a decree 
in the absence o f either party could enable that party to seek a 
reversal o f the decree on showing, in the case of desertion, that 
the alleged offence had a reasonable explanation. From the order 
o f separation the wife was in the same position as a feme sole 
with regard to the acquisition and disposal o f property and the
16 i
d e v o lu t io n  o f  i t  on h e r  d e a th .  T h is  a l s o  a p p l ie d  to  th e  w i f e 's  
c a p a c i t i e s  to  c o n t r a c t  and to  sue  and be su e d .
E i t h e r  h usb and  o r  w ife  was e n a b le d  by s e c t i o n  16 to  p e t i t i o n  
f o r  r e s t i t u t i o n  o f  c o n ju g a l  r i g h t s  w hich  th e  C o u rt c o u ld  g r a n t  
"on b e in g  s a t i s f i e d  o f  th e  t r u t h  o f  th e  a l l e g a t i o n s "  w ith  pow er 
to  aw ard a lim on y  w here i t  c o n s id e r e d  i t  a p p r o p r i a t e .
S e c t io n  22 e n a b le d  a h u sb an d  t o  p r e s e n t  a  p e t i t i o n  f o r  
d i s s o l u t i o n  b e c a u se  o f  h i s  w i f e 's  a d u l t e r y .  A w ife  was a c c o rd e d  
t h a t  r i g h t  on th e  g ro u n d s t h a t  h e r  h usb an d  had b een  g u i l t y  o f  
in c e s tu o u s  a d u l t e r y ,  b igam y w ith  a d u l t e r y ,  r a p e ,  sodom y, b e s t i a l i t y ,  
a d u l te r y  w ith  o r  w ith o u t  d e s e r t i o n  o r  su c h  c r u e l t y  a s  w ould have 
fo u n d ed  an o r d e r  f o r  d iv o r c e  a  m ensa e t  t h o r o . Where a d u l te r y  
was a l l e g e d ,  th e  a d u l t e r e r  was to  be jo in e d  a s  c o - re s p o n d e n t  and  
th e  C o u rt was to  ta k e  s p e c i a l  c a re  i n  s a t i s f y i n g  i t s e l f  t h a t  th e r e  
h ad  been  no co n n iv an ce  o r  c o l l u s i o n .  I f  o th e rw is e  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  
th e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  p r o o f ,  th e  C o u rt c o u ld ,  p u r s u a n t  to  s e c t i o n  2 7 , 
o r d e r  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  m a rr ia g e  by d e c re e  n i s i  i n  th e  f i r s t  
i n s t a n c e  n o t  to  be made a b s o lu te  f o r  a  p e r io d  o f  a t  l e a s t  s i x  
m onths u n le s s  th e  C o u rt s h o u ld  o th e rw is e  o r d e r .  Damages c o u ld  
be c la im e d  from  an a d u l t e r e r  by s e c t i o n  30 a t  th e  s u i t  o f  a  
h u sb a n d .
R e l i e f  i n  th e  form  o f  a lim on y  and o r d e r s  f o r  th e  c u s to d y  o f  
c h i l d r e n  was in c lu d e d  i n  th e  A c t .  P erm an en t a lim o n y  o r  a lim o n y  
p e n d e n te  l i t e  was c o n te m p la te d  by s e c t i o n  29» th e  p ro c e d u re  b e in g  
by d eed  o r  o th e r  ap p ro v ed  in s t r u m e n t .  A lim ony c o u ld  be p a id  to  a  
w ife  d i r e c t l y  o r  to  a t r u s t e e  on h e r  b e h a l f .  B e fo re  f i n a l  d e c r e e ,  
th e  C o u rt was empowered by s e c t i o n  33 to  make p r o v i s io n  f o r  th e  
c u s to d y , m a in te n a n c e  and e d u c a t io n  o f  c h i l d r e n  o f  a  d is p u te d  
m a r r ia g e .  A f t e r  su ch  f i n a l  d e c r e e ,  a  p e rm an en t o r d e r  on s p e c i a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  c o u ld  be m ade. I f  th e  g ro un d  o f  
d iv o r c e  w ere th e  a d u l te r y  o f  a  w ife ,  she  was e n a b le d  by th e  A ct 
to  s e t t l e  h e r  s e p a r a te  p r o p e r ty  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  in n o c e n t
party and the ch ild ren  o f  the marriage*
On d is s o lu t io n  o f  a m arriage, se c t io n  46 p rescribed  th a t, 
provided the time fo r  appeal had elapsed, the resp ectiv e  p a r tie s  
were to  be at l ib e r t y  to marry again as i f  the o r ig in a l marriage 
had been d isso lv ed  by death.
The adm in istration  o f  the Act was l e f t  to the D ivorce Judge.
"I  was appointed the f i r s t  Judge in the Divorce C ourt", said
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Hargrave, J . ,  in  Ex parte Shepherd, "and on me devolved the
burden o f  framing ru les and regu la tion s fo r  the conduct o f  the
business under that A ct. The ru les were framed w ith much care,
and a fte r  some l i t t l e  trou b le , by me, togeth er with the able
assistan ce  o f  the la te  Mr. Robert H. Owen. As the ru les now
stand they are condensed from those framed by Lord Penzance under
the English A ct, and from those in  fo rce  in  the neighbouring Colony 
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o f  V ic to r ia " .
In an attempt to widen the p rov ision s o f  the s ta tu te ,
Buchanan proposed in  1873, 1874 and 1875 a Matrimonial Causes Act 
34
Amendment B i l l .  This was eventually  returned by the Council but 
the Royal Assent was refused in  England.
C ertain  p ro o f o f  the r ig id  con tro l which the Im perial 
L eg isla tu re  continued to w ield  over th is  branch o f  the law is  
a fford ed  in  the disallow ance o f  an amending A ct, 40 V ic . No. 21 
in  1878* This measure was ca lle d  the Matrimonial Causes Act 
Amendment B i l l  and was based on the proposals o f  Buchanan a few 
years b e fo re . I t  had been reserved in  1877« I t  was simply 
intended to equate the r igh ts  o f  men and women in  resp ect o f  
d ivorce  and p a r ticu la r ly  to a llow  a w ife to  p e t it io n  fo r  
d is so lu t io n  o f  marriage on the grounds o f  her husband’ s adu ltery .
In 1878 a short amending sta tu te  was passed as 42 V ic .
No. 3. This repealed the p rov is ion s  o f  the p r in c ip a l Act 
whereby no appeal on the su b ject o f  costs  only could  be heard.
I t  fu rth er p rescribed  that when appeals were brought s o le ly  on
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the question of costs, no security would be required from the 
appellant.
In 1881 another short Act, styled the "Matrimonial Causes
Act Amendment Act” was reserved for approval. Its intention also
was to allow equal rights to women as to men in connexion with
divorce. Thus, a wife was enabled to present a petition for
dissolution on the grounds of her husband’s adultery, achieving
what the British Government had refused in recommending the
disallowance of 40 Vic. No. 21. Speaking of the 1881 statute,
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the compilers of Mackenzie ’ s Practice in Divorce said: ’’The
Act ... gave the wife a right to divorce on the ground of her 
husband’s adultery only, a concession which was not granted by 
English law until 1923» and which formed the first striking 
difference between the law of England and that of this State.
This Act made express and deliberate provision for proof of the 
husband’s domicile in New South Wales at the time of the 
institution of the suit (which) ... seemed to lend some colour 
to the argument that it was intended to give the Court jurisdiction 
under the original Act in cases where the parties had their 
bona fide matrimonial residence in this State. That such is not 
the law, however, is shown by the decision in the case Webb v. Webb; 
and the provision would, therefore, seem to have been unnecessary, 
as domicile had to be proved in all such cases under the original 
Act, in which there was no such provision”.
The Matrimonial Causes Act Amendment Act of I884 was
formally styled the 48 Vic. No. 3» It enabled the Court upon
decreeing dissolution against a husband to order him to pay
maintenance to his wife by weekly or monthly instalments if it
appeared that he was unable to provide security for payment in a
lump sum: it extended the provisions of section 28 of the principal
Act relating to the avoiding of suits for nullity on the ground 
37
of collusion: and it gave the Court a discretion in awarding
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costs to the Crown Solicitor when intervening or showing cause
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against a decree nisi.
In all other respe cts the Act related to the trial of jury
3d
issues as it had been demonstrated in Horwitz v. Horwitz that the 
previous law had insufficient machinery for striking a jury where 
damages were claimed. In that case a husband petitioned for divorce 
on the ground of his wife's adultery. The names of twenty four 
jurors were called in open Court and written down, from which 
list the petitioner and respondent each struck out six. The 
co-respondent claimed to be entitled to strike out six names but, 
because this would render it physically impossible to empanel a 
jury of twelve, his claim was rejected. He was subsequently 
rendered liable in heavy damages by the jury, whereupon he applied 
for a Rule Nisi for a new trial on the grounds that the damages 
were excessive, and that he was entitled to take part in striking 
the jury. Considering section 30 of the Divorce Act, 36 Vic. No. 8,
M i
the Court made the Rule absolute for a new trial. The Chief Justice
found the construction of the section difficult, but he adduced
that as trial was to be in the same manner as for actions for
criminal conversation, a jury should be empanelled under the Jury
Act, 11 Vic. No. 20. His Honour concluded: "If a separate action
had to be brought against this co-respondent, he would, as
defendant, have had an opportunity of striking off six names. He
would not only have had his right of challenge for cause, as
everybody else has, but also his peremptory right of challenge by
striking out these six names. In this case he was deprived of
that right. That being so, it appears to me that there has been 
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a mis-trial". As a result it would be impossible to proceed under 
the existing law because a jury could not be struck unless the 
co-respondent in an action for damages waived his right of 
challenge.
The changes consequently effected by 48 Vic. No. 3 were
shortly as fo llow s*- Forty eight special jurors were to he 
summoned, in the case o f an action fo r damages against a co­
respondent. Where there were several co-respondents the number
o f jurors to he summoned was to he increased to allow o f a ll
42
parties strik ing o f f  s ix  names. The Court o ff ic e r  would then
draw names until such number had been attained as would allow o f
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the empanelling o f a jury o f twelve. The l i s t  o f jurors was to
he delivered to petitioner, respondent and co-respondent or
co-respondents in turn who were each to strike o f f  s ix  names and
the remaining twelve names or, i f  more than twelve, those twelve
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f i r s t  appearing, constituted the jury. Otherwise the governing
law and practice was to fo llow  that operating at the n is i prius
44?
sittin gs o f the Supreme Court. As a saving clause i t  was enacted 
that verdicts o f juries empanelled prior to the passing o f the 
Act were deemed not to he invalidated, reversed or otherwise 
p re jud icia lly  a ffected by the passing o f the Act. The opportunity 
was also taken to declare that i f  in cases under the Divorce Act 
a jury could not reach unanimous agreement within s ix  hours, a 
three-fourths majority verdict could he taken by consent, other­
wise the jury would he discharged on fa il in g  to reach agreement 
within twelve hours.
Mr. Justice Hargrave, who prepared the B il l  fo r  the amending
Act, had also included a provision extending the time within which
desertion was deemed to have occurred to three years. Realizing,
however, that this would cause the whole B i l l  to he reserved fo r
Royal assent, the Judge arranged for the draft clause rela tin g to
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desertion to he withdrawn by the Leg is la tive  Council in committee.
There followed a short Act in 1886 -  50 Vic. No. 12 -  which 
recited that doubts had arisen as to the rights o f parties to 
have contested matters o f fact tried  by a jury in Matrimonial 
Causes. The Act went on to declare that such rights were to 
apply in cases where a decree was sought fo r the dissolution o f
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marriage.
Just as Royal Assent was given in 1886 to 50 Vic. No. 12, 
a simultaneous move was made for even wider relief by the 
introduction in the Legislative Assembly of a Divorce Extension 
Bill. It was the same Bill which six years later was to be 
confirmed as 55 Vic. No. 37» Perhaps the most remarkable circum­
stance of the tussle which ensued between Church and State during 
those six years was the championship of the Bill by the elderly 
Sir Alfred Stephen, former Chief Justice and a sitting member of 
the Legislative Council. The same Sir Alfred almost twenty years 
before had outspokenly criticized David Buchanan*s Divorce Bill 
(enacted as 42 Vic. No. 3) and, as Buchanan himself remarked, it 
was curious that the Chief Justice who had so vigorously condemned
a Divorce law with only one ground for divorce, should take up the
4 8cause of a later enactment having several grounds. Sir Alfred 
Stephen spared no energy in pressing his cause* he published 
pamphlets, addressed public meetings, rallied the support of 
influential politicians and maintained a stream of press publicity 
which at length won success. The achievement was the more 
remarkable as the great majority of the Colony’s religious 
denominations and their spokesmen denounced the proposed law.
The conflict between civil and spiritual leaders deserves a brief 
review.
The Churches* arguments against the Bill were frequently 
as technical as they were various. A Melbourne newspaper of May, 
1887, made this cursory summary of the objections raised*
’’Cardinal Moran, in conformity with the Catholic doctrine, holds 
that the marriage tie is absolutely indissoluble. Bishop Barry 
is equally emphatic in maintaining that divorce is permissible 
for one reason only. The Presbyterians go a step further, claiming
the authority of the Apostle to the Gentiles; while among a dozen
On the one hand Dean
4-9
laymen there are as many different minds”.
William Macquarie Cowper declaimed from the pulpit of St. Andrew's
Cathedral: "The only ground then which can be adduced for
departing from the law of Christ is that of expediency; or what
men think will be conducive to the good of society. And those who
are now striving in this Colony to extend the law of Divorce claim
that they are actuated by the most benevolent and compassionate
motives. We have no reason to doubt that some who are most
prominent in the matter are. They have had experience of so much
suffering, oppression and cruelty, that they are anxious by this
means to afford relief. But is it not a dangerous thing to attempt
to afford relief by legislation which is contrary to the teaching
of our Divine Master? Are we wiser than He? Can we judge better
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than He could what is best for mankind?" On the other hand Canon 
Selwyn repeated his unavailing efforts of 1870 in organizing a 
large number of petitions of objection from Protestants in the 
following terms: "Your Petitioners observe with great sorrow and
alarm that by the Bill now before Your Honourable House, provision 
is being made by which not only Divorce may become possible for 
causes other than those now allowed, but that the remarriage of 
the Divorced persons, the guilty as well as the innocent, is 
provided for and encouraged. It is this part of the Bill which 
your Petitioners look upon with the greatest repugnance, because 
it seems evident that if a husband or wife has been guilty of grave 
breaches of the marriage relation such person ought not to be set 
at liberty by law, to repeat their offence, and be encouraged to 
obtain fresh victims, upon whom their licentiousness may be 
exercised. Your Petitioners also desire with the greatest urgency, 
to draw the attention of Your Honourable House to the declaration 
of the Lord Jesus Christ, that "whosoever marrieth her that is 
put away committeth adultery". Any legislation therefore, that 
provides for the remarriage of one put away is a direct incentive
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to a "breach of the Commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"".
Public opinion was clearly in favour of extensions to the 
SSL
Divorce Law and the clerics failed in their strenuous appeals and
decrees because they were themselves so divided on selecting the
appropriate remedy. The Argus of Melbourne made this comment on
one such brush between the Churches of England and Scotland: "The
ecclesiastical world of Sydney, usually somewhat torpid, has been
suddenly fluttered by the introduction of Sir Alfred Stephen's bill
for amending the law of divorce. Bishop Barry denounced the
proposal from the pulpit, and hastily summoned a conference of
clergy and laymen to concert measures against the dangerous
innovator who is willing to annul the marriage tie in confirmed
cases of desertion, drunkenness and crime. According to the
bishop's interpretation of Scripture there is only one cause for
which divorce ought to be granted, and to go beyond that limit is
to precipitate society into perdition. But the fervid denunciation
of the Anglican prelate has not been allowed to pass unchallenged.
Doctor Steel, a Presbyterian of renown and unquestioned orthodoxy,
comes to the rescue of the bill which has incurred the episcopal
S3
censure, and boldly contradicts the bishop*s theology". The Sydney 
Morning Herald somewhat severely reduced the differences of 
opinion to this formula: "We must either take a theological
settlement of this question or not; if we are to do it, then we 
must abide by somebody's interpretation. But vrtiose interpretation 
is it to be? Cardinal Moran says "Take mine", the Bishop of Sydney 
says "Take mine", Dr. Steel says "Take mine", and the President of 
the Baptist Union says "Take mine". Sir Alfred Stephen shakes his 
head at them all, and says that amid this diversity of interpretation 
he cannot accept any one of them as sufficient authority, and 
therefore, as a statesman, he rests his case on the ground of
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social expediency”*
55
Sir Alfred Stephen in his pamphlet on Australian Divorce Bills
pointed out that the remedy of separation acknowledged by the
canonical law was in truth divorce, though called by a different
name* ’’Where”, he asked, ’’since these are questions not of
expediency or compromise, but of lawfulness in the sight of God,
where in Holy Writ is found the warrant for this evasion? We answer
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for you it cannot be found there”. He further relied on the
theology, inter alia, of Dr. Zachary Barry, that by the authority
of 1 Corinthians, VI, 16, not even separation should be countenanced
by the clerics. To this he coupled a reproach to ’’bishop and dean,
and all the conservators ofthe present cruelty, (who) acquiesce
cheerfully in ’’permanent putting asunder”, and allow of married
persons not cohabiting; an abomination never even thought of, or
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hinted as even possible in Scripture”.
”It is wonderful to reflect”, said the Editor of the Melbourne 
Age after summarizing the public controversy aroused by the Bill,
’’that this eager and widespread conflict has been engendered by a 
very simple reform in the law, proposed by the oldest, most 
experienced, most respected, and usually most cautious, politician 
the neighbouring colony possesses”.
Of greater interest to the legal and political historian is 
the chapter of misadventures which the Bill encountered in the 
Parliaments of the Colony and in England. One cannot but admire 
the resolute persistence of Stephen who, time after time, reformed 
his campaign as he had in turn to overcome the strongest imaginable 
pressures from the Church, from the unrelenting countermands of 
the English Government and from colonial politicians who either 
opposed or did not care about the measure.
When the Bill was first introduced in 1886 in the Legislative
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Council i t  was carried, but on being referred back to the Assembly
was lost in Committee fo r  want o f a quorum. Undaunted, Stephen had
the same measure brought forward in the follow ing year and i t
passed with a l i t t l e  d if f ic u lty  through both Houses. "The debate
was not free from a desire on the part o f some members to shelve
the b i l l  by means o f a count-out", said the Sydney Morning Herald,
"but i t  was satisfactory to see that a majority were opposed to
th is, and that the b i l l  was carried to a division. The numbers in
the division should be some indication to those who are opposed to
the b i l l  that the measure is  not considered to be the dangerous one
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to the community some persons have represented i t  to be". Para­
doxically the B il l  was supported in the Assembly but found its  
opposition this time in the Council where Knox, on the third reading, 
proposed the deletion from the measure o f a l l  the words a fter the 
word "that" with a view to substituting "th is day s ix  months" fo r
"now" in the text. The supporters o f the B ill  allowed i t  to be
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counted out, but i t  was subsequently resubmitted and passed.
The B il l  was obliged to be reserved fo r  Royal assent, but
the Queen was advised not to give her consent fo r  three basic
reasons. F irs t, that the B il l  was in general princip le at variance
with the established Divorce law o f the Empire; secondly that i t
was considered that the B il l  could be read in a manner allowing
o f any B ritish  subject's obtaining a divorce in New South Wales
regardless o f domicile; and, th ird ly, that a mandate should be
sought from the colonists in general e lection  before approval
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could be considered. " I  have only to repeat", the Secretary o f 
State wrote to the Governor, "that her Majesty's Government would 
strongly urge upon your advisers the inexpediency o f enlarging the 
grounds upon which a divorce can be obtained, un til i t  has been 
fu lly  established that the general fee lin g  o f the colony is 
decidedly in favour o f the change, and u ntil a fte r  communication
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with the other Australian colonies it is made clear that they are
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prepared to adopt a similar alteration to their laws”.
The exercise of the prerogative in this fashion served
temporarily to unite the Houses of the Parliament of New South Wales
and when an identical Hill to that of 1887 was introduced hy Neild
in the lower House in 1888, the Council gave every indication of
support. However, they became oreoccupied with a virtual vote of
censure against the Colonial Office which was carried by a large
majority, but the principal Bill was delayed long enough to be lost 
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by dissolution. When again introduced it was "run over by the
6+ 65
prorogation and killed”. Exactly the same befell it in 1889* 
Introduced again in the Council on the first day of the 1890 session, 
the Bill was referred to the Assembly for a second reading and there
failed to secure a quorum despite the appeal of Parkes to the
members that "they were bound by every sense they had of the value
of the right of self-government to send this bill back as a protest
against the interference of the Imperial Government even once, let
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alone time after time". Summarizing the history of the measure at
that period, a contemporary newspaper observed: "The Bill has
passed through the Legislative Council three times, and has also
passed through the Assembly three times. It has been before
Parliament in each of five successive years. It has passed through
the Assembly in a session following a general election, and it has
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never yet been defeated in either house by an adverse vote".
After all of these vicissitudes, the Bill at last became law 
in 1892. The Assembly carried its second reading on 8th February 
by 36 to 20 votes and in the following week the third reading 
passed by 38 to 18 votes. By 25"th February the Council read the 
Bill a second time on a narrower margin of 16 to 12 votes and a 
third time on 15th March by 18 to 7 votes. Royal assent was this
time obtained on 9^1». May, but even then the matter was delayed
through omission to proclaim the allowance of the Act in the 
Government Gazette« A notification to rectify this was much
delayed, and the Act did not take effect until 30th August, 1892*
For a measure which had been so hardly won, the Act was short 
enough. It contained only seven sections of which the first was 
the most substantial. Any married person having been domiciled 
in the Colony for three years could present a petition for the 
dissolution of his or her marriage or for judicial separation on 
any one or more of four grounds. The grounds were continuous 
desertion for three years and upwards; habitual drunkenness for 
three years and upwards and coupled in the case of a husband with 
leaving his wife unsupported or being guilty of cruelty to her 
or in the case of a wife with neglecting or being unable to 
discharge her domestic duties; the imprisonment of the respondent 
for prescribed lengths of time on being sentenced for the commission 
of some crime; the conviction of the respondent within one year of 
the presentation of the petition for the attempted murder of the 
petitioner, or assault and cruel beatings.
The remainder of the Act was of trifling importance. So far
as they could consistently stand, the provisions of the Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1873 and its amendments were to remain in operation
and, in particular, the previous rights of appeal and jury trial 
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were preserved. The Court’s power under the earlier legislation 
to make alimony orders in respect of a wife's property under a 
decree for divorce, was extended also to decrees on suits for
70judicial separation.
The Court had jurisdiction to dismiss a petition where it 
considered that the petitioner's own habits had contributed to 
the wrong complained of. Otherwise, it was to pronounce a decree 
on being satisfied of the proof of the petitioner's case. If it 
was not satisfied that the marriage should be dissolved, but
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accepted a case for judicial separation it could order accordingly.
The Court was given express authority by section 4 to allow 
proceedings in forma pauperis and to prohibit the publication of 
evidence. By section 5 the Court could try issues before a Judge 
on circuit.
The Matrimonial Causes Procedure Amendment Act of 1893 was 
more completely styled "An Act to amend the Law and Practice in 
the Matrimonial and Divorce Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and 
to validate certain proceedings therein”. It was also called 56 
Vic. No. 2)6 .
By section 2 a husband petitioning for dissolution of marriage 
or judicial separation on the ground of his wife’s adultery could 
claim no damages in respect of such offence committed more than 
three years before the filing of the petition. Section 3 enabled 
a respondent to apply to have a decree nisi pronounced absolute if 
the petitioner failed to do so at the expiration of the prescribed 
period. Provision was made by section 4 for deeds or documents 
fraudulently prepared by respondents to defeat petitioners to be 
set aside on such terms as the Court might consider proper. Like­
wise sales of real estate considered to be made with the intention
of defeating a petitioner's claim to costs or alimony could be set 
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aside. The Court was empowered to award costs to parties inter-
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veningor showing cause against a decree nisi and, in any undefended
case could give the wife custody of the children on proof that the
respondent had notice of the petitioner's intention to apply for 
74-
a rule absolute. At any time before final decree on an application
for restitution of conjugal rights (or after such decree, if the
respondent failed to comply) the Court had further power to make
orders for the custody, maintenance and education of children of 
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the marriage. By section 13, a husband applying for restitution 
of conjugal rights could, on establishing to the Court's satisfaction 
that the wife had separate property, obtain an order for the settlement
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of the property for the benefit of the husband, and the children of 
the marriage.
The Act had new provisions concerning the periodical 
payment of alimony or maintenance. By section 12 decrees for 
restitution were no longer to be enforced by attachment. However, 
the Court could order a respondent husband to make periodical 
payments enforceable in the same manner as for orders for alimony 
in suits for judicial separation. Orders for periodical payments 
could be varied or modified by the Court in its discretion pursuant 
to section 14*
Sections 12 to 16 of the Act were based on the Imperial 
statute 47 & 48 Vic. c. 68. One of its most significant measures 
was that embodied in section 15 of the local law, whereby non- 
compliance with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights was 
deemed to be desertion. This applied even though three years had 
not elapsed since the failure to comply.
A few procedural alterations were made by the Act. Section 
9 enabled the parties to suits and their spouses to be admissible 
witnesses. Section 11 conferred on the Registrar of the Court 
power to tax costs, settle issues and deeds, extend time in 
undefended suits, allow proceedings to be carried on in forma pauperis, 
examine witnesses in alimony applications and generally to discharge 
in the Divorce Jurisdiction other necessary duties which, at Common 
Law would be the preserve of the Prothonotary. Section 17 enabled 
the Judge exercising the jurisdiction to refer matters of law to 
the Pull Court for decision, if he thought fit.
By the consolidating Act of 1899 it was declared that ’’there 
shall be vested in the Supreme Court jurisdiction in respect of 
divorces a mensa et thoro suits of nullity of marriage suits for 
dissolution of marriage suits for restitution of conjugal rights 
suits for jactitation of marriage and in all causes suits and 
matters matrimonial (except in respect of marriage licences)”
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This jurisdiction was to be the matrimonial causes jurisdiction of 
77
the Supreme Court and all the powers and authorities conferred by
the Act were to be exercised in the same way as were the other
powers jurisdictions and authorities given to or vested in the Court.
The jurisdiction was to be exercised by a Judge appointed for that
purpose or by any Judge acting in his place or having co-ordinate
jurisdiction with him, the decrees of such Judges having equal
validity to decrees of the Full Court. In all suits and
proceedings, other than those for dissolution, the Court was
empowered to act and give relief as closely as possible in
accordance with the practice and rules of the English Ecclesiastical
78
Courts prior to the passing of 20 &  21 Vic. c. 85* However, as was
79
pointed out by Davidson, J., in C v. C_, this section of the 1899
Act did not "necessitate the adoption of any practice of the
Ecclesiastical Courts unless in the opinion of this Court such
practice is as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and
9o
rules on which those Courts acted"
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CONCLUSION
Viewed at the close of the nineteenth century, the Supreme 
Court of 1824 could only be described as having been dismem­
bered. The sole reminder of its plenary authority lay in the 
direction of appeals from the several jurisdictions to the Banco 
Court! To the litigant who sought damages before an Equity 
Judge, a grant of Probate before a Divorce Judge or an injun­
ction before a Common Lav; Judge, there could be no remedy. He 
had come to the wrong Court, so it was said. He might well have 
enquired on what historical basis he could thus be denied jus­
tice. It cannot be questioned that the Court required special­
ization to function properly and that a case obviously falling 
within one jurisdiction ought not to be heard by a Judge sitting 
in another jurisdiction. Yet from this the fallacious extension 
was made that a Judge sitting in one jurisdiction could not in 
any circumstances hear a case which ought to have originated in 
another jurisdiction. Further again, if a Judge considered that 
a case before him, though partly cognisable in his own jurisdic­
tion, ought in substance to have been brought in another juris­
diction, he might refuse relief and force the parties to proceed 
again in the other jurisdiction. This was often a source of 
hardship. In the High Court in 1910, Isaacs, J., observed that 
"in New South Wales, alone of all the Australian States, does 
there exist the antiquated separation of legal procedure which 
invites ... technical, expensive and protracted litigation ... 
which might very easily (lead) to a gross miscarriage of justice"?
The injustice may be described as stemming from an assimi­
lation of the word "jurisdiction" to the word "Court". Where 
statutes in colonial times regulated the constitution of the 
Supreme Court in its various jurisdictions and the appointment 
of special Judges to control and exercise those jurisdictions, 
it was wrongly assumed that new Courts had thereby been created.
1 8 0
The Equity Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by a type of 
legal fiction became the Equity Court, the Bankruptcy Juris­
diction became the Bankruptcy Court and so on. With the san­
ction of long usage this transparent fallacy so secured the 
concept of a Supreme Court constituted by a number of subor­
dinate Courts that it required the intervention of Parliament 
to attempt ameliorating the severity of the dismemberment. It 
is not appropriate here to consider the Supreme Court Procedure 
Act, 1957^ beyond observing that its machinery for allowing the 
transfer of actions from one jurisdiction of the Court to an­
other in certain cases, in the present submission, adds to the 
confusion. By regarding the separation of jurisdictions as a 
separation of Courts the legislature has countenanced the de­
fect it purported to cure.
A legal historian may be excused for shirking the guise of 
prophet and, in the present case, seeking to foretell whether 
a Judicature Act system would be of benefit in hew South Wales. 
Suffice to say that, on historical grounds, there seems no ne­
cessity for such a change. The Supreme Court has been shown in 
its constitution always to have been a single Court administer­
ing a single law. No legislative change, other than the acqui­
sition of certain State jurisdictions by the Pederal Courts, 
has ever weakened that position, but practice and precedent 
have been responsible for the perseverence of such a monument 
of artificiality and oppression.
181
N O T E S
1. Assuming the appeal was not direct to the Privy Council.
2. Turner v. The New South Wales Mont de Piete Deposit and 
Investment Co, Limited. (1910) 10 CLR, 539 at 554.
3. See generally, 3 SLR 83 ("Law and Equity in New South 
Y/ales after the Supreme Court Procedure Act, 1957", K. S. 
Jacobs), also, for example, Boag v. Lee (1957) 75 WN, 77, 
N.S.W. Rutile Mining Co. Pty. Limited v. Eagle Metal and 
Industrial Products Pty. Limited I960 SR (NSW) 495.
